Individuals behaviour in social dilemma games and the role played by persuasion : theory and experiments. by Levati, Maria Vittoria
Individuals' Behaviour in 
Social Dilemma Games and 
the Role Played by Persuasion. 
Theory and Experiments. 
Maria Vittoria Levati 
DPHIL IN EcONOMICS 
UNIVERSITY OF YORK 
DEPARTMENT OF EcONOMICS AND RELATED STUDIES 
APRIL 2000 
SUPERVISOR: Professor J. D. Hey 
Abstract 
This work is a study of individuals' decisions pertaining to social dilemma 
games. Its main purposes are to propose a new explanation-the persuaszon 
hypothesis-for the cooperative behaviour which people (beyond the game theo- 
retic prediction) are found to exhibit in these kinds of games, and to investigate 
its empirical strength by means of a series of experiments. These experiments 
are specifically designed to assess the validity of my hypothesis in comparison 
with alternative models of cooperative behaviour. 
Two main (contrasting) observations can be drawn from such an empirical 
investigation: persuasion appears to be a plausible explanation for previously 
inexplicable cooperation in a simple linear setting where the subjects' decisions 
are binary, but it fails to explain the data from a more complicated non-linear 
setting where the solutions lie in the interior of the strategy space. 
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than include them in an Appendix of the thesis (as I did for the data from 
Chapter 6's experiment) because of their quantity: 72 subjects took part in 
this experiment, and each subject made 6 decisions in each of 30 periods. 
The data can be read with any text editor, and they are separated according 
to experimental session. Since the experiment consisted of three sessions-each 
of which employed one of three treatments-I have created three directories and 
named them CT (for communication treatment), NCT (for non-communication 
treatment), and NQT (for non-questionnaire treatment). 
Each directory includes the data files of the 24 people who participated in 
the session-treatment to which the directory refers (so that a total of 24 x3= 72 
individual data files are provided). 
In each individual file, there are three tables which pertain to the three 
phases (i. e., supergames) into which each session-treatment was divided. 
In the directories CT and NCT, each of these three tables has six columns 
and ten rows. The latter refer to the number of periods for which the game was 
repeated in each phase. The content of each column is the following: 
i) the first column reports the contribution decisions of the subject; 
ii) the second column reports the motivations he provided for the corresponding 
period-decision; 
iii) the third column reports his guesses of the motivation underlying the second 
group member's period-decision; 
iv) the fourth column reports his guesses of the motivation underlying the third 
group member's period-decision; ' 
v) the fifth column reports his predictions about the next contribution decision 
11 strongly recommend to look at pages 206 and 207 in Appendix B while reading the data 
in columns 2-4, since the lists of nine alternatives among which subjects had to pick out one 
in order to answer the questions to which columns 2-4 refer axe described on these pages. 
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of the second member of his group; 
vi) finally, the sixth column reports his predictions about the next contribution 
decision of the third member of his group. 
In the directory called NQT, each of the three tables showed in each indi- 
vidual file has only one column, which reports the contribution decisions of the 
subject. 
For each individual file and for each of the three phases in it, I also indicate 
who-among the 24 part icipants-were the two partners of the subject. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
My intention in this work is to study people's behaviour in sociaJ dilemma 
settings with the aim of identifying forces and underlying principles behind 
their actions. Social dilemmas are defined by two simple properties: a) each 
individual receives a higher payoff for a socially defecting choice than for a 
socially cooperative one, no matter what the other individuals in the society 
do; but b) all individuals are better off if all cooperate rather than if all defect. 
The specific social dilemma to which the major part of this work is devoted 
is the public goods problem. 
A public good has two essential attributes: non-rivalry in consumption 
and non-excludability. The former characteristic refers to the possibility of 
simultaneous consumption of the same unit of the good by multiple consumers. 
The other characteristic means that it is difficult to prevent consumption of the 
good by those who fail to pay. Hence, when the public good must be financed 
by private arrangements, any individual has an incentive to free-ride on the 
contributions of the others. If everyone follows such an individual incentive, 
the good is provided at an inefficient level; i. e., at a Nash equilibrium level 
which is Pareto dominated by the non-equilibrium outcome where everyone 
contributes to the public good. 
The incentive to free-ride has generated a standard presumption among 
economists that decentralised allocation mechanisms cannot be relied upon to 
provide public goods efficiently (e. g., Samuelson (1954)). The vast resources de- 
voted to the government provision of goods and services in developed economies 
support a general perception that the free-rider problem is pervasive. This 
presumption, however, is not without critics. The claim is that government 
provision of public goods, financed by lump-sum taxes, is not necessarily more 
efficient than private provision of public goods (e. g., Bergstrom et al. (1986)). 
The public broadcasting service (PBS) in the United States, for instance, is 
2 
a private, non-profit corporation whose members are public TV stations, and 
which is almost entirely financed by voluntarily contributions. In contrastl 
public TV stations in Canada are mainly financed by taxes. A comparison 
between the two stations shows that the latter does less well than the former 
both in quality and budget. Noting the large number of Canadian underwriters 
to United States' PBS, one has evidence that Canadians are actually willing to 
make voluntarily contributions to finance quality broadcasting. 
To address the question of the significance of the free-rider hypothesis (i. e., 
that the provision of public goods will not occur at all or will be suboptimal) 
experimenters in economics as well as in psychology started investigating human 
behaviour in well controlled public goods situations in the laboratory. 
What emerges from these early experiments is that-contrary to the the- 
oretical predictions-people are willing to cooperate. Generally speaking, the 
major findings of this vast literature axe the following: 1) in one shot trials 
and in the initial stages of finitely repeated trials, subjects contribute axound 
halfway between the Pareto-efficient level and the free-riding level; 2) contri- 
butions decline with repetition; 3) face-to-face communication improves the 
rate of contributions. ' 
The research problem becomes, lience, to discover when subjects cooperate 
and why they do so. 
The aim of this work is (a) to give an overview of the vaxious theories that 
have been advanced for explaining individuals' cooperative behaviour; (b) to 
present a new hypothesis for such a behaviour; (c) to investigate how well the 
former theories perform in laboratory settings and how much of the previous 
inexplicable cooperation can be explained by my new hypothesis. 
As for point (a), since the full rationality argument for playing the domi- 
nant strategy can be divided into three components: motive (a player prefers to 
have more money to having less), cognition (a player can identify the action that 
best satisfies motive), and choice (a player chooses the action that best satisfies 
motive), and since most theories dealing with dilemma games depart from full 
rationality on one of the three components and rely on it (sometimes implicitly) 
for the other two, in this work, I will classify the existing theories of cooper- 
ative behaviour by the major component of deviation. In particular, altruism 
and equity theories will be regarded as alternative to motive; reciprocity and 
commitment theories as alternatives to choice; reputation building/strategies 
'Extensive surveys of the early experimental studies on voluntary contributions to public 
goods axe presented by Ledyard (1995) and Davis and Holt (1993). 
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hypothesis, confusion and simple learning as alternatives to cognition. 
Examination of several experiments which have been run in order to verify 
the descriptive power of these theories reveals that the issue of which approach 
best explains the data remains open. Each of the models considered have been 
shown to effectively explain outcomes in only some subset of the various ex- 
perimental settings. In other words, no model appears to be able to account 
for all observed cooperation. This suggests that some of the reasons for peo- 
ple voluntarily contributing to public goods remain to be found. Accordingly, I 
propose a new behavioural hypothesis through which I try to explain previously 
inexplicable cooperation. 
This hypothesis relies on persuasion as a valid principle organising be- 
haviour, where persuasion is defined as the intention to influence the others 
in order to make them behave in a way that they otherwise would not. In 
settings like voluntary contribution mechanism environments, the persuasion 
hypothesis rests on two facts: 1) an agent realises that his own payoff is higher 
when other group members contribute to the public good an amount greater 
than the equilibrium rather than the equilibrium amount; and consequently 2) 
in order to get these higher benefits, (if the mechanism is implemented in a 
sequence of periods) he tries to push the others (who are free-riding) towards 
contribution decisions. 
When no kind of verbal communication is allowed, the only way that a 
player has got to signal information to the others is by his choices of moves 
as the game proceeds. Thus, he chooses to contribute a constant amount for 
some consecutive periods (even if the others are making the socially defecting 
choice) because he hopes that through this choice he can edher educate the 
free-riders about the mutual benefits connected to contribution, or reduce their 
uncertainty about the way in which he (himself) will play the game (by raising 
their expectations about his own contributions). In both cases, it is the hope of 
achieving the most favourable outcome for the group (and, hence, for himself) 
that, under the persuasion hypothesis, leads an agent to select a cooperative 
arrangement. In this sense, although the persuasion hypothesis is in the spirit 
of Kant's categorical imperative, 2 it differs from Kant's moral because, under 
my hypothesis, contributions are not conceived as obligations independent of 
any strategic considerations. A persuasive player must, in fact, believe that, 
during the interaction process, his group members are willing to modify their 
2A persuasive agent is, in fact, expected to act in accordance with collective rationality, 
which prescribes a course of action to all players simultaneously, and contrary to individual 
rationality, which prescribes to each player the course of action most advantageous to him 
under the circumstances. 
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initiaJ views (i. e., they are available to be persuaded). For this reason, after 
some periods of unconditionaJ cooperation, he looks at what the others do and 
keeps on the sa; rne contribution decision only if this is reciprocated. 
A similar reasoning implies that, if he is successful in his attempts to push 
the partners towards his own's contribution, the persuasive player perseveres 
with this choice as long as he observes that each of the others does the same; 
otherwise, he modifies it in the direction of the others' average contribution in 
the previous period. There exists, hence, the possibility for him to free-ride 
if other players in his group are free-riding. The persuasive behaviour theory 
appears, therefore, to be compatible with both the observed successes and the 
observed failures of voluntary cooperation. 
Since my interpretation of individuals' cooperative behaviour generates test- 
able predictions which differ from those of earlier theories, its capability of 
accounting for previously inexplicable cooperation can be empirically verified. 
Thus, I shall conduct a series of public goods experiments whose designs allow 
for a direct test of the persuasive behaviour hypothesis and for its comparison 
with earlier theories of cooperative behaviour. 
The experiments combine behaviour with belief-elicitation and (what is less 
common) with an investigation into subjects' motivations for their own deci- 
sions. Asking subjects to motivate their decisions is not only a very straightfor- 
ward way to obtain insights into their decision rules, but it should also induce 
them to be more concentrated on the game, and to think seriously about the 
problem that they face. 
Some previous experiments have attempted to investigate the relationship 
between an individual's decisions and his expectations about his fellow mem- 
bers' next decisions in public good settings. However, most have deceived sub- 
jects about the true contributions of the other players. In contrast to most 
of this previous literature, I will not use any deception. Indeed, I will elicit 
players' expectations by explicitly asking them to predict what the others will 
do in the upcoming period. 
In a further departure from earlier experiments, I will elicit expectations in 
period t for period t+1 after a subject has observed the actual choices made by 
the others in t. On the one hand, this procedure avoids (or, at least, reduces) 
the psychological regularity known as 'falsus consensus effect', according to 
which individuals think others axe like themselves; indeed, if a subject is asked 
to predict the decisions of the other members of his group once a decision has 
been already taken by them (revealing hence their attitude), he should be less 
inclined to believe that others' choices are like his. On the other hand, this 
5 
procedure allows subjects to answer all questions in a unique stage so as to 
divide each period into two parts only. 
Outline of the thesis 
The contents of the next seven chapters will be as follows. 
e In Chapter 2, after presenting some relevant concepts of game theory, I shall 
introduce the specific types of interactive situations to which this work is de- 
voted. I shall describe, hence, a typical public good game by emphasising the 
traditional game-theoretic predictions in it. 
a In Chapter 3,1 shall review the initial laboratory examination of the public 
goods problem. Before starting such a survey, I shall discuss some methodolog- 
ical issues concerning experimentation in economics. 
9 In Chapter 4,1 shall concentrate on the explanations and justifications which 
the modern experimental research provides for the cooperative behaviour ob- 
served in the pioneering works. 
a In Chapter 5,1 shall present my 'persuasion' theory and I shall elaborate 
how persuasive behaviour can be used in public goods settings as instrument 
to achieve cooperation. 
9 The empirical analysis of the validity of my hypothesis and of its relevance in 
comparison with former theories of cooperative behaviour will start in Chapter 
6. Here, as domain for this analysis, I shall use a simple three-player dilemma 
game with a standard linear public good specification whose theoretical solu- 
tions (the Nash equilibrium on one side, and the social optimum on the other) 
should be immediately clear to all subjects. 
e In Chapter 7, the voluntary contribution mechanism environment in which 
people interact will be complicated by taking into account games with interior 
solutions which (according to various authors) introduce scope for potentially 
confounding effects. 
9 Chapter 8 concludes and discusses the potential contribution of this study 
to a positive theory of public good games. 
Chapter 2 
Game theory and social 
dilemma games 
2.1 Introduction 
The standard theory of choice, as developed by economists, is rational-choice 
theory. A main distinction that applies to rational choice situations is that 
between parametric and strategic decisions. 
In a parametric setting, an agent faces external constraints that axe in some 
sense given or parametric; first he estimates them as well as he can, and then he 
decides what to do. In such a setting an individual's choice is defined 'rational' 
if it is the choice which best satisfies his objectives. 
In a strategic setting, individuals' decisions are interdependent. Before mak- 
ing up his mind, each agent has to anticipate what others are likely to do, which 
may require an estimate of what they anticipate that he will do; his decision 
enters as part-determinant of the constraints that shape his decision. 
The branch of social science that studies strategic decisions and individuals' 
interaction is game theory. One can identify three types of strategic decisions 
and game theory: ideal-normative theory, prescriptive theory, and descriptive 
theory. 
In ideal-normative game theory one assumes fully rational decision mak- 
ers and also common knowledge of full rationality, and then analyses strategic 
behaviour under these conditions. "The assumptions are not realistic, but nev- 
ertheless ideal normative game theory is an important intellectual pursuit. The 
consequences of ideal normative game theory are of great philosophical signifi- 
cancel' (Selten 1994, p. I). 
In prescriptive game theory the point of interest is what should be done if 
the participants in the game are not fully rational. 
2.2 Game theoretic approach to individuals' interactions 7 
In descriptive game theory one is not interested in the topic how players 
should act, but how they actually act. 
This chapter will be concerned only with ideal normative game theory. First, 
some relevant concepts of this approach and its cognitive foundations will be 
sketched. Then, the specific type of interactive situations to which this thesis 
is devoted (social dilemmas in general, and public goods games in particular) 
will be introduced. Finally, the normative game-theoretic predictions in these 
kinds of situations will be discussed. 
The analysis of how people actually behave in social dilemma games and 
public goods experiments will be the topic of the next chapter. 
2.2 Game theoretic approach to individuals' inter- 
actions 
Game theory can be formally defined as "the study of mathematical models of 
conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers" (Myerson 
1997, p. 1). 
In the past two decades, it has been increasingly adopted by several branches 
of the social sciences as well as by practical decision-makers. Two eminent game 
theorists explain this how follows: "Game Theory may be viewed as a sort of 
umbrella or 'unified field' theory for the rational side of social science... [it] does 
not use different, ad hoc constructs... it develops methodologies that apply in 
principle to all interactive situations" (Aumann and Hart 1992, p. 3). 
A similar view is held by Elster (a well-known social theorist) who affirms: 
"If one accepts that interaction is the essence of social life, then... game theory 
provides solid microfoundations for any study of social structure and social 
change" (Elster 1982, p. 477). 
All this interest is not difficult to understand. Modern game theory may 
be said to begin with the work of Zermelo (1913), Borel (1921), von Neumann 
(1928), and the great seminal book of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). 
In the language of game theory, a game refers to any social situation involving 
two or more individuals who have some understanding of how the outcome 
for 
one is affected not only by his own actions by also by the actions of all others. 
This is quite extraordinary. "Prom crossing the road in traffic, to decisions to 
disarm, raise prices, give to charity, join a union, produce a commodity, 
have 
children, and so on, it seems that we will be able to draw on a single model of 
analysis: the theory of garnes" (Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis 
1995, p. 2). 
As far as its specific solution techniques are concerned, the major successes 
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of game theory have come primarily from formalising common-sense intuitions 
in ways that allow analysts to see how such intuitions can be applied to fresh 
contexts and extended to sEghtly more complex formulations of situations. 
Game theory provided the few tools needed to frame and analyse theoreti- 
caJly unmanageable strategic behaviours in a mathematical theory. ' This is 
predominantly how game theory makes a contribution: it helps to clarify some 
fundamental issues and debates in social life. 2 In this sense, its contribution 
is largely pedagogical. By repeating Selten's (1994) statement: "... ideal nor- 
mative game theory is an important intellectual pursuit. The consequences of 
ideal normative game theory are of great philosophical significance". 
The beginnings of this theory are presented here. Some formalism is nec- 
essaxy in such a presentation because the English language is not equipped 
enough to express the appropriate ideas compactly. Without some formalism 
it is, therefore, easy to get confused. 
2.2.1 The assumptions of game theory 
Rationality 
An individual is rational if he makes decisions consistently in pursuit of his own 
objectives. In game theory (building on the fundamental results of decision 
theory) it is assumed that each player's objective is to maximise his expected 
utility. 
This idea goes back to Bernoulli (1738), but its modern justification is due 
to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). Using remarkably weak assumptions 
about how a rational decision-maker should behave, 3 they show that for any 
rational decision-maker there exists a way of assigning utility numbers to the 
various possible outcomes that he cares about, such that he would Oways choose 
the option that maximises his expected utility. Such a result is called expected- 
utility maximisation theorem. 
When there is uncertainty, expected utilities can be defined and computed 
only if aJl relevant uncertain events can be assigned probabilities, which quan- 
titatively measure the likelihood of each event. Ramsey (1926) and Savage 
(1954) showed that, even where objective probabilities cannot be assigned to 
some events, a rationa. 1 decision-maker should be able to act as if he knew all 
1 The Economist newspaper (24 December 1988) wrote about Jean Tirole: "Drawing on 
game theory and other strange techniques, [Tirole's] approach began to make sense of strategic 
behaviour that had seemed theoreticaJly unmanageable". 
2Cf., Kreps (1990); Myerson (1997); and Haxgreaves-Heap and Vaxoufakis (1995). 
3partirUlarly, the assumptions on the agent's preferences axe the following: reflexivity, 
completeness, transitivity, continuity, non-satiation, and convexity. 
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the subjective probability numbers that are needed to compute these expected 
values. 4 
However, when we move from parametric to strategic settings (in which two 
or more decision-makers interact) a special difficulty arises in the assessment 
of subjective probabilities. For example, suppose that one of the factors that 
is unknown to some individual I is the action to be chosen by some other 
individual 2. To assess the probability of each of individual 2's possible choices, 
individual I needs to understand 2's behaviour, so I may try to imagine himself 
in 2's position. In this thinking process, 1 may realise that 2 is trying to 
rationally solve a decision problem on his own and that, in order to do so, he 
must assess the probabilities of each of individual 1's possible choices. Indeed, I 
may realise that 2 is trying to imagine himself in 1's position, to figure out what 
1 would do. So the rational solution to each individual's problem depends on 
the solution to the other individual's problem. Neither problem can be solved 
without understanding the solution to the other. 
The assumption of common knowledge is direct exactly to place some con- 
straints on people's subjective expectations regarding the others' actions. 
Common knowledge 
The formulation of common knowledge was first given by Lewis (1969) in a 
philosophical study of conventions. 
Aumann (1976) came up with the idea independently in a different context. 
By following him, we say that a fact is common knowledge among the players 
if every player knows it, every player knows that every player knows it, and so 
on; hence, every statement of the form "(every player knows that)k every player 
knows it" is true for k= 01 11 2,... 00. 
A player's private information is any information that he has that is not 
common knowledge among all the players in the game. 
In general, whatever game model one may choose to study, the methods of 
game theory compel him to assume that this model must be common knowledge 
among the players. A game whose structure is common knowledge is called 
game with complete information. 5 
On the other hand, one can define a game with incomplete information as 
a game in which-at the first point in time when the players can begin to plan 
4 See also Friedman and Savage (1948). 
5 The structure of a game consists of its players, the decisions they face and the infor- 
mation they have when making them, how their decisions determine the outcome, and their 
payoffs for earch outcome. The structure incorporates any repetition, correlating devices, or 
communication possibilities. (Cf., Gomes, Crawford and Broseta (1996)) 
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their moves--some players have already private information about the game 
that others do not know. This initial private information is called the type of 
the player. 
Games with incomplete information are studied by reducing them to games 
of complete information using a methodology introduced by Harsanyi (1967- 
68). For example, I may be in doubt whether my opponent at chess is really 
aiming to win or whether he wants to lose. Harsanyi would say that this 
should then not be seen as a two-player game with perfect information (where 
everybody knows what has happened previously in the game), but as a game 
with imperfect information with at least three players and where the opening 
event is a chance move that selects the type of my opponent. 
A standard procedure is to take for granted that every player attaches the 
same probabilities to the possible outcomes of such a chance move. 
It was Aumann (1976) who suggested that rational players will come to hold 
the same information. In particular, he asked whether rational players can agree 
to disagree by maintaining different probabilities for the same event, when (as 
happens in a game of incomplete information) the probabilities that they attach 
to the possible outcomes of chance events are common knowledge. His answer 
is that this is impossible. Intuitively, each player will use his knowledge of other 
players' estimates of the probabilities to refine his own estimate and this will 
continue until all the estimates are the same. 6 
However, Aumann requires a strong assumption in order to reach his result. 
He refers to it as the "Harsanyi doctrine". The idea is that before receiving 
any data, rational agents are all in the same position and therefore assign the 
same probabilities prob(w) >0 to the states wGQ. Moreover, these prior 
probabilities are common knowledge among the players. Hence, the Harsanyi 
doctrine is that there is common knowledge of a common prior. Later, the 
players have different experience which lead them to revise their probability. 
The current probabilities that they attach to the states wEQ are posterior 
probabilities obtained by Bayesian updating from the given common prior. And 
it is in this sense that it is common knowledge that these posterior probabilities 
are equal. 
6See Bacharach (1985) for a more general expression of the idea. 
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2.2.2 The elements of game theory 
The representation of games and some notation 
The analysis of any game must begin with the specification of a model that 
describes the game. Several different forms axe used, the most important of 
which are the extensive (or dynamic or tree-diagram) form and the strategic 
(or normal) form. 
A tree-diagram shows the possible events that could occur in a game. The 
tree consists in a set of branches (or line segments), each of which connects 
two points that axe called nodes. The first node in the tree is the root and 
represents the beginning of the game. The nodes that axe not followed by any 
further branches are called terminal nodes and represent the possible ways in 
which the game may end. Each possible sequence of events that could occur 
in the game is represented by a path of branches from the root to one of these 
terminal nodes. When the game is actually played, the path depicting the 
actual sequence of events that will occur is called the path of play. The goal of 
game-theoretic analysis is to try to predict the path of play. 
A simpler way to represent a game is to use the strategic form. To define a 
game in strategic form, we need only to specify the set of players in the game, 
the set of options available to each player, and the way that players' payoffs 
depend on the options that they choose. 
Formally, a strategic form game is any IF of the form 
(N, (Ci)iENi (Ui)iEN)i 
where N is the set of players; Ci is the set of (pure) strategies available to Z 
(Vi E N); and ui is a function from C= XjENCj into the set of real numbers 
R. Here C denotes the set of all possible combinations or profiles of strategies 
that may be chosen by the various players, when each player j chooses one of 
his strategies in Cj. Given any strategy profile c= (Cj)jeN in C, the number 
ui(c) describes the expected utility payoff that player i would get in the game 
if c were the combination of strategies implemented by the players. When 
a strategic form game is studied, it is usually assumed that the players all 
choose their strategies simultaneously; hence, there is no element of time in 
this analysis. 
Domination and rationability 
How should (or would) a rational person play a game? The simplest way pro- 
posed by game theorists suggests him to weed out strategies which axe strate- 
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gically inferior by means of a step-by-step logic. Such elimination of strategies 
relies on what is called dominance reasoning. 
To formally define dominance, we must first develop additional notation and 
illustrate the concept of best-response strategy. 
For any player i, let C-i denote the set of all possible combinations of 
strategies for the players other than i. Given any e-i in C-i and any d, in Ci, 
(e-j, di) is the strategy profile in C such that the i-component is di and all 
other components are as in e-j. 
Let A(C) be the set of all probability distributions over the set of strategy 
profiles for all players in 1P. If player i believes that some distribution q in 
A(C_j) predicts the behaviour of the other players, so each strategy combina- 
tion e-i has probability q (e-i) of being chosen, then the rational player i wants 
to choose his own strategy in Ci to maximise his own expected payoffi 
Player i's set of best responses to q is the set of i's strategies that maximise 
his payoff function. Formally, it is: 
argmax 1: 71(e-i)ui(e-i, di). 
diC-Ci 
e-i(z-C-i 
A randomised strategy for any player i is a probability distribution over Ci. 
Thus, A(Cj) denotes the set of all possible randomised strategies for i. For 
any pure strategy ci in Ci and any randomised strategy oj in A(Cj), a(ci) is 
the probability that i would choose ci if he were implementing the randomised 
strategy ai E A(Cj). 
A strategy di in Ci is strongly dominated for player i iff there exists some 
randomised strategy ci in A(Cj) such that: 
ui(c-i, di) < 1: ui(ei)ui(c-i, ei), Vc-i E C-i- 
eieCi 
Alternatively, we can say that di is strongly dominated if and only if it can 
never be a best response for i, no matter what he may believe about the other 
players' strategies. This fact suggests that eliminating a strongly dominated 
strategy for any player i should not affect the analysis of the game, because 
player i would never use this strategy, and this fact should be evident to all 
other players if the hypothesis of common knowledge of rationality holds. 
After one or more strongly dominated strategies have been eliminated from 
a game, other strategies that were not strongly dominated in the original game 
may become strongly dominated in the game that remains, and therefore they 
can be eliminated as well. 
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The process of successive elimination of strongly dominated strategies con- 
tinues until no strategies can be further eliminated. Let Ci(') denote the set 
of player i's strategies that remain after iterative elimination of strongly domi- 
nated strategies. 
If Di is a nonempty subset of Ci representing the set of strategies that player 
i might actually choose, then it can be shown that 
Di C Ci(oo), 
This means that, when all players are rational and there is common knowledge 
of rationality, no player can be expected to use any strategy that is iteratively 
eliminated by strong domination. 
Thus, this first and weakest solution concept predicts only that the outcome 
of the game should be some profile of iteratively undominated strategies in 
XiENCi(cýo), In many games, however, strong-dominance reasoning does not 
offer clear (or useful) predictions of what might happen. 
One way to eliminate more strategies is to do iterative elimination of weakly 
dominated strategies. 7 But it is hard to argue that such a process would not 
affect the analysis of the game, because weakly dominated strategies could be 
best responses for a player if he feels confident that some strategies of other 
players have probability 0. Furthermore, the order in which weakly dominated 
strategies are eliminated may matter. 8 
Let us now suppose that all players choose their strategy independently. If 
the solution concept just introduced predicts that each player j will choose his 
strategy in the set Dj and if the assumption of common knowledge of rationality 
is true, then player i should choose a strategy that is best response to the other 
players' independent randomisation over their Dj sets. Let Hi(D-i) be the set 
of such best responses. If all players are rational and this is common knowledge, 
7A strategy di in Ci is weakly dominated for player i iff there eycists some randomised 
strategy oi in A(Cj) such that: 
ui(c-i, di) !ýE oi(ei)ui(c-i, ei), Vc-i E 
C-i, 
ejECi 
and, for at least one strategy combination 6-i in C-j: 
ei ECi 
8To avoid this order problem, Samuelson (1989) suggested that we might 
look for the 
largest sets (Dj)iEN such that, for each player i, Di is the set of all strategies 
in Ci that 
would not be weakly dominated for player i if 
he knew that the other players would only use 
strategy combinations in D-i = XjEN-jDj. However, 
Samuelson himself showed that there 
exist games for which no such sets exist. 
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then the solution concept should satisfy: 
Di C Hi(D-i), Vi E N. 
Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) have shown that there exist sets (Dj*)jEN 
that satisfy (2.1) such that, for any other (Dj)jEN that satisfies (2.1), 
Di 9 Dý Vi E N. z 
The strategies in Dý are called rationalisable strategies. Any rationalisable z 
strategy is a best response to some combination of independent randomisations 
over rationalisable strategies by the other players; that is, 
Di* = Hj(D* J, Vi G N. 
It is straightforward to check that Dj* Cj(00) in general and that Dj* = Cj(") 
for two-player games. That is, rationalisable strategies, in general, are a subset 
of the set of strategies that are left when the process of successive elimination 
of strongly dominated strategies is completed; while, in two-player games, they 
coincide with such a set. 
The Nash equilibrium 
This subsection introduces the most powerful, popular and controversial tool 
of game theory. It comes from John Nash who gave this discipline, through a 
number of seminal papers in the 1950s, an impetus and character that it retains. 
In these papers, he addresses precisely the problem of multiple rationalisable 
strategies by seeking to place further restrictions on the beliefs which a rational 
player will entertain. 
In Subsection (2.2.1), 1 presented the so-called Harsanyi doctrine, which 
(together with the Aumann argument over the impossibility of agreeing to dis- 
agree) implies consistent alignment of beliefs (henceforward, CAB). Put infor- 
mally, the latter notion means that no instrumentally rational person can expect 
another similarly rational person who has the same information to develop dif- 
ferent thought processes. Or, alternatively, that no rational person expects to 
be surprised by another rational person. 
Starting from the assumption of CAB, Nash developed his solution concept. 
To illustrate his argument, let us therefore suppose that players' beliefs are con- 
sistently aligned. Then each player i would want to choose the pure strategies 
that maximise his expected payoff, and there should be zero probability of his 
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choosing any strategy that does not achieve this maximum. That is, 
if oi(ci) >0 then ci E axgmax ui(u-i, [dj]) (2.2) 
diECi 
where oi(ci) represents the probability that i would choose ci, and ui(U-i, [di]) 
is i's expected payoff if he uses the pure strategy d, while all other players 
behave independently according to the randomised-strategy profile o,. 
A randomised-strategy profile a is a Nash equilibrium iff it satisfies condi- 
tion (2.2) for every player i and every ci in Ci. 9 
Thus, a randomised-strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if and only if 
no player could increase his expected payoff by unilaterally deviating from the 
predictions of the randomised-strategy profile. That is, o, is a Nash equilibrium 
ifflo 
ui(o, )>ui(c-i, -ri), ViEN, V-riEA(Ci). (2.3) 
Put differently, we can say that a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if its 
implementation is not inconsistent with the expectations of each player about 
the others' choices, or also that Nash strategies are the only rationalisable ones 
which, if implemented, do not contradict the expectations on which they were 
based. This is why they are often referred to as self-confirming strategies or 
why it can be said that this equilibrium concept requires that players' beliefs 
are consistently aligned. 
Notice that a corollary of definition (2.3) is that Nash equilibria are formed 
by strategies that are best responses to each other. This reveals the connection 
between this equilibrium concept and CAB from another angle. If one accepts 
the Harsanyi doctrine and all players face the same information about the rules 
of the game, then one will accept that the players will draw the same inference 
about how rationality requires them to play. We assume common knowledge of 
rationality; so the players will expect that the uniquely rational way of playing 
will be followed. The question is: what is it? If there is one way 
for rational 
agents to play and they are aJl rational, then it follows that this uniquely 
rational way must satisfy the condition of specifying strategies which are 
best 
responses to each other. Otherwise a player, by not selecting a 
best response, 
will not be acting rationally. Thus one may not be able to see 
immediately 
what the uniquely rational way of playing is, but he can naxrow the answer 
9Cf., Nash (1951). 
1OFor a proof of the equivalence between condition (2.2) and the 
following condition (2.3) 
see, for instance, Myerson 
(1997). 
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down because of his knowledge that, when there exists a uniquely rational way, 
then it will have to be formed by strategies that are best responses to each 
other; i. e., they must be in Nash equilibrium. 
The thinking behind the Nash equilibrium is in many respects quite bril- 
liant. By putting more restrictions on the beliefs hold by rational players, it 
arrives at a simple conclusion which corresponds to the highest degree of mutual 
respect of everyone's mental capacities. In more practical terms, it can furnish 
a set of solutions that are significantly smaJler than the sets of rationalisable 
or iteratively undominated strategy profiles. It is thus no wonder that game 
theorists, as well as many social theorists, have embraced the Nash concept. 
Nevertheless (as many game theorists admit, " and as will be pointed out at 
the end of Chapter 3) there exist reasons for being cautious. 
Subgame-perfect equilibria 
The concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium was defined for extensive-form 
games by Selten (1965; 1975; 1978). 
Let 171 denote an extensive-form game. For any node x in I", let F(x) be 
the set of all nodes and branches that follow x, including the node x itself. We 
say that x is a subroot if any player who moves at x or thereafter knows that 
the node x has occurred. A subgame of Ie is any game which can be derived 
from re by deleting all nodes and branches that do not follow some subroot x 
and making that node x the root of the subgame. 
Let ]pe be a subgame of IF' which begins at a subroot x. If node x occurred X 
in the play of re, then it should be common knowledge among the players who 
move thereafter that they were playing in the subgame beginning at x. That is, 
a game theorist who was modelling this game after node x could describe the 
commonly known structure of the situation by the extensive-form game ]pe, and X 
could try to predict players' behaviour just by analysing this game. Rational 
behaviour for the players in re at node x and thereafter must also appear 
x. Thus, 
Selten (1965; rational when viewed within the context of the subgame re 
1975) defined a subgame-perfect equilibrium of Ie to be any equilibrium of Ire 
which is also an equilibrium for every subgame of re. In other words, subgame- 
perfect equilibria require that an equilibrium should remain an equilibrium 
when it is restricted to a subgame, which represents a portion of the original 
game that would be common knowledge if it occurred. 
" See, for instances, Binmore (1990); Kreps (1990); and Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis 
(1995). 
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2.3 Social dilemma games: definition and relevance 
Interest in sociaJ dilemmas has grown dramatically in the past 20 years among 
humanists, scientists and philosophers. Social dilemmas are defined by two 
simple properties: (a) the payoff to each individual for defecting behaviour is 
higher than the payoff for cooperative behaviour, regardless of what the other 
society members do, yet (b) aJ1 individuals in the society receive a lower payoff 
if all defect than if all cooperate. 
This section reviews the structure and ubiquity of social dilemma problems, 
outlines the specific dilemma game (i. e., the public goods problem) analysed 
here, and then emphasises the game-theoretic prediction in such a dilemma. 
2.3.1 Introduction to the logic of social dilemmas 
A social dilemma is, by definition, a situation in which each group member gets 
a higher payoff if he goes after his individual interest, but the whole group is 
better off if all group members pursue the common interest. 12 
Examples abound. During pollution alerts in some areas, residents are asked 
to ride bicycles or walk rather than to drive their cars. Each person is better 
off driving rather bicycling or walking; yet all the residents are worse off using 
their cars and maintaining the pollution than they would be if all bicycled or 
walked. 
Soldiers who fight in a big battle can reasonably conclude that no matter 
what their comrades do they personally are better off taking no chances; yet if 
no-one takes chances, the result will be a rout. 
Or consider the position of a wage earner who is asked to use restraints 
in his saJary demand. Doing so will hurt him a lot; yet if aJl fail to exercise 
restraints, the result will be high inflation from which all will suffer. 
Women in India may outlive their husbands and, for the vast majority who 
cannot work, their own old age's source of support would be their male sons. 
Thus, each woman achieves the highest social payoff by having as many children 
as possible. Yet the resulting overpopulation makes a social security or old-age 
benefit system impossible, so that all the women are worse off than they would 
have been if they had all practised restraints in having children. 
Some of these examples come from the three crucial problems of the modern 
world: resource depletion, pollution and overpopulation. In most societies, it is 
to each individuaJ's advantage to use as much energy, to pollute as much, and 
to have as many children as possible. Yet the result is to exceed the "carrying 
12 For a precise definition of social dilemmas see, for instance, Dawes (1975; 1980). 
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13 capacity" of "spaceship eartliý', an excess from which all people will eventually 
suffer. It is these dilemmas, which axe particularly globaJ and pressing, that 
have attracted the most attention among social thinkers. 
Probably one of the most influential article on such a topic is Garrett 
Hardin's (1968) Tragedy of the Commons. In it (p. 1244), Hardin argues that 
modern humanity as the result of the ability to overpopulate and overuse re- 
sources faces a problem anaJogous to that faced by herdsmen using a common 
pasture. Haxdin's situation does indeed result in a social dilemma, ajthough 
not all social dilemmas have that precise form. In particular, it is a dilemma 
situation in which the external consequences of each herdsman who is trying 
to maximise his own profits axe negative, and these negative consequences out- 
weigh the positive ones to him. This brings the economic concept of externality 
to mind. 14 In Hardin's commons (as in almost all social dilemmas) the exter- 
nalities are negative and greater than the individual's payoff. 
2.3.2 The public goods (free-riding) problem 
The public goods problem is a typical social dilemma (in the sense that it meets 
the two conditions stated at the beginning of this section) and it is essentially 
an externality problem. Individuals have scarce resources to allocate among 
alternative uses. Resources allocated to some uses benefit only the individual, 
while resources allocated to other uses benefit others besides the individual. An 
individual who decides to allocate resources on the basis of private costs and 
benefits will neglect these external benefits and allocate too few resources to 
those uses from which others benefit. 
A typical symmetric public good game can be modelled in the following way. 
There are N identical players, each of which is endowed with m tokens. These 
tokens can be either contributed to a public good (and used to produce units 
of this good) or privately consumed. Let gi denote the amount contributed to 
the public good by player i (Vi E N), with gi =: 10,1,2,..., ml. Each player's 
earnings from private consumption is simply the amount consumed; i. e.: (m - 
gi). Each player's earnings from contributions to the public good is a multiple 
j=1 gj. The payoff function of of the surn of all players' contributions; i. e.: V EN 
13 Cf., Hardin (1976). 
14 "We can define an externality as being present whenever the behaviour of a person affects 
the situation of other persons without the explicit agreement of that person or persons" 
(Buchanan 1971, p. 7). 
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a representative individual i typically is linear and takes the following form: 
NN 
Ui=U(gi, l: gj)=(M-gi)+vl: gj, ViEN. (2.4) 
j=l j=l 
The marginal rate of substitution of public contributions for private con- 
sumption, or marginal per capita return (MPCR), is here equal to v. Let us 
assume that: 
I 
- <v < N (2-5) 
Inequality (2.5) creates a dilemma situation as defined before. When all the 
others contribute m to the public good, player i's (Vi E N) payoff is always 
higher if he does not contribute anything than if he contributes m; i. e., 
U(O, (N - I)m) > U(m, Nm); 
but universal contributions among the N players leads to a greater payoff than 
does universal defection; i. e., 
U(m, Nm) > U(O, 0). 
What should one expect to happen in this simple public good game? 
2.3.3 Game theoretic predictions 
Given inequality (2.5), the unique dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium of the 
game is, for each subject, contributing nothing to the public good. Indeed, 
each one token contributed yields only v to its contributor (and costs him 1) 
no matter what the others do. However, if everyone chooses the equilibrium, 
the resulting outcome is less preferred by all players to that resulting from all 
group contributing. The equilibrium is, therefore, not Pareto efficient. "9 
Hence, the public goods (free-riding) problem can be identified as one in 
which all players have dominating Nash strategies that result in a non Pareto 
efficient equilibrium. 
If Nash equilibria can be interpreted as describing how rational players 
should play the game, then rational individuals should expect to all do rel- 
atively badly in this game. 
15 An outcome of a game is (weakly) Pareto efficient iff there is no other outcome that would 
make all players better off. 
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Repeated public goods games 
People may behave quite differently toward those with whom they expect to 
have a long-term relationship than toward those with whom they expect no 
future interaction. For instance, it becomes possible to condition what one 
does on what his partners have done in the previous rounds. Thus one can 
punish or reward the others depending on their past behaviour. Likewise one 
learns things about his partners from the way in which they have played, and 
he can exploit such learning by using early rounds of the game to develop and 
secure a reputation in later rounds. Therefore the analysis of repeated games 
promises further insights regarding the behaviour that we may expect from 
rational players. 
(i) The finitely repeated game 
When the game is repeated a fixed number of times (that is, when the players 
know in advance when the game will end), repetition does not encourage people 
to contribute. To understand why this happens, suppose that it is common 
knowledge that the game will be played for exactly 100 rounds. Then, at the 
last (100th) round, contributing to the public good cannot induce any further 
contributions by the other players (because there is no future; the last play is, 
after all, just a one-shot version of the game); so there is no reason for each 
player to contribute. Hence, all rational players should contribute 0 at the 
100th round, no matter what the prior history might be. At the 99th round, 
the players must know that their moves will have no impact on the 100th- 
round moves, so they should contribute 0 on the penultimate round as well. 
Working backward through the game, it is straightforward to verify that the 
unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is to contribute 0 at every round. 16 
(h) The randomly-infinitely repeated game 
Suppose now that the number of times that the game will be played is a random 
variable, unknown to the players until the game stops. In this case, contributing 
behaviour can be supported in equilibrium. The key is that, whenever the 
players meet, they believe that there is a high probability that they will play 
again; so the hope of inducing future contributions by the other players can 
give each player an incentive to contribute. 17 
In infinitely repeated games with standard information (which represent sit- 
uations in which a group of individuals face exactly the same situation infinitely 
"See J. W. Friedman (1986). 
"On this point see Myerson (1997, p. 309), who explains the concept for the repeated 
prisoner's dilemma. 
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often and always have complete information about each other's past behaviour), 
a strategy for a player is a rule for determining his move at every round as a 
function of the history of moves that have been used at every preceding round. 
One celebrated strategy for repeated games like the social dilemmas is the so- 
called tit-for-tat strategy. Under it, a player chooses to cooperate in the first 
round, and thereafter chooses the same move of his partners in the preceding 
round. 
If all players follow the tit-for-tat strategy, then, in every round, the actual 
outcome can be that in which all cooperate if the discount factor of average pay- 
off assumes specific values. However, even if it is an equilibrium for all players to 
use the tit-for-tat strategy, such an equilibrium might not be subgame-perfect. 
2.3.4 How can the public goods problem be theoretically solved? 
Since the public goods problem is a pervasive phenomenon of social life, the 
question arises of how it is possible to deal with it. 
Economic theorists have reacted to the problem by exploring institutional 
designs which might facilitated contributions and by designing sophisticated 
mechanisms for the implementation of an efficient allocation of public goods. 
Designing a mechanism to foster contribution is not at all easy. The difficul- 
ties lie in finding a normative standard that would help contribution and, then, 
ensuring that individual incentives axe aligned with the standard. It is well 
understood that the lack of alignment between the standard and the incentive 
can be a serious inhibitor to cooperation. 
For years a fundamental belief was that such an alignment was impossible 
regardless of the normative standard. That is, it was believed that all imag- 
inable normative standards would suffer from the problem of alignment. An 
intuition about both the nature and the depth of such a fundamental belief is 
captured by the following quote of Samuelson: "One can imagine every person 
in the community being indoctrinated to behave like a parametric decentraj- 
ized bureaucrat who reveals his preferences by signaRing in response to price 
parameters, ... to questionnaire, or to other 
devices. But there is still this 
fundamental technical difference going to the heart of the whole problem of 
social economy: by departing from his indoctrinated rules, any one person can 
hope to snatch some selfish benefit in a way not possible under the self-policing 
competitive pricing of private goods; and the 'external economies' or jointness 
of demand' intrinsic to the very concept of collective goods and governmental 
activities makes it impossible for the grand ensemble of optimizing equations to 
have that special pattern of zeros which makes laissez-faire competition even 
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theoretically possible as an analogue computer" (Samuelson 1954, p. 389). 
The research world was shocked with the publication of the Groves and 
Ledyard's (1977) paper, in which the authors produced the outline of a process 
that demonstrated that the fundamental belief is wrong. In the world of theory 
at least, there is no logical incompatibility of purpose. The Groves-Ledyard 
mechanism formulates a particular allocation-taxation scheme such that in- 
dividuals find it in their self-interest to reveal their true preferences for the 
level of public goods provided. Furthermore, the resulting level of public goods 
would be Pareto optimal; that is, it would be the same as if individuals had 
been "indoctrinated to behave like a parametric decentralized bureaucrat" de- 
scribed in Samuelson's quote. In other words, the Groves-Ledyard mechanism 
provides a set of incentives for individuals to reveal their true demand for the 
public goods. So, the incentives of individuals become perfectly aligned with 
the 'normative standard'. 
Other economic theorists have suggested alternative mechanisms for enforc- 
ing an efficient allocation of public goods. 18 However, the proposed mechanisms 
are frequently rather complicated and difficult to implement. In his survey, Laf- 
font writes: "... any real application will be made with methods which are crude 
approximations to the mechanisms obtained here ... considerations such as sim- 
plicity and stability to encourage trust, goodwill and cooperation will have to 
be taken into account" (Laffont 1987, p. 567). 
Recently, several authors have proposed mechanisms which induce efficient 
contributions to the public good and seem to meet the requirements of sim- 
plicity. Varian (1994a), for instance, examined a simple two-stage game in 
which agents had the opportunity to subsidise the others' contributions. His 
mechanism relies on the concept of subgame perfection. 19 Earlier, Bagnoli and 
Lipman (1989) presented a simple sequential voluntary contribution game which 
implements the core of the economy. However, the implementation requires a 
rather complex and particular refinement of the Nash equilibrium. 20 
Other recent proposals deal with mechanisms in which the govermnent tries 
to increase contributions to the public good by suitable tax-subsidy schemes. 
Such mechanisms are not purely private since they require a centraJ authority 
which can enforce taxes. The relevant question is whether a government with 
"For a survey see Laffont (1987). 
"Varian (1994b) generalised the mechanism to other economic environments involving ex- 
ternalities. Guttman (1978; 1987) and Danzinger and Schnytzer (1991) considered a similar 
game in which individuals chose subsidy rates in the first stage, and decided about their con- 
tributions to the public good in the second stage, given the subsidy rates chosen in the first 
stage. A critical assessment of their analysis is provided by Althammer and Buchholz (1993). 
20Bagnoli and Mckee (1991) and Bagnoli et aJ. (1992) tested this mechanism experimentally. 
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no information about private characteristics can design a tax-subsidy scheme 
which induces people to contribute more. The literature on the neutrality of 
lump-sum payments 21 or income taxation 22 shows that this is not a trivial 
task. 23 Andreoni and Bergstrom (1996) put forward an interesting model of 
tax-financed government subsidies to private contributions which definitely in- 
crease the equilibrium supply of public goods. Falkinger (1994) has shown 
that the private provision of public goods increases significantly if people value 
the relative size of their contributions positively. In Falkinger (1996) a simple 
tax-subsidy scheme is designed which induces people to take into account the 
relative size of their contributions in such a way that an increased or even an 
efficient level of public good provision is achieved as a Nash equilibrium. 24 
All the above mentioned mechanisms are desirably simple and do well in 
theory. It is, however, important to note that the fact that a mechanism does 
well in theory, does not say much about its effectiveness in the laboratory or 
in practice. In principle, it could well be the case that, although the Nash 
equilibrium in the presence of the mechanism implies an efficient provision of 
the public good, subjects' actual behaviour will generate significant under- (or 
over-) provision. For instance, in a recent paper by Chen and Plott (1996) 
it turns out that the performance of the Groves-Ledyaxd mechanism critically 
depends on the size of a so-called punishment parameter, which, according to 
the theory, should not affect at all the performance of the mechanism. 25 
All these institutional designs start from the assumption that individuals 
facing a public goods situation will behave according to the economic/game- 
theoretic predictions and, hence, they will always free-ride. In other words, the 
proponents of this literature admit the existence of the public goods problem 
and try theoretically to solve it by designing mechanisms that would make 
crational' people reveal their preferences for the public good. 
The question of overriding importance therefore becomes: is it certainly 
true that there is a public goods problem? That is, axe individuals fully ra- 
tional and self-interested as the theory predicts or do they deviate from the 
predictions? To answer these questions, we need to discover what happens in 
a voluntary contribution context where institutional designs and public poli- 
21 cf. 
, Warr (1982; 1983). 
22 Cf, Bernheim (1986). 
23 See Brunner and Falkinger (1995) for a generaJ characterisation of neutraJ and non-neutral 
taxes and subsidies in an economy with private provision of public goods. 
24 Falkinger et al. (1999) report on a series of experiments designed as a test of the practical 
tractability and effectiveness of the incentive mechanism proposed by Fajkinger (1996). 
25 In particular, in order to implement the efficient solution as a Nash equilibrium, the 
mechanism only requires that the punishment paxameter must be positive. 
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cies are absent. Experimental studies on the provision of public goods through 
voluntary contributions will be the topic of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
How people actually behave in 
dilemma game situations: a 
first generation of experiments 
3.1 Introduction 
Until the beginning of the 1970s the public goods problem (that individual 
incentives are at odds with group interest so that any individual who has a 
chance to free-ride will take it) was the conventional wisdom among economists. 
However this view became widely recogiiised as an assumption rather than a 
fact: there were indeed few data to affirm that the problem really existed. 
The researchers' interest was therefore directed to understand to what ex- 
tent people actually try to free-ride when there are incentives for doing so. 
Experimental methods in economics as well as in psychology provided us with 
important tools for dealing with such an issue, and the systematic experimental 
effort carried out in the 1970s and in the 1980s by various research groups has 
been fundamental in developing our understanding of the problem. 
What emerges from these early experiments is that-contrary to the the- 
oretical predictions-people are willing to cooperate. Generally speaking, the 
major findings of this vast literature are the following: 
1. in one-shot trials and in the initial stages of finitely repeated trials, sub- 
jects contribute around halfway between the Pareto-efficient level and the 
free-riding level; 
2. contributions decline with repetition; this decay is observed when subjects 
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know the length of the game for sure' as well as when they do not know; 2 
I face-to-face communication improves the rate of contributions. 
This chapter will report on some of these pioneering experiments directed 
to study people's behaviour in the presence of public goods. Before analysing 
how the experimental method has been used to provide insights into this topic, 
it seems appropriate to discuss some general methodological issues concerning 
experimentation in economics. 
3.2 Experimental methods in economics 
For many years it was a widely shared belief that economics is not an exper- 
imental discipline. Friedman, for instance, affirms: "Unfortunately, we can 
seldom test particular predictions in the social sciences by experiments explic- 
itly designed to eliminate what axe judged to be the most important disturbing 
influences" (M. Friedman 1953, p. 10). And, quite a few years later, Samuel- 
son and Nordhaus declare: "One possible way of figuring out economics laws... 
is by controlled experiments... Economists [unfortunately]... cannot perform 
the controlled experiments of chemists or biologists because they cannot easily 
control other important factors" (Samuelson and Nordhaus 1985, p. 8). 
Nevertheless, when Charles Plott, in his Presidential Address to the VI An- 
nual Meeting of the Southern Economic Association in 1990, raised the question 
"Will economics become an experimental science? " he confidently predicted 
that it would. 
Economists have been employing the experimental method for at least 60 
years. However, for the first part of this period, this method had only limited 
significance in empirical economics: experiments were quite rare and often con- 
ducted in a rather informal manner. During the last 25 years the picture has 
changed considerably. The use of experimental methods to address economic 
questions has grown rapidly and experimentation has acquired a significant 
degree of recognition as a legitimate branch of empirical enquiry, relevant to 
economic discourse. 3 These days, there are many economists who speak enthusi- 
astically about experiments and their contributions to economics. For instance, 
'Cf., Isaac et al. (1984); and Isaac and Walker (1988). 
2cf. 
, Kim and Walker 
(1984); and Isaac et al. (1985). 
3There axe numerous clear signs of this: articles reporting experimental research axe now 
frequently published in leading international journals such as Econometrica, the American 
Economic Review and the Economic Journal; the Journal of Economic Literature established 
a separate bibliographic category (Experimental Economic Methods) devoted to the classifica, 
tion of experimental works in the late 1980s; and a new journal (the Journal of Experimental 
Economics) entirely devoted to experiments began publication in 1998. 
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two leading experimentaJists maintain: "Since the mid-1970s this kind of work 
[experimentation] has been transformed from a seldom encountered curiosity 
to a small but well-established and growing part of the economic literature" 
(Roth 1987, p. 1), and "... as currently practised, economics is ideally suited 
for experimental investigation" (Hey 1991, p. 15). 
This enthusiasm is to a large extent at odds with the scepticaj tones of the 
opening quotations. Given the large amount of experimental work produced 
currently, the view that experiments axe rarely possible in economics seems 
hard to sustain. Hence, if taken simply as suggestions that one cannot run 
experiments in economics, the sceptics' comments appear to contrast with the 
current events. There is, however, another different perspective of reading these 
critical comments, i. e., that experimental procedures may not provide very 
meaningful data relevant to the discussion of economic enquiry. 
The latter is certainly a more plausible interpretation of the statement of 
Friedman who, at the time of his Essay in Positive Economics (1953), was 
well aware that economists had been using experimental methods. In fact, 
Friedman was co-author of a review of one of the first experiments reported in 
the economics literature: that of Thurstone (1931). In such a review we read: 
"It is questionable whether a subject in so artificial an experimental situation 
could know what choices he would make in an economic situation; not knowing 
it is almost inevitable that he would... systematize his answers in such a way as 
to produce plausible but spurious results" (Wallis and Friedman 1942, p. 179). 
Arguments to the effect that experimental results may be 'spurious' be- 
cause of the 'artificiaJ' context in which they are generated should be familiar 
to anyone who has presented experimental results to an audience of general 
economists. Indeed, Loomes notes that one of the questions most frequently 
posed to experimentalists is: "Can you really take the observed behaviour of 
groups of volunteers spending short periods of time in carefully controlled en- 
vironments and draw any meaningful conclusions about the way things work in 
the outside world? " (Loomes 1991, p. 29). 
This question exemplifies a scepticism towards experimentaJ research in eco- 
nomics which persists in spite of the now widespread use of the method and its 
new prominence in mainstream dialogues. 
I will examine what basis there might be for this scepticism later in this 
section, after a brief discussion of the reasons why laboratory experiments have 
become such an important source of data for economists. 
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3.2.1 Why laboratory experiments? Their main purposes and 
advantages 
Several aims can be pursued with experimentation. A review of them is in 
order. 4 
A primary purpose of experiments is to discover empirical regularities in 
areas where no theory exists. An important example of 'theory searching ex- 
periments' is provided by market experiments. Much of the literature in this 
axea is concerned with the existence and the properties of the equilibrium but 
not with its achievement. Some kind of meta-theory would be required to 
show how a set of consumers and producers actually reach the equilibrium. 
Experiments have filled this theoretical gap by reveaJing that market processes 
converge to the equilibrium with a speed which depends on the institutional 
setting: 5 Smith (1982) calls these experiments heuristic. 
In other areas, by contrast, several competing theories offer different pre- 
dictions. In this case, the role of laboratory work is to delineate the range of 
applicability for each theory. For example, Fiorina and Plott (1978) studied 
committee decisions in the laboratory and found that only a few of the sixteen 
models and variants considered were at aJl consistent with the data. Finally, 
there exist axeas for which only one model is applicable. Here, experimentation 
can demonstrate whether there are any conditions under which the theory can 
account for the data and, if so, it can test theory for robustness. Smith (1982) 
refers to the last two types of experiments as boundary and to sets of experi- 
ments directed to establish definitive broad laws of behaviour as nomothetic. 
A further purpose that can be fulfilled by experiments is to advise policy- 
makers in settings lacking theoretical predictions. For example, Grether and 
Plott (1984) used experiments to provide evidence in an antitrust case. Often 
the question is which institution yields the most efficient allocation in an eco- 
nomic or political market. Recently, economists and policy-makers have found 
it useful to study new institutions in the laboratory before introducing them in 
the field. 
Some experimental economists believe that one purpose of running experi- 
ments is to test a theory. Most theorists oppose this opinion in that they see 
prediction as the primary end of theorising. According to them, a theory is 
formally valid if it is internal consistent (that is, it does not lead to statements 
that contradict each other) and if the conclusions are provable from the assump- 
tions. This is certainly the view of R-iedman (one of the above sceptics) who 
4Cf., plott (1982; 1987). 
'On this topic see, for instance, Hey (1991). 
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grants that a theory is of direct interest only to the extent that its conclusions 
provide good approximations of actual behaviour even when its assumptions 
axe not precisely satisfied. 6 The debate on this topic among economists (both 
experimentalists and not) is still open and, given its complexity, it cannot be 
adequately treated here. ' 
As far as the advantages of the experimental method are concerned, the 
most important one is that it allows the researcher to have control over the 
environment. The institutions are easy to control in a laboratory but not in 
the outside world; hence, it is easier to evaluate the effects of a change in 
institutions in an experimental setting. The ideal procedure in an experiment 
lets the researcher to measure the effects of one of the independent (exogenous) 
variables on the dependent variable by varying this independent vaxiable, while 
keeping the others constant. In this way, casual relationships can be traced and 
alternatives theories and policies can be evaluated and compared. Although 
8 sometimes experimenters do not succeed in reaching this ideal, they usually do 
a better job than field studies where there is virtually no control over important 
variables. 
Of course there exist aspects which are simply uncontrollable. Examples are 
subjects' personal idiosyncrasies and (usually) expectations. Random allocation 
of subjects to different treatments takes care that treatment effects are not 
affected systematically by such uncontrolled aspects. Besides randomisation, 
in an experimental setting it is also possible to elicit and measure expectations 
(or idiosyncrasies) which are usually considered unobservable in field studies 
(even if economists-unlike psychologists-are not so keen on obtaining such 
information and measurements). In this study, I will elicit expectations that 
subjects have regarding the others' behaviour and (by means of a questionnaire) 
I will try to understand subjects' attitude towards other people. 
A further advantage of experimentation is that its data are replicable. 9 Field 
data are generated from events that occurred at a specific time in a specific 
place. Due to the continually changing nature of these settings, it is very dif- 
ficult for other researchers to replicate a field data set, therefore making it 
difficult to verify the accuracy of both the data and the findings. Since labo- 
ratory data are generated in controlled conditions, it is easier to reproduce an 
6Cf., Riedman (1953, p. 23). 
'For references (besides the cited Fýiedman's (1953) essay) see also Koopmans (1957); 
Riedman and Sunder (1994); Lipsey and Crystal (1995); and Staxmer (1996). 
'Examples of experiments which can be criticised for 'lack of control' will be provided later 
in this chapter. 
'Cf., Davis and Holt (1993, p. 14). 
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experiment and replicate its results. Furthermore, if it is suspected that a data 
set contains a lot of noise or if the data axe insufficient to draw a firm con- 
clusion, one may re-run the experiment and collect new data. With naturally 
occurring phenomena it may take considerable time to acquire a different data 
set of the desired size. 
3.2.2 Realism and controlled economic experiments 
As pointed out above, a usual objection raised against experiments is that they 
lack realism. The argument is that subjects behave differently in an 'artificial' 
laboratory setting than in the real world, and that-as a consequence-the data 
obtained in experiments are meaningless. 
Actually, an effective design is often very simple compared to reality. There 
are practical, financial and ethical considerations which render certain sorts of 
realism impractical. But-as many authors affirm-it is futile to try to replicate 
in the laboratory all features and complexities of some naturally occurring phe- 
nomena. 10 There exists indeed a trade-off between realism and control. If one 
wants to make the laboratory environment close to reality, then the experiment 
will become so complex that one will find it difficult (or even impossible) to 
clear up causes and effects and so the experimenter will lose control over some 
relevant variables. If one wants to have control over the important variables, 
then one must find the simplest laboratory environment which incorporates the 
key interesting aspects of the real world. 
Plott argues that many early experimentalists mistakenly believed that "the 
only effective way to create an experiment would be to mirror in every detail, to 
simulate, so to speak, some ongoing natural process" (Plott 1991, p. 906). But 
a good part of the rationale for experimenting, in Plott's view, is that it allows 
us to investigate the relationships hypothesised in a theory while abstracting 
from other factors which, even if at work in the broader social setting, are not 
part of the theory being investigated. In other words, in so fax as is possible, 
the experimenter must deliberately omit these other factors. Therefore: "Once 
models, as opposed to economies, became the focus of research the simplicity 
of an experiment and perhaps even the absence of features of more complicated 
economies became an asset. The experiment should be judged by the lessons it 
teaches about theory and not by its similarity with what nature might happened 
to have created" (Plott 1991, ibidem). 
The issue therefore is not how to replicate a real world decision setting in 
every detail but how to create an appropriate abstract setting which isolates 
10Cf., Plott (1991); Riedman and Sunder (1994); and Staxmer (1996). 
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all the interesting elements of the theory under consideration. In other words, 
the question is: how can we tell when an experimental environment has been 
suitably controlled to allow an appropriate test of a given hypothesis? I will 
illustrate the point in relation to a particular class of experiments. 
A large number of experiments have been concerned with investigating the 
behaviour of microeconomic systems. Smith (1982; 1989) argues that any mi- 
croeconomic system consists of two elements: environment and institution. In 
Smith's terminology, the environment refers to: the set of agents participating 
in the system (including their individual characteristics such as their prefer- 
ences); the goods existing in the economy; the production technology; and the 
initial resource endowments. The institution governs the interactions of the 
agents: it can be thought of as a set of rules which define how agents may or 
may not interact and it specifies the form that any such interaction must take 
(including the language through which messages may be transmitted). The 
interplay of the environment and institution generates behaviour which refers 
to all the observable outcomes of the system: the agents' actions and the emer- 
gent outcomes, for example. In experiments with microeconomic systems, the 
experimenter seeks to create and (in most cases) to manipulate institution and 
environment with the intention of investigating the relationship between their 
characteristics and the behaviour of the system. 
A great number of experiments can be interpreted in such a way. For in- 
stance, let us consider the public goods experiment described in Chapter 2, Sub- 
section (2.3.2). The individuals in the experiment, their preferences and their 
initial endowment constitute the environment. The rules of the experiment- 
how contributions can be made and how they are redistributed to participants- 
define the institution. " 
Is the behaviour observed in these experimentally generated microeconomies 
just an artifact of the laboratory system or is it of more general significance? 
In a sequence of closely related papers, Smith (1976; 1980; 1982) and Wilde 
(1980) have argued that, given certain assumptions, the laboratory microe- 
conomies can be regarded as real (small-scale) microeconomic system; the 
agents' behaviour can be thought of as a real economic behaviour and, there- 
fore, the observed behaviour is suitable a-- a test for economic theories. These 
assumptions are related to the reward structure of the experiments and are the 
following. 
"In Subsection (2.3.2) the institution is represented by the voluntary contribution mecha- 
nism (without communication). In it, each individual is told to contribute an amount of his 
initial endowment privately and without any information about what the others axe doing. 
The level of public good provided then equals that producible with the total endowments 
contributed. 
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Nonsatiation (or monotonicity) which requires that subjects prefer more 
money to less, and that this desire does not become satiated in the course of 
the experiment. Saliency which requires that the reward received by a sub- 
ject depends on his action (and possibly on the actions of the other agents). " 
Dominance which requires that changes in subjects' utility from the experiment 
come predominantly from the reward medium and that the effects of other costs 
(or benefits) on their utility are negligible. 
A further condition introduced by Smith to neutralise motivational factors 
that may disturb the reward structure induced by the experimenter is privacy. 
This condition requires that each subject receives information only on his own 
reward, and it is intended to guard against motivations arising from interper- 
sonal considerations. However, some kinds of experiments (among which public 
goods experiments) axe expressly directed to investigate if (and to what extent) 
subjects care about the rewards earned by the others; in these cases, the privacy 
condition is intentionally excluded by the experimental procedures. 
According to Smith (1982, pp. 931-935), if nonsatiation and saliency are 
satisfied, we are entitled to interpret the behaviour observed in an experimen- 
tal microeconomy as maximising, behaviour which is appropriately tied to the 
institutional context of the experiment. 
When also dominance holds, the subjects are maximising utility functions 
which depend only on the reward medium designed by the experimenter, who 
has, hence, achieved control over subjects' preferences in the sense that he has 
induced known preferences on the subjects. 13 
This argument constitutes a challenge to those who argue that the labo- 
ratory is an artificial environment and that, consequently, the results may be 
spurious because they do not capture all the complexities of the real world eco- 
nomic environment. The Smith/Wilde position (like that of Plott) shifts the 
focus from comparison between laboratory and real world to comparison be- 
tween laboratory and theory. The microeconomy created in laboratory is much 
more close to the economic theory than does the real economy. Hence, if the 
theory fails in this simple context, there are good reasons for expecting that its 
predictions will also fail in a more complex natural environment. 
There seems to be great merit in this argument. Nevertheless, its practical 
significance is severely limited by two problems. 14 The first is that it will never 
be possible to establish whether the conditions have been satisfied in a given 
"For example, a fixed flat payment is not salient because it does not depend on the actions 
chosen by the subjects in the laboratory. 
13 Cf., Riedman and Sunder (1994, p. 13). 
14 cf. 
, 
Cross (1980). 
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experiment. For instance, to determine if dominance has held, one needs to ask 
whether the experimental rewards were sufficiently large to outweigh other pos- 
sible influences. Some economists believe that experiments must use 'adequate' 
incentives before the results can be taken seriously. 15 The problem is to know 
what 'adequate' means and there is no agreement among experimentalists on 
this point. Some empirical work suggests that incentives do affect behaviour in 
the sense that subjects take their task more seriously with incentives, 16 while 
other work reports no effect of incentives on behaviour. 17 
The dominance condition seems to be especially problematic in public goods 
and bargaining games. In these areas, indeed, subjects' choices seem to be 
affected by concerns about the payoffs for others or concerns for being treated 
fairly. One may continue to defend the view that dominance and control over 
preferences will result if incentives are sufficiently high, but a problem of such 
a defence is that it cannot be rejected. 
In this study, subjects will be motivated with proper incentives as much as 
possible. However, in the experiments reported in Chapters 6 and 7, the test of 
specific behavioural hypotheses will require to assess the concerns that subjects 
have towards the payoffs to others; therefore, in these experiments, each subject 
will be informed not only about his own payoffs (as privacy requires) but also 
about the others' payoffs. 
Similarly, for saliency and nonsatiation to hold, it is important that subjects 
properly understand the experiment; in paxticular, how the reward medium is 
related to their actions. And, even if they understand what has been described 
to them, there might be questions regarding whether subjects trust the exper- 
imenter. There are strategies that experimentalists can (and often) adopt for 
reducing the possibility of misunderstanding. 18 There may also be possibili- 
ties for attempting to assess subjects' understanding or to explore their trust 
in the experimenter. 19 But while these procedures may reduce the scope for 
scepticism, they are unlikely to eliminate the possibility of doubt. 
The second practical limitation of the Smith/Wilde argument concerns the 
generalisability of the experimental results. In particular, Cross (1980) pro- 
poses two reasons why behaviour in the laboratory might be different from real 
world behaviour. First, real world behaviour may be a product of learning and 
"See, for example, Hey (1991); and Binmore (1993). 
16 See, for instance, Grether (1992); Offerman and Schram (1993); Smith and Walker (1993); 
and Harrison (1994). 
"Cf, Camerer (1995). 
18For instance, opting for simple designs, ensuring that the instructions axe clear, allowing 
time for subjects to become familiar with the experimental setting. 
19Including, for instance, 'test' questions or post-experimental questionnaire. 
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adaptation and, if laboratories do not embody analogous mechanisms (or allow 
them sufficient time to operate effectively), there will always be systematically 
differences between the laboratory environment and the naturally occurring 
behaviour. Second, behaviour may be sensitive to context since human beings 
interpret their surroundings to decide which modes of behaviour are appropri- 
ate to their environment. Smith argues that attacks along these lines do not 
subvert the role of experimentation in theory testing. His argument seems to 
be that if economists believe that evolution, learning, context, or whatever else 
are important factors in determining outcomes, then those factors should be 
included in economic theories. 
By concluding, nobody can deny that today the experimental method is 
widely used among economists and that it has acquired some prominence in 
mainstream issues. With experimentation several goals can be pursued and this 
method exhibits some advantages in comparison with field studies. However, 
due to the puzzles arising when experiments attempt to confront theory with 
reality, no experimenter would argue that experiments should replace empirical 
research. On the contrary, each method can make up for the deficiencies of the 
other. 
After this brief analysis of the advantages and disadvantages, aims and limits 
of the experimental method, let us come back to the main topic of this chapter 
and let us see how economists (and psychologists) have used experiments to 
provide evidence for the public goods problem. 
3.3 First attempts to estimate demand for public 
goods: Bohm's experiment 
One of the earliest attempts to discover experimentally if there is a public goods 
problem is attributed by Ledyard (1995, p. 122) to Bohm (1972). 
In his paper, Bohm describes "a test involving five different approaches to 
estimating the demand for a public good". The test was used for a TV-show 
not yet show to the public but available on closed-circuit TV for representative 
samples of the Stockholm population if aggregate willingness to pay exceeded 
costs. Six groups of different size (randomly drawn from a sample of 605 persons 
from the age 20 to 70 of the population of Stockholm) were confronted with 
different demand elicitation procedures, i. e., different payment consequences in 
case the good were to be produced. In particular, the first five groups received 
the following instructions. 
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"Try to estimate in money terms how much you find it worth at a maximum 
to watch this half-hour program in this room in a little while, i. e., what is the 
largest sum you are willing to pay to watch it. If the sum of the stated amounts 
of all the participants covers the cost (Kr. 500) of showing the program on 
closed-circuit TV, the program will be shown; and you will have to pay: 
(to group I) the amount you have stated, 
(to group II) some percentage (as explained) of the amount you have stated, 
(to group III) either the amount you have stated or a percentage (as explained) 
of this amount, or Kr- 5 or nothing, to be determined later by a lottery you 
can witness, 
(to group IV) Kr. 5, 
(to group V) nothing. In this case the participants were informed that the costs 
20 
were to be paid by the SR, i. e., the taxpayers in general. 
Counter-strategic arguments 21 were added to instructions I, II, IV and V. 
The subjects in group VI, who received instructions which differed from the 
instructions to the first five groups, were simply asked how much they found 
the program to be worth at a maximum. In a second round, these people were 
asked to give their highest bids for a seat to watch the program and were told 
that the 10 highest bidders out of an alleged group of some 100 persons were 
to pay the amount they had bid and see the program" (Bohm 1972, p. 119). 
The purpose of such a design was to test whether (as predicted by the 
theory) group I would understate their willingness to pay, while groups IV and 
V would overstate. 
Data analysis showed that no significant differences (at the 5 percent level) 
existed between any pair of instructions I to V. This leaded Bohm to conclude 
that "the well-known risk for misrepresentation of preferences in this context 
may have been exaggerated" and people may be willing to contribute to the 
public good even if their own self-interest runs counter. 
In Ledyard (1995), the approach used by Bohm is criticised for "lack of con- 
trol" . 
22 In particular, Ledyard refers to three aspects of the design which sug- 
gest a lack of control. First, it did not have any known individual willingness- 
to-pay with which to compare the stated willingness-to-pay. Second, it mis- 
represented the true situation to the subjects in order to study the effect of 
20The Swedish Radio-TV broadcasting company. 
21 Presenting a set of counter-strategic arguments in order to spell out all relevant axguments 
and pieces of information is, according to Bohm, one of the requirements which an empiricaJ 
test of aJternatives approaches must meet in order to be effective. 
22cf. 
, Ledyard (1995, pp. 124-125). 
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large group, 23 and so even if the experimenter might hope that the subjects be- 
lieved that the group was large, control might have been lost. Third, it includes 
counter-strategic arguments whose use in experiments is clearly controversial. 
Besides Ledyard's critics, Bohm's study was, at his time, an important step 
towards the understanding of individuals' voluntary behaviour in public goods 
environments. 24 
3.4 Psychological approach to social dilemmas 
While economists were putting considerable effort to get their experiments un- 
der control, psychologists were independently studying social dilemmas in their 
laboratory. As emphasised before, for experimental economists saliency is an 
essential and self-evident precept; in order to tie the experiment to the relevant 
theory, they take great pains to establish a clear incentive structure within an 
institutional framework. Most psychologists, on the contrary, feel no necessity 
to offer salient rewards; they believe that the admonition to subjects to 'do 
their best' is acceptable. 
As an example of the type of experiments carried out in psychology, let us 
consider the study of Dawes et al. (1977). 
25 In their experiment, 40 eight-person groups were created. Each subject 
in each group had to decide whether to mark an X or a0 on a card in private. 
Each knew that marking a0 he would earn $2.50 with no fine to anyone, and 
that marking aX he would earn $12.00 with a fine of $1.50 to all group members 
(including himself). Thus each player had an incentive to defect (i. e., to choose 
X) but, if all defected, no one received anything. Two payoff conditions were 
included in the experiment. The loss condition in which payoff to a cooperator 
was reduced by $1.50 for every defector in the group; and the no-loss condition 
in which cooperators' negative payoffs were truncated to zero. Subjects were 
presented the payoffs in the form shown in Table 3.1. 
One of the aims of the experimenters was to investigate the effects of various 
aspects of face-to-face communication on cooperation rates. 26 
23 "The subjects were given the impression that there were many groups of the same size 
simultaneously being asked the same questions on other rooms elsewhere in the broadcasting 
company" (Bohm 1972, p. 118). 
24 Ledyard himself expresses a similax judgement (Ledyaxd 1995, p. 125). 
25 Sometimes less people in each scheduled group showed up so that, rather than the antic- 
ipated 320, only 284 subjects were used. 
26A different type of communication is that in which people transmit messages by computers. 
At the time of Dawes et al. 's experiment, no computerised experiment had been conducted. 
The first public goods experiment which was run by using Plato computer system is, at the 
best of my knowledge, Isaac et al. 's (1984) experiment. 
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Table 3.1: Dawes et al. 's (1977) experiment: Payoff matrix. 
Payoff to X Number choosing Payoff to 0 
x0 
Loss condition 
08 2.50 
10.50 17 1.00 
9.00 26 -0.50 
7.50 35 -2.00 
6.00 44 -3-50 
4.50 53 -5.00 
3.00 62 -6.50 
1.50 71 -8.00 
. 00 80 - 
No-loss condition 
- 08 2.50 
10.50 17 1.00 
9.00 26 0 
7.50 35 0 
6.00 44 0 
4.50 53 0 
3.00 62 0 
1.50 71 0 
. 00 80 - 
For this reason, four communication conditions were included in the de- 
sign. The no-communication condition, in which groups worked silently on 
an unrelated topic before making their decision in the game. The irrelevant- 
communication condition, in which subjects discussed the same unrelated topic 
for 10 minutes but were not allowed to discuss the group dilemma decision. The 
relevant-communication condition, in which groups discussed the dilemma situ- 
ation before making their decisions, and the relevant-communication-plus-vote 
condition in which groups ended their discussion with a roll call-non binding 
declaration of intended decision. 
Results of the experiment axe displayed in Table 3.2, which shows the aver- 
age proportion of defectors in each of the eight conditions. 
Three main conclusions are drawn by Dawes et al. from these data. The first 
is that the effect of face-to-face communication on cooperation is highly signif- 
icant: without communication and with irrelevant communication cooperation 
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Table 3.2: Dawes et al. 's (1977) experiment: Proportion of subjects defecting. 
Condition 
No Irrelevant Unrestricted Communication 
Condition Communication Communication Communication Plus Vote 
Loss . 
73 
. 
65 
. 
26 
. 
16 
No Loss . 
67 
. 
70 
. 
30 . 
42 
rates were only 30% and 32% respectively, while with relevant communication 
and with communication plus commitment they increased to 72% and 71%. 
The second conclusion is that commitment made no difference: "the structured 
communication with the vote did not elicit any more cooperation than did the 
unstructured communication (73% versus 72% on average), despite the fact that 
every subject in the structured communication condition announced an inten- 
tion to cooperate". 27 The last conclusion is that the no-loss condition had no 
effect: "the possible loss manipulation was not only ineffective in explaining dif- 
ferential cooperation, it was ineffective in eliciting differential predictions about 
others' behaviour as well" - 
28 
Let us consider each of these conclusions in turn. Relevant talking matters 
a lot. This is not surprising. A more informative result would have explained 
what it is about face-to-face communication that leads to more cooperation. 
Although four types of communication were used, the data provide little infor- 
mation with reference to why when people can communicate, they cooperate 
more than when they cannot. Letting subjects talking for 10 minutes in an 
uncontrolled setting introduces unintended effects and a lot of contamination 
in the design. 29 
Also the finding that the communication-plus-vote condition did not in- 
crease cooperation in comparison with the relevant-communication condition 
is not so amazing (contrary to what the authors believe) if one thinks that the 
commitment did not arise spontaneously from the group process but was forced 
by the experimenters. Moreover the promise to cooperate is the only reasonable 
statement to make no matter what one's intentions. Thus, that each subject 
would have announced cooperation could be expected. 
Finally, as for the lack of impact of the no-loss condition, Ledyaxd (1995) 
argues that such a result is due to the existence in it of two countervailing effects 
"Dawes et al. (1977, p. 5). 
"Dawes et al. (1977, ibidem). 
"Cf., Ledyaxd (1995, p. 129). 
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(one which induces more defection ceteris paribus, and the other which induces 
less defection ceteris paribus) that could have easily cancelled each other. In 
addition, Ledyard shows that the direction of the effect may change according 
to the subjects' expectations about their group members' behaviour. "The 
incentive effects of the no-loss treatment are" therefore "complex and out of 
control" (Ledyard 1995, p. 128). 
3.5 First systematic approaches to the public goods 
problem 
At the same time as psychologists, but independently from them, Maxwell and 
Ames were experimentally investigating the predictive power of the free-rider 
hypothesis regarding the provision of public goods by groups. In a series of three 
related papers, 30 besides testing the free-rider hypothesis, they studied the ef- 
fects on contributions of several independent variables: group size, distribution 
of interest, distribution of resources in the group, provision points, strength of 
induced preferences, experience of subjects, divisibility of the public good and 
training of the subjects. 
As an example of the experimental design implemented by Maxwell and 
Ames, let us consider the first of their three papers. 
In this experiment, 256 high school students between the ages of 15 and 17 
were recruited from a sample of all homes with telephone in the Madison and 
Wisconsin area. 31 The study was performed in a 'natural setting', in that all 
contact with the subjects was by telephone and mail and subjects remained in 
their normal environments throughout all the experiment. 
Subjects were provided with a given amount of resources (in the form of 
tokens) which they had to invest in either an 'individual exchange' or a 'group 
exchange'. The individual exchange returned a fixed amount (i. e., 1 cent) for 
each unit of resources invested, regardless of the other group members' be- 
haviour. The group exchange paid its cash earnings to all members of the 
group by a preset formula, regardless of who invested. Thus, the subject re- 
ceived a share of the return on his own investment in the group exchange (if 
any), and also the same share of the return on the investments of each other 
group member. The payoff table given to the subjects for a large group with 
30 Maxwell and Ames (1979; 1980; 1981). 
31 "High school-age students were selected for study because we felt that the amount of 
money at stake in their decision (about $5.00) would be most meaningful to young people 
and that at the same time these subjects would be old enough to understand the investment 
decision they had to make" (Maxwell and Ames 1979, p. 1341). 
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unequal benefits (designed blue and green) and unequal resources is provided 
in Table 3.3.32 
Table 3.3: Marwell and Ames' (1979) experiment: Payoff from group exchange 
in large, unequal-interest, unequal-resource groups. 
How much money you get 
if you axe ($) 
If the total tokens invested Total money Blue Green 
in the group exchange by earned by (21-c of each (9/10c of each 4 
all group members is the group group dollar) group dollar) 
Between 
0-1,999 0 00 
2,000-3,999 14.00 . 32 . 13 
47000-51999 32.00 . 72 . 29 
67000-71999 54.00 1.22 . 
49 
8,000-9,999 320.00 7.20 2.93 
10,000-11,999 350.00 7.88 3.21 
127000-13,999 390.00 8.78 3.57 
14,000-15,999 420.00 9.45 3.85 
16,000-17,999 440.00 9.90 4.03 
18,000 450.00 10.13 4.12 
As can be seen, while returns to the group exchange are near zero for the 
first 7.999 tokens invested, at the investment of 8.000 tokens the return on all 
invested tokens increases dramatically. At this point, which the authors call 
provision point, the group exchange returns approximately 3.8 times as much 
as the individual exchange for every token invested. Under these circumstances, 
aJl group members would be better off if all their resources were invested in the 
group exchange. On the other hand, each individual would be best off if he 
invested in the individual exchange while everyone else invested in the group 
exchange (i. e., if he free-rides on all others' investments)- 
Notice that the payoff structure proposed by Maxwell and Ames generates 
multiple Nash equilibria: one at which nobody contributes (the strong free- 
rider hypothesis) and several others where everyone contributes only partially. 
Thus, not contributing is not longer a dominant strategy and (in case of equal 
distribution) contributing 44% on average is a natural focal point. 
Besides testing the free-rider hypothesis, the authors were interested in 
ana, lysing the effect on contributions of three independent variables: group size, 
32TVVhat laxge group, unequal benefits, and unequal resources mean is discussed below. 
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distribution of interest, and distribution of resources. 
In order to vary the group size, they informed half their subjects that their 
group contained 80 rather then 4 persons. "However, no individual was ac- 
tually a member of a group of 80 persons. All group contained just four real 
subjects". 33 
In order to vaxy the perceived distribution of interest, they implemented 
two different conditions: in the 'equal' condition, all group members received 
identical shares of the cash produced by investment in the group exchange; 
in the 'unequal' condition one-fourth of all group members (the blue subjects 
in Table 3.3) received a share of the group exchange approximately 2.5 larger 
than the share of the other group members (the green subjects of Table 3.3). 
Resources were also either equal or unequal within groups, and followed the 
same proportions as the distribution of interest. 
The main finding of this study was that subjects invested much more in the 
public good than would be predicted by the strong free-rider hypothesis. A 
typical group invested 57% of its resources in the public good, 28% more than 
needed to reach the provision point. 
A second result was that the rate of contribution was less if initial endow- 
ments were unequal. 
Since the presence of a provision point could have been crucial in determin- 
ing the high level of contribution, in a later study, Maxwell and Ames (1980) 
removed such a point, and designed a payoff structure in which the returns 
to investments in the group exchange (rather than increasing precipitously at 
a given point) were kept in simple proportion, regardless of the total amount 
invested. 
The generaJ level of contribution, after this change, replicated that of their 
previous reseaxch: approximately 51% of the available tokens were invested in 
the group exchange. 
The work of Maxwell and Ames provided, hence, staxk and clean evidence 
against the standaxd economic predictions: in their experiments, subjects con- 
tributed and did not all free-ride. 
There is, however, a note of criticism which can be made against their 
design and which reminds that made in Section (3.3) on Bohm's research. The 
critic concerns the deception that Maxwell and Ames practised on their subjects 
regarding the group size. It is well known (and it has been claimed by many 
experimentalists) 34 that honesty in procedures is fundamental if the data are to 
33 Maxwell and Ames (1979, p. 1345). 
34 For instance, Hey (1991) and Ledyard (1995). 
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be valid. Any deception can be, in fact, discovered and contaminate a subject 
pool. 
3.6 Reaction of the economists: some first responses 
Marwell and Ames studies provoked the reaction of the experimental economists 
who had been focusing on markets and who felt sure that the work of sociologists 
had to be inaccurate. In particular, two researches were carried out in direct 
response to Marwell and Ames: one by Kim and Walker (1984) and the other 
by Isaac, McCue and Plott (1985). Purpose of both these authors was to show 
that Marwell and Ames were wrong, and "to explore the behavior of groups 
within a set of conditions where we expected the traditional model would work 
with reasonable accuracy". ', ' 
The main difference with the Marwell and Ames experiment was the in- 
troduction of repetition: in both the Isaac and al. and the Kim and Walker 
experiments, subjects faced the same decision problem for a series of periods 
rather than just making their decision once. 
As for the experiment of Isaac and aJ., it consisted of 9 experimental ses- 
sionS36 with 10 participants in each session (except in sessions 4 and 9). 
Subjects received a participation-fee of $5. Half of them were assigned to 
the so-called 'high' payoff condition and the other half were assigned to the 
'low' payoff condition. Subjects were given a table which indicated both their 
marginal payoff and total payoff at each level of the public good from 0 to 40. 
The functions which generated these marginal payoffs were $. 44 - 0.011q for 
the high types and $. 276 - 0.008q for the low types (where q is the amount 
of public good actually chosen). Given this environment, the social optimum 
(which maximises total payoff) is at q= 23 or 24, while the Nash equilibrium 
is at q=0 and it is a single-period dominant strategy for both types. 
Data analysis from this study showed that average contribution rates de- 
cayed from 38% of the efficient contributions level in the initial period to 9% 
in the final period. Therefore, although in initiaJ decision periods contribution 
rates resembled those observed by Maxwell and Ames, they declined substan- 
tially with repetition. 
With a similar design, Kim and Waker (1984) found contributions provided 
41% of the maximal group payoff in the first period and decayed to 11% by the 
third period. Their study, however, can be strongly criticised because they de- 
35ISa, aC at aj. (1985, p. 51). 
"Two of these sessions were, however, excluded from the analysis on the basis of aberrant, 
, irrational' participants' decisions. 
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ceived their subjects. In fact, although Kim and Walker were extremely careful 
to try to eliminate factors of earlier studies which might have invalidated the 
design (factors that, according to them, involved a loss of control by the exper- 
imenter), they misled their subjects hoping that they would think they were in 
100-person groups. Whether the subjects believed that or not is unknowable. 
Initial laboratory examination of the free-ride problem provided, hence, 
quite different results. On the one hand, Dawes et al. and Marwell and Ames 
found far less free-riding than predicted by economists. On the other hand, 
Isaac and al. reported nearly complete free-riding particularly in the terminal 
periods of multiperiod sessions. 
Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984) tried to reconcile and identify the rea- 
sons for the divergence in contribution rates reported in these earlier investiga, 
tions. Consequently, their experiment included a variety of the design features 
that were varied across previous experiments, including repetition, group size, 
marginal payoff, and experience levels. 
Here, each participant knew that there would be 10 decision periods and 
that his endowment and payoff would remain constant over all repetitions. 
As for the group size and the marginal payoff, since it was challenging to 
change N (the group size) keeping constant the incentives between group and 
self interest, it is worth considering how Isaac at al. dealt with this problem. 
Algebrically, the payoffs in this experiment were Ui = p(m - gi) + ay/N, where 
Y= EN j=1 gj and the meaning of each other term is as in Eq. (2.4). The 
marginal rate of substitution, M, of the private for the public good is alff. 
The marginaJ group return, computed from E Uj = p(Nm -E gi) +aE gi, 
is a/p. If one increases N and nothing else, then M decreases and, hence, the 
incentives for individual interest increase relative to the incentives for the group 
interest. If one increases N but keeps M constant by increasing a, then the 
incentives for the group interest increase relative to the incentives for individuaJ 
interest. As stated above, it seems impossible to vary the group size N without 
changing the incentives between group and self interest. The authors solved 
this issue by choosing a2x2 design with N=4 or 10 and M=0.30 or 0.75; 
aJways p=1. Thus, one has a= NM and four parameter choices (N, M, a); 
i. e., (4,0.3,1.2), (4,0.75,3), (10,0.3,3), and (10,0.75,7.5). These allow the 
experimenters to compare a change in N keeping M constant and to compare 
a change in N keeping a=3 constant. 
Finally, as far as experience is concerned, such a parameter was measured 
as previous participation in similar experimental sessions. 
Even if the sessions differed according to the values of these variables, a 
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shared the characteristic that complete free-riding (i. e., a contribution rate of 
zero) is the unique Nash equilibrium, and that the joint income is maximised 
when all participants contribute all tokens to the group exchange. 
Table 3.4 provides the percentage contribution data from this experiment. 
Table 3.4: Isaac et al. 's (1984) experiment: Percentage contribution data. 
1 2 3 4 
Period 
56 7 8 9 10 Aver. 
All 51.1 47.2 44.1 47.4 46.7 38.1 40.6 35.2 35.8 37.3 42.4 
M=0.3 43 35 28 32 26 25 20 17 20 17 26 
M=0.75 60 59 60 63 67 51 61 53 52 57 58 
Inexperienc. 53 53 45 50 55 43 50 41 39 44 47 
Experienc. 49 41 43 45 38 33 31 30 33 30 37 
N=4 50 50 38 40 38 30 36 32 38 30 38 
N= 10 56 50 40 41 41 34 32 33 37 35 40 
As can be seen, the average percentage contribution across all treatments 
is 42%, and the average across first periods is 51%. These look very much like 
Dawes et al. and Maxwell and Ames. However, the variance is high: contri- 
bution rates ranged from 0% (period 8 with M=0.3, N=4, experienced 
subjects) to 83% (period 5 with M=0.75, N=4, inexperienced subjects). 
Hence, something more than just 40-60 percent contribution is going on. 
Three more conclusions derive from this experiment's data. First, increasing 
M from 0.3 to 0.75 increases contribution levels in all cases. Second, experi- 
ence matters since inexperienced subjects contribute more. Finally, repetition 
decreases and group size increases contributions for low M (= 0.3) but neither 
seem to have an effect if M=0.75. 
3.7 An important final question: Is it really the the- 
ory that is wrong? 
Experimental evidence from the pioneering laboratory work described in this 
chapter shows that people in the presence of public goods do not behave as 
predicted by the traditional theory: they do not free-ride all the time, but 
voluntarily provide public goods in one shot trials and in the initial stages of 
repeated trials. Hence, the question worth reflecting upon is: do we face bad 
experiments or a wrong theory? 
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Undoubtedly there are difficulties in doing experimental research in public 
goods and, except the Isaac, Walker and Thomas experiment (whose design 
was carefully thought out and confounding variables were kept under control), 
all the other examined designs exhibit some uncontrolled features which expose 
them to criticism. 37 
Nevertheless, it is also true that the two basic assumptions (i. e., fully ra. - 
tional decision-makers and common knowledge of full rationality) upon which 
normative game theory and its central solution concept (the Nash equilibrium) 
axe built have provoked contradiction and debates which still are ongoing. 38 
What it is argued is that such assumptions are too strong (4cnon realistic" Sel- 
ten (1994) says) and that, consequently, the predictive power of the theory is 
questionable. In particular, the quarrel moves along the following lines. 
Game theoretic analyses usually take for granted that the notion of 'rational' 
agent can be assigned a sharp and unambiguous meaning; namely, the meaning 
associated with rational choice theory, or the (neoclassical) economic approach 
to social life. 39 A digression on what 'rational' means in this approach appears, 
hence, necessary. 
"A glance at any dictionary will confirm that economists, firmly entrenched 
in the 'static' viewpoint described above [the viewpoint of substantive ratio- 
nality], have hijacked this word [rational] and used it to mean something for 
which the word consistent would be more appropriate" . 
40 Savage's (1954) the- 
ory on individual decision-making (in which he synthesised Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern's expected utility theory with the subjective probability ideas of 
Ramsey, De Finetti and others) can be considered entirely and exclusively as 
a descriptive theory of consistent behaviour. It has nothing to say about how 
decision-makers come to have the tastes and the beliefs ascribed to them; it 
asserts that if the decisions taken are consistent (in a sense made precise by a 
list of formal axioms), then the decision-makers act as if they were maximisers 
of expected utility relative to a subjective probability distribution. 
The mistake of orthodox game theorists seems to lie in supposing that Sav- 
age's passive descriptive theory can be reinterpreted as an active prescriptive 
theory at negligible cost. In order to come up with precise predictions on ratio- 
nal behaviour, they consider enough to assign prior beliefs to a decision-maker 
31 Some of these criticaJ remarks have been stressed through the exposition, more axe dis- 
cussed by Ledyard (1995). 
38 Objections to these centraJ assumptions as well as to the Nash equilibrium concept axe 
provided, for example, in Binmore (1990); Kreps (1990); Selten (1994); and Hargreaves-Heap 
and Varoufakis (1995). Most of the discussion which follows rests on these writings. 
39 See Downs (1957); and Becker (1976). 
40Binmore (1990, p. 152). 
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and to assume (by following the Aumann-Haxsanyi argument) that there is 
common knowledge of a common prior. 41 Consistency then forces any new in- 
formation that may transpire to be incorporated into the system by Bayesian 
updating (i. e., a posterior belief is deduced from the prior belief using Bayes's 
rule). In this process, the problem of where original beliefs come from has been 
forgotten. But-it has been axgued-without specifying how people come to 
hold the beliefs ascribed to them, whatever is inferred and deduced from such 
beliefs is exposed to the danger of being without prescriptive validit Y. 42 
In addition, there seems to be something distinctly optimistic about the 
part of the argument which concerns the Harsanyi doctrine: namely, that pri- 
ors should be taken to be common, to which Aumann adds the rider that it 
should be common knowledge that the priors are common. This doctrine seems 
indeed to depend on a powerfully algorithmic and controversial view of rea- 
Son. 43 Reason on this account is similar to a set of rules of inference which can 
be used in moving from evidence to expectations. That is why people using 
reason (because they are using the same algorithmS)44 should come to the same 
conclusions. However, there is a genuine puzzlement over whether such an al- 
gorithmic view of reason can apply to all circumstances. The question is: can 
any finite set of rules contain rules for their applications to all possible circum- 
stances? The answer given by non-orthodox game theorists is no. According 
to them, under some sufficiently detailed level of description of an event, there 
will be a doubt about whether the rule applies to this event. In such a case, an 
individual will need rules for applying the rule (for applying the rule). Since 
there is no limit to the details of the description of events, an individual will 
need rules for applying the rules for applying the rules, and so on to infinity. 
In other words, every set of rules will require creative interpretation in some 
circumstances, and therefore, in these cases, it is possible for two individuals 
who share the same rules to hold divergent beliefs. After all, "we do not seem to 
expect the same fixtures to be drawn when we complete the football pools; nor 
do we enjoy the same subjective expectations about the prospects of different 
45 horses when some bet on the favourite and other on the outsider". Of course, 
some of these differences might be due to differences in information, but it is 
difficult to believe that this accounts for all of them. 
There remains, finally, a most important question: why a rational decision- 
41 See p. 10 of this work. 
42 See, for example, Binmore (1990). 
43 cf. 
, Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis (1995). 
44 Binmore (1990, p. 145) refers to such algorithms as information-processing tools. 
45Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis (1995, p. 27). 
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maker should want to be consistent . 
46 After all, consistency may lead to ineffi- 
cient outcomes and players may get high benefits from inconsistencies (as it is 
the case in public goods settings). 
The following statement of Binmore appears to capture quite well all the 
issues discussed above: "My contention is that the conventional approach misses 
this aim [to exclude irrelevancies so that attention can be focused on matters of 
genuine importance], not only by leaving unformalized factors which matter, but 
also by introducing formal requirements that cannot be defended operationally 
except in terms of mathematical elegance or simplicity" (Binmore 1990, p. 152). 
Therefore, the ambitious claim that game theory will provide a unified foun- 
dation for all social sciences 47 seems misplaced to some theorists. They identify 
a variety of problems with such a claim: some are associated with the assump- 
tion of the theory, some come from the inferences which are often drawn from 
these assumptions, and others more come from the failure (even once the con- 
troversial assumptions and the inferences are in place) to generate determinate 
predictions of what a 'rational' agent would or should do in important social 
interactions. 
Thus, coming back to the question raised at the beginning of this section, it 
seems reasonable to say that the pioneering experimental research on behaviour 
in public goods enviromnents (even if not aJways conducted under controlled or 
well designed laboratory conditions) mirrors the reported doubts about main- 
stream game theory and reveals that subjects axe more complexly motivated 
than such a theory allows. 
The point now is to understand which are these motivations and what ex- 
actly causes cooperation. Modern experimentaJ research is directed toward this 
aim: its primary purposes axe to find out the source of cooperative behaviour 
and to identify the factors which affect cooperation. 
Next chapter will report on what has been discovered so far and, therefore, 
where the next work might begin. 
46 Cf., Binmore (1990). 
47Cf, Elster (1982); and Aumann and Hart (1992). 
Chapter 4 
Why do people cooperate if 
full rationality demands 
defection? Some hypotheses of 
cooperative behaviour 
4.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapter we looked at the initial laboratory examination of 
the public goods problem. We found, in contrast with what Nash expected, 
that in one-shot games and in the initial periods of finitely repeated games 
people voluntarily provide public goods, and that contributions decline when 
the decision sequence is repeated. However, repetition seemed to induce decay 
in certain environments and not in others. ' The research problem becomes, 
hence, to discover when subjects cooperate and why they do so. 
Various explanations for individuals' cooperative behaviour have been ad- 
vanced. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss them and to analyse the way 
in which these theories have been tested in laboratory. 
4.2 A taxonomy of some hypotheses of cooperative 
behaviour 
While the dominant strategy hypothesis does not provide an accurate descrip-- 
tion of observed behaviour, it has the advantage of being a simple, well-defined 
argument with clear predictions. By following Bolton et al. (1997) and Bolton 
I Cf. , Isaac et al. 
(1984). 
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(1998), 1 exploit this clarity to classify different theories of cooperative be- 
haviour by minimaJ modifications to the dominant strategy argument. 
4.2.1 Dividing the dominant strategy argument into three parts 
The full rationality argument for playing the dominant strategy can be divided 
into three components: 
1. Motive: a player prefers having more money to having less. 
2. Cognition: a player can identify the action that best satisfies Motive. 
3. Choice: a player takes the action that best satisfies Motive. 
In a standard single-shot prisoner's dilemma, for instance, the dominant 
strategy argument is assembled as follows: each player realises that defection 
maximises the money he will make, independently on what the other does 
(motive plus cognition); hence, each player chooses defection (choice). 
Most theories of cooperative behaviour depart from full rationality on one 
of the three components and rely on full rationality (sometimes implicitly) for 
the other two. In this section, I distinguish among alternative theories by the 
major component of deviation. 
4.2.2 Altruism and equity theories: alternatives to motive 
The theories discussed here challenge the game theory's assumption concerning 
what motivates people. None of them represents a radical departure from the 
cmore money is preferred to less' assumption. Rather, each supposes an addi- 
tional motive to interact with self-interest. In all cases, the motive is added 
as an argument to some form of preference function. Models differ on what is 
added. 
Altruism theories 
These kinds of theories posit that individuals care about more than their own 
self-interest; they also care about the others' welfaxe. 
The usual technique to model aJtruistic preferences is to add a variable to 
the classical utility function representing either the consumption or the utility of 
the others. Collard (1978) distinguishes between commodity-related altruism 
and utility-related altruism depending on the additional variable used. 
Models of altruism have been influential in explaiining economic behaviour in 
many settings, including charitable contributions and volunteer behaviour (e. g., 
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Unger (1991); and Smith et al. (1995)), social security and other welfare sys- 
tems (e. g., Coate (1995)), internationaJ bequests and macroeconomic growth 
(e. g., Rangazas (1991); Hory (1992); Chakrabarti et al. (1993); and Straw- 
cyznski (1994)). Other studies have examined altruism from an evolutionary 
perspective, either describing evolutionary reasons for altruistic preferences or 
determining the evolutionary outcomes of societies with heterogenously altruis- 
tic individuals (e. g., Bergstrom and Staxk (1993); Samuelson (1993); Bergstrom 
(1995); and Bester and Giith (1998)). 
To see how altruistic preferences induce people to contribute an amount 
greater than the equilibrium, let us consider the symmetric public goods game 
presented in Chapter 2 (Subsection (2.3.2)). In such a game, a way to insert 
pure altruism into player i's utility function is by writing: 
vi -"-": V(U(917Y)I ---I 
U(9i)Y)I 
---I 
U(gNiY)) (4.1) 
where y= EN 1 gj denotes the total amount of public good provided, and Vi j= 
increases in all arguments. 
By assuming that the altruist's utility function is lineax and that the concern 
he expresses for the others' welfare is represented by a weight -y, Eq. (4.1) 
becomes: 
V(9i 
i Y) 
U(gi 
i Y) +71: 
U(9k 
i Y) 
(4.2) 
kOi 
where 0< -y :51.2 If 7=0, then V(gi, y) = U(gi, y) and player i shows no 
concern for the welfare of his partners; this contrasts with altruistic preferences. 
If -y = 1, the altruist treats the others as himself. 
Assigning the functional form (2.4) to all U(gj, y) (j N) in (4.2), we 
have: 
Vi :::::: (7n - 9i) + VY +71: (M - 9k) +Y 
1: 
M 
kj6i kOi 
where (M - 9k) are the benefits that i's kth fellow member derives from his 
private consumption. The term Ek: Ai (M - 9k) is, therefore, a constant from i's 
point of view and we can indicate it with Prk. Thus, the latter equation can 
2 Edgeworth (1881, p. 53) employed a similar formulation of altruism. Restricting attention 
to two people (i and j), he described i's altruistic preferences by: 
Vi = -fui (gi, gj) + (i - -0 uj (gi, gj), 
and called the value (1 - -f)/-y the 'coefficient of effective sympathy'. 
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be written as: 
Vi =: (m - gi) + vy + -y(N - 1)VY +YPrk, 
or, equivalently 
Vi = (m - gi) + -yNvy + (I - -y) vy + -yPrk - 
(4.3) 
Eq. (4.3) implies that, whenever the inequalities stated in (2.5) hold (i. e., 
when the parameter v satisfies the constraints v<I and Nv > 1), if the weight 
is such that 0< -y < 1, then the optimal contributions for an altruist will be 
greater than zero and less than m. They will coincide with m, when -Y = 1. 
Public goods models that incorporate the specification of altruism given 
in (4.2) have a neutrality property. Specifically, the models imply that govern- 
ment contribution to the public good, funded by la; rnp-sum taxes, crowds out 
private contribution with a one-to-one correspondence. The axgument can be 
stated briefly in terms of function (4-2) by assuming N=2. Imagine that i is 
the only contributor. Sinceý---from (4.2)-i's preferences are completely deter- 
mined by the total amount of public good provided y, i should be indifferent to 
whether he contributes gi voluntarily or involuntarily through a tax transfer. 
Hence, if a law forces him to contribute ji < gi, i's voluntaxy contributions 
should fall by exactly ji. It has been shown that this one-to-one crowding 
out (or neutrality property) holds also when altruistic preferences are modelled 
34 differently from (4.2), and even for some distortionaxy taxes. 
Field studies of charitable giving, however, report that actual crowding out 
is quite small. One explanation for this inconsistency, advanced by Andreoni 
(1989), is known as impure altruism hypothesis. Specifically, Andreoni's argu- 
ment is that people receive some utility-a. 'waxm-glow'-from their voluntary 
gift per se. By introducing a warm-glow parameter as additional argument 
into altruistic utility functions, Andreoni showed that the resulting model is 
consistent with the empirical results. 
Equity (or inequality aversion) theories 
The ERC model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) posits that people are moti- 
vated by their own pecuniary payoff as well as by their own relative payoff, 
"a 
measure of how a person's pecuniary payoff compaxes to that of others". 
ERC 
stands for equity, reciprocity and competition: the authors show, indeed, that 
'See Sugden (1982, p. 346) for a proof. 
'Cf., Bernheim (1986). 
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their model can account for phenomena reported in bargaining (equity), market 
(competition), and dilemma (reciprocity) games. 
Bolton and Ockenfels characterise preferences in terms of what they call 
motivation function, which "may be thought of as a special class of expected 
utility functions". The term 'motivation function' is preferred because it makes 
clear that the emphasis is on the objectives that motivate behaviour during the 
experiment, and (although the weights that individuals put on these objectives 
may not be immutable) the important is that the trade-off between pecuniary 
and relative payoffs remains stable for the duration of the experiment. In an N- 
player game with monetary and nonnegative payoffs yi, each player i is assumed 
to act in order to maximise the expected value of his motivation function: 
vi = vi (yi, oi), 
where ai is i's relative share of the payoffi 
oi (yi, c, N) 
Yi/C if c>0 
IIN if c= 01 
and cN1 Yj is the total pecuniary payout distributed among all players. j= 
We have, hence, yi =_ cui (yi, c, N). 
How a lab subject trades off pecuniary and relative payoffs is clearly private 
information. On the other hand, testing the model requires a reliable (prefer- 
ably observable) measure of the underlying trade--offs. With respect to this 
point, the authors found that much of what we need to know is captured by the 
thresholds at which behaviour deviates from the "more money is preferred to 
less" assumption. For all c>0, each player is supposed to have two thresholds, 
ri(c) and si(c), defined as follows: 
ri (c) = axgmax vi (cui, ai); 
Ci 
si(c) is implicitly defined by 
vi(esi, si) = vi(0, lIN), si < lIN. 
Bolton and Ockenfels demonstrated that knowing the distributions of these 
thresholds is sufficient to characterise many phenomena. To see, for instance, 
how their model justifies cooperation in dillemma games, consider the prisoner's 
dilemma payoff matrix displayed in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4-1: Prisoner's dilemma payoff ma- 
trix. 
Player 2 
Player I Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate 2m, 2m M, 1 +m 
Defect 1 +M, m Ill 
m= marginaJ per capita return E (0.5,1). 
Suppose that player i (i = 1,2) can be described by the following additively 
separable motivation function: 
vi (cori, oj) =: ai cai 
b, (Ori 2 
22 
(4.4) 
The component aicai is an expression of standard preferences for the pe- 
cuniary payoff. The other component of (4.4) delineates the influence of the 
comparative effect. 5 Therefore, a/b (the ratio of weights attributed to the pe- 
cuniary and relative components of the motivation function) fully characterises 
a player's type. Strict relativism is represented by a/b = 0; strict narrow self- 
interest is the limiting case a/b -+ oo. Let us denote by F(alb) the population 
distributions of type. It will be optimal for a subject with type a/b to cooperate 
rather than defect if- 
1 
a<P2- 
g(m, p) b 4(l - m)(1 + 
2m)2 
where p is the probability that the opponent cooperates, and m is the MPCR. 
Thus, in the ERC model, cooperation is influenced by the extent to which 
subjects axe motivated by relative payoffs, the magnitude of the MPCR, and 
the proportion of cooperating subjects in the population. There is always an 
ERC equilibrium in which no one cooperates, but-depending on the shape of 
F(a/b)-there can also be ERC equilibria in which a proportion of subjects 
cooperate, while others defect. 6 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) formulate a theory of inequality aversion which 
makes predictions similax to those of ERC. Even the Fehr-Schmidt model is 
'Basically, the further the aRocation moves from i receiving an equal shaxe, the higher the 
loss from the compaxative effect. 
'An ERC equilibrium is defined as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium solved with respect to 
player motivation functions where each player's r and s axe private information but the density 
functions fr and f' are common knowledge. 
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based on the assumption that (to some extent) people dislike inequality in 
payoffs, and that they dislike inequality more if it is to their disadvantage 
than if it is to their advantage. Like in the ERC model, such an assumption is 
captured by incorporating an equity term along with an own-earnings term into 
an individual's utility function. Applied to public goods situations, the model 
predicts that, as long as inequality-averse players believe that other players are 
contributing, they are willing to contribute too. 
There are two differences between the ERC model and the Fehr-Schmidt 
model. One is that, in the latter, inequality between self and all others matters 
instead of inequality between self and the average earnings of others. The other 
difference is that most of the results in the Fehr-Schmidt model are derived in 
a complete information context, whereas the ERC is an incomplete information 
model. Both models are, however, based on preference assumptions which 
transform the dilemma game (with its unique inefficient equilibrium) into a 
coordination game (with multiple equilibria), where players have to form beliefs 
about the others' choices in order to choose one of the equilibria. 
4.2.3 Reciprocity and commitment theories: alternatives to 
choice 
Theories which reformulate the choice ride of orthodox game theory are tradi- 
tionally considered as bounded rationality theories. They move away from the 
maximisation assumption and assert that people forgo their own self-interest 
because of a sense of obligation to conform to particular rules. These models 
differ from one another with respect to how far they move away from formal 
optimisation as well as with respect to the alternative decision rule considered. 
Reciprocity theories 
Theories of reciprocity assume that individuals reciprocate or match the others' 
contributions. 
SUgden (1984) proposed a model based on the idea that a subject who ben- 
efits from the public good feels a moral obligation towaxds those who contribute 
which leads him to contribute as well. Specifically, in his model, a person max- 
imises his own utility subject to an external moral constraint: the 'principle of 
reciprocity'. Sugden writes player i's utility function as: 
Ui = Ui (qi, 
where qj is i's contribution to the public good and z is the quantity of public 
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good provided. Uj increases in z and decreases in qj. The constraint can 
be stated as follows. Let q9 be the contribution that maximises Ui under 
the assumption that everyone contributes the same amount. Then, i has the 
obligation to contribute at least qjG if everyone else does so, or at least qj if 
some person j in his group contributes an amount qj less than qjG. Formally, 
i is meeting the reciprocity principle (i. e., his obligation towards the group) if 
and only if either qi ý! qjG or, for some other person j, qi qj. An equilibrium is 
a vector of contributions in which each player contributes the smallest amount 
that meets his obligation. 
One implication of the model is that an increase in one person's contribution 
tends to induce others to increase their own contributions. 7 
Commitment theories: Kant and morality 
A further suggestion for explaining cooperation connects rationality with moral- 
ity and Kant provides a ready reference. His practical reason demands that we 
should undertake those actions which when generalised yield the best outcomes. 
Or, to say the same thing slightly differently, according to Kant, an agent should 
undertake only an action that can be generalised to good effect by all agents. It 
does not matter whether others perform the same calculation and actually un- 
dertake the same action as you. The morality is deontological and it is rational 
for an agent to be guided by a categorical imperative. 
As an example of how the categorical imperative might be applied and 
how it differs from full rationality, consider a person wondering whether to pay 
his taxes. Non-payment could be rational (in a standaxd sense) in so far as 
the person is interested only in his welfare and the chances of being fined for 
non-payment are low. However, such a behaviour would not pass the test of 
the categorical imperative. If the person were (hypothetically) to consider not 
paying while at the same time accepting the premise that others axe similarly 
rational, then he would be committed to the predictable result that society 
would break down and collapse without the necessary funding. For Kant the 
rational person should not allow his reason to be a slave to the passions (which 
might lead to non-payment); instead his rationality, and the fact that he shares 
it, should lead him to the categorical imperative and hence to the payment of 
the taxes. 
This is perhaps the most radical departure from the conventional under- 
standing of what is required by rationality because, while accepting the payoffs, 
it suggests that agents should not act in a traditional way upon them. The no- 
7 See Result 4 of Sugden (1984, p. 780) for a proof. 
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tion of rationality is no longer understood in the means-end structure (as the 
choice of the action most likely to satisfy given motives). Instead, rationality 
is conceived as an expression of what it is possible; it has become a motive in 
its own right. 
I shall refer to the class of theories based on Kantian reasoning as com- 
mitment theories. 8 In the spirit of the categorical imperative, these theories 
assume that, even if each individual is motivated by purely egoistic satisfaction 
derived from the goods that he possesses, there is an implicit social contract 
such that each performs duties for the others in a way calculated to increase 
the welfaxe of all. 
Laffont (1975) analysed the case where each individual believes that the 
others will act as he does, and then he maximises his utility given that belief. 
Laffont showed that, under these beliefs, individuals voluntarily coDtribute and 
social welfaxe increases. 9 
Similaxly, Harsanyi (1980) described the principle of 'rational commitment' 
in which an individual makes whatever contribution he would wish others to 
make, irrespective of whether they actually make this contribution. 
4.2.4 Reputation building, errors and learning theories: alter- 
natives to cognition 
Models which modify the cognition component of the full rationality argument 
assume that people are not able to recognise the action that maximises their 
utility either because their information about the others is incomplete or be- 
cause they do not grasp the incentives of the game. In the case of incomplete 
information, early contributions may be consistent with rational behaviour. In 
the case of not understanding of the game, people's behaviour can be charac- 
terised in terms of errors or in terms of a learning process in which the rule that 
governs the choice changes with experience. 
Reputation building and the strategies hypothesis 
It is the claim of both Kreps et al. (1982) and McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) 
that a form of cooperation is rationally possible when the game is repeated-10 
Both models alter the classical theory by a single precept: instead of supposing 
8This expression is used by Croson (1998b). Collard (1978; 1983) UJIed these theories 
'Kantian', and Sugden (1984) referred to the principle underlying them as the 'principle of 
unconditional commitment'. 
9He also discussed the social benefits of a government convincing the population that this 
belief is true. 
1OSee also Kreps and Wilson (1982); and Milgrom and Roberts (1982). 
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that it is common knowledge that all players are rational, they suppose that 
the information about the types of players is incomplete, and that individuals 
attach a positive probability to the likelihood that the others are not fully 
rational (i. e., they use dominated strategies). 
Kreps et al. (1982) described an equilibrium in the finitely repeated pris- 
oner's dilemma in which two rational players both believe that there is a small 
probability, 6, that the other is 'irrational' and, as a consequence, they ratio- 
nally build reputation. Kreps et al. gave two examples of irrationality. First, 
the opponent might be playing a tit-for-tat strategy, which begins by coop- 
erating and then plays whatever the other played on the last round. Second, 
players could believe that the opponent gets extra utility from mutual coopera- 
tion, such that cooperation is the best response to cooperation. In each case, a 
sufficiently high 6 can lead each player to adopt a strategy of the sort "cooper- 
ate until round T, or until the opponent defects, and defect thereafter". Higher 
values of 6 will tend to increase the amount of cooperation. 
A strict interpretation of Kreps et al. 's theory is that no irrational or al- 
truistic types need to exist, but only that there are sufficient beliefs that such 
types exist. However, since in the known last period defecting is always opti- 
mal, in anticipation of this subjects may start 'bailing-out' and, as it becomes 
increasingly clear that the population is all rational, cooperation may become 
increasingly difficult to maintain. 
Andreoni (1988) first applied Kreps et al. 's theory to public goods exper- 
iments and referred to it as the strategies hypothesis. According to this hy- 
pothesis if a (perfectly rational and selfish) player is not sure whether the other 
players are fully rational, then, in early repetitions of the game, he may find 
convenient not to educate them to play the dominant strategy; rather, he may 
have an interest in building up a reputation as a cooperative type himself. This 
would imply a relatively high contribution level in the early periods, which de- 
creases either as the player has no longer doubts about the others' rationality 
(because, for instance, he observes them playing the dominant strategy), or in 
the (known) last period of interaction, when it does not make any more sense to 
build up reputation (since there is not future, contributing to the public good 
cannot induce any further contributions by the others). 
The strategies hypothesis is quite vague about the number of periods needed 
by a player to dissolve all his doubts about the others' rationality. Andreoni does 
not make any specific assumption with respect to this point and, at the best of 
my knowledge, no experimental study has examined this issue. However, since 
my analysis of the strategic type and the way in which the strategies hypothesis 
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is treated in this work require to know when exactly a player stops doubting 
about the rationality of his partners, throughout the thesis, I shall assume 
that the latter happens whenever an agent observes his partners to play the 
dominant strategy for two consecutive periods. Such an assumption is my own 
and the reader may well find that he (or she) disagrees. 
Theories of errors: confusion and simple learning 
A further explanation for contributing behaviour can be found in the inexperi- 
ence of the subjects. The lack of familiarity with the game may lead people to 
contribute out of confusion or error. 
Two different mistakes hypotheses have been proposed. One asserts that 
mistakes are random and derives from Ledyard's (1995) proposition that "sub- 
jects make mistakes, do not care, are bored, and choose their allocation ran- 
domly" (Ledyaxd 1995, p. 170). The other asserts that mistakes are systematic, 
in the sense that the players confuse the game they are in with one that is 
more common to their everyday experience. Failing to recognise the dominant 
strategy, they contribute because this is the social norm that they associate 
with the 'game of life' (i. e., with the everyday game). This hypothesis-called 
misidentification by Bolton et al. (1997)-is a specific interpretation of the 
argument advanced by Gale et al. (1995) in the context of ultimatum games. 
Notice that misidentification differs from random errors in two ways. First, it 
postulates a systematic pattern of contribution that random error does not. 
Second, it may be strategy sensitive in the sense that it may vary depending 
on the information about the others' contributions; Ledyaxd's statement of the 
mistakes hypothesis, on the contraxy, is strategy insensitive. 
Palfrey and Prisbey (1992) noticed that when the Nash equilibrium is a 
corner solution, the only way in which a subject can err is to contribute too 
much to the public good. Hence, contributions due to 'background noise' have 
been misinterpreted as purposeful contributions and this has led some authors 
to overstate the importance of altruism or strategic reputation-building play. " 
Palfrey and Prisbey turned their observation into a new hypothesis; namely, 
that confusion among the players might explain contributing behaviour. 
Andreoini (1988) proposed the simple learning hypothesis as an explanation 
of the decay phenomenon observed in public goods experiments. According 
to this hypothesis, subjects might not immediately understand the incentives 
of the game, but need time in order to realise that not contributing is the 
dominant strategy. Andreoni (1995a) argued that, only if confusion is the 
"See also Ledyaxd (1995, p. 147). 
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principal explanation for cooperation, the emphasis on learning in the literature 
is justified. 
Reinforcement learning models 
If subjects axe trying to learn (by some suitable groping process) what the ap- 
propriate strategy is, then a learning algorithm would provide the right model 
for describing the process. 12 If everyone learns, one should observe that con- 
tributions converge to the non-cooperative equilibrium after enough periods. 
This seems to happen after 10 iterations in small groups. We do not know, 
instead, how long it would take in large groups. 
Roth and Erev (1995) described a simple reinforcement learning algorithm 
predicting the dynamic path of play as people learn about the game and about 
the others' behaviour. The reinforcement was introduced to increase the fre- 
quency of those strategies which had more success in the past periods. 
The basic mechanics of the Roth-Erev model were as follows. Each player 
i begins the first round of the play, t=1, with an initial propensity to play 
his kth pure strategy given by some number qik(l). Repeated play modifies 
these propensities through a process of adaptation. If player i plays his kth 
strategy in round t and receives a payoff x, then the propensity to play k in 
round t+I is updated to qik(t + 1) = qik(t) + X; that is, the reinforcement 
which a player receives after playing a strategy k and receiving a non-negative 
payoff x is set equal to the payoff itself. 13 The probability that k gets played 
in round t is qik (t) /E qij (t), where the sum is taken over all pure strategies 
j of i. The predictions of the model were derived from computer simulations 
of the reinforcement process. The intermediate run of the average simulation 
path was then compaxed to the actual path observed in the experiment. 
The Roth and Erev model incorporates some of the robust properties of 
learning typical of the psychology literature. Specifically, the Law of Effect 
which states that the choices that have led to good outcomes in the past are 
more likely to be repeated in the future, and the Power Law of Practice which 
states that learning curves tend to be steep initially and then flatter. 
Roth and Erev took also into account the public good game known as 'best 
shot'. In this two-person game, the first mover chooses a contribution of tokens. 
After viewing the first mover's choice, the second mover makes a contribution. 
The maximum of the two determines the total cash to be divided: the larger the 
12 These types of models have been proposed by Boylan (1990); Crawford and Haller (1990); 
Kalai and Lehrer (1990)) Miller and Andreoni (1991); and Roth and Erev (1995). 
13 This way to model reinforcement was due to the fact that, in the three games in which 
Roth and Erev tested their model, all potential payoffs were non-negative. 
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maximum, the larger the pie. The largest payoff, however, goes to the player 
who contributes the least. Perfect equilibrium has the second mover doing all 
contributing and receiving, therefore, much less than the first mover. Along the 
equilibrium path, the best shot second mover has the opportunity to end the 
game with both players receiving nothing. 
Studies by Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989) and Prasniskax and Roth (1992) 
found that, after a few iterations., best shot play approaches 100% perfect equi- 
librium. This outcome was anticipated by the Roth-Erev model. 
Duffy and Feltovich (forthcoming) provided further evidence for reinforce- 
ment leaxning in best shot games. Miller and Andreoini (1991) demonstrated 
that replicator dynamics can explain some of the stylised fact in public goods 
experiments. 14 
In their model, Roth and Erev did not attempt to predict initial playing 
propensities which were taken as given. 15 Nevertheless, the way in which these 
initiaJ propensities are interpreted is important if one wants to compaxe rein- 
forcement leaxning with altruism, reciprocity and commitment theories. The 
crucial difference between reinforcement learning and these other theories seems 
to lie on the fact that the former assumes that all concerns for altruism, reci- 
procity or Kantian reasoning will dissipate with enough reinforcement of the 
right sort. 
4.3 How well do these theories perform in laboratory 
settings? 
The present section reports on a series of experiments which have been run in 
order to verify the descriptive power of the theories of cooperative behaviour 
described above. I shall start the discussion by taking up results dealing with 
repetition and the related issues of learning and experience. Then, I will focus 
on experiments expressly designed to separate confusion (or errors) from coop- 
erative or altruistic theories. Finally, since it will be shown that linear altruism 
models are not sufficient to account for all cooperation observed in public goods 
settings, I will examine the role and the weight (in comparison also with aJtru- 
14 A replicator dynamic is a simple and canonical dynamical representation that biologists 
use to formalise the genetic mechanism of natural selection. In this dynamic, the fraction of 
the population playing strategy k is determined by how well k faxes relative to the population 
average fitness. Note that this argument rewaxds strategies that do well against the population, 
not those that axe the best. 
"Roth and Erev first analysed the model using initial conditions drawn randomly from a 
uniform distribution, and then compared the model to experimental data using initial condi- 
tions fitted from the first round of play. 
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ism hypotheses) of framing, reciprocation and equity in explaining cooperation. 
4.3.1 Repetition, learning and strategies 
For those environments where contribution rates diminish after some number 
of iterations, the relevant point is to find out whether such a decay is due 
to leaxning or strategic behaviour. In analysing the experimental literature 
which tried to address the question of the relative importance of leaxning and 
strategies, there are a number of different dimensions to which we need to 
pay attention: 1) the Partners/ Strangers design; 2) the restart effect; 3) the 
subjects' end behaviour. 
The Partners/ Strangers design 
The truly innovative contribution of Andreoni's 1988 paper was the introduc- 
tion of the Partners/ Strangers design. In an Isaac and Walker environment 
with p=1, aIN = 0.5, N=5, and m= 50,16 Andreoni compared two dif- 
ferent treatments. In one, the Partners treatment, group members remained 
fixed throughout all the session, which consisted of a sequence of 10 decision- 
rounds. In the other, the Strangers treatment, group members were randomly 
re-assigned to new groups of 5 after each repetition. 
Andreoni's idea was to separate strategic play by Partners from non-strategic 
play by Strangers. In the Strangers condition, in fact, one should see only learn- 
ing: any increase in free-riding that is observed in such a condition cannot be 
attributed to strategic play but to the fact the subjects learn from their own 
experience that free-riding is the dominant strategy. On the other hand, any 
differential increase in free-riding that is observed between the two treatments 
can be attributed to strategic play, but not to learning. Suppose a subject is 
initially investing some positive amount in the public good, but learns in round t 
that free-riding is the single-shot dominant strategy. If he is a Partner-playing 
strategicallyýhe may continue to contribute to the public good; instead, if he 
is a Stranger, he has no incentive to continue cooperation (every game for him 
is, after all, an end-game). Therefore, if one believes in the strategies hypoth- 
esis, one should expect that giving by Partners will be greater than giving by 
Strangers, especially early in the game. 
Results of Andreoni's experiment are reported in Table 4.2. 
As can be seen, contrary to expectations and to the strategies hypothesis, 
subjects who could not play strategically actually provided more of the public 
"BSee p. 43 of this work. 
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Table 4.2: Andreoni's (1988) experiment: Average investment in public good 
per subject. 
Round 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All 
Partners 24.1 22.9 21.5 18.8 18.4 16.8 12.8 11.2 13.7 5.8 16.6 
Strangers 25.4 26.6 24.3 22.2 23.1 21.9 17.8 19.7 14.0 12.2 20.7 
Difference -1.3 -3.7 -2.8 -3.4 -4.7 -5.1 -5.0 -8.5 -0.3 -6.4 -4.1 
good than subjects who could. In all ten rounds of the experiment, in fact, 
Strangers contributed more than Partners. 
I have, however, some doubts about Andreoni's results. In particular, the 
Strangers treatment does not seem to be correctly designed: it goes to allow 
for strategic play. Indeed, since the experiment involved 20 subjects who, di- 
vided into 4 groups of 5, played the game ten times and since this structure was 
common knowledge, Strangers knew they would have met one another more 
than once. Such a knowledge may have, of course, influenced their behaviour 
inducing them to play strategically. Hence, any result concerning the learning 
hypothesis which is drawn in such a design does not appear extremely convinc- 
ing. As a consequence, also the possibility of using the comparison between the 
Partners and Strangers treatments to throw light on strategic play weakens. 
Andreoni's finding (that Partners contribute less than Strangers) has, in 
fact, shown itself not to be robust to replication. 
For instance, in an experiment directed to examine the Partners/ Strangers 
treatment, Weimann (1994) found no statistically significant difference between 
Partners and Strangers contributions. Specifically, only in 4 out of 30 cases 
significant differences were observed; in 3 out of these 4 cases, Partners made 
significantly higher contributions. This is at odds with Andreoni's results. 
However, the methodology used by Weimann for particular treatments was 
substantially different from that used by Andreoni. In Weimann's experiment, 
the Partners treatment was run in laboratory, while the Strangers treatment 
was run by phone and involved no personal contact with either the experi- 
menter or the other subjects. In addition, half of Weimann's subjects received 
information about the individual contributions of each member of their group, 
rather than information only about the total contribution of the group, as in 
Andreoni. While average contributions are indistinguishable in these two treat- 
ments, related work by Sell and Wilson (1991) shows that the variance of contri- 
butions differs substantially. Thus pooling observations from these treatments 
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as Weimann did is misleading. 
One more study that replicated Andreoni's experiment was carried out by 
Croson (1996). Her design differed from that of Andreoni in only two as- 
pects: the group size (4 rather than 5) and the subjects' initial endowment 
(25 rather than 50). Nevertheless, her results were in sharp contrast with those 
of Andreoni. In Croson's experiment, Partners always contributed more than 
Strangers, with the difference between the two narrowing as the end of the game 
approached. Hence, all her observations are compatible with the strategies hy- 
pothesis. 
Testing the robustness of Andreoni's findings was also part of the purpose 
of Burlando and Hey's (1997) experiment, which was run in two different ge- 
ographical places: in England (York) and in Italy (Turin). Burlando and Hey 
cast their experiment in terms of a public 'bad'. The results they obtained 
were decidedly mixed: the Partners/ Strangers distinction by itself was not sig- 
nificant. It appeared instead relevant when the data were split by nationality: 
for the English subjects, Paxtners free-rode rather more than Strangers (just 
like Andreoni discovered) although the difference in contributions was not sig- 
nificant; for the Italian subjects, on the contraxy, Partners free-rode less than 
Strangers. These findings give the impression that national differences (which, 
as the authors suggest, presumably reflect cultural, sociological and psycho- 
logical differences between subject groups) have a strong effect on individual 
behaviour. 17 
The difference in results between the considered studies highlights the im- 
portance of replications for economics experiments. When we are searching for 
robust behaviour, only by replicating experiments we can safely drawn conclu- 
sions about our investigations. 
The restart effect 
A second innovative feature of Andreoni's 1988 paper was that of introducing- 
and studying the effects of-a restart. The basic experiment was performed 
twice. After the announced end of the game, subjects were unexpectedly told 
that they would restart a new set of 10 rounds. Paxtners stayed in the same 
group, while Strangers continued to be randomly re-assigned. However, An- 
dreoni suspended the restart game after only three additional rounds. 
A short break between two subsessions allows for what is called in psy- 
chology cognitive dissonance, a moment in which players stop the continuity of 
17 Ledyard (1995) provides an excellent summary of the factors known to influence the level 
of public goods contributions. 
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decisions and/or actions and rethink about what to do next in the light also of 
the recent experience. 18 
Such a procedure was introduced in order to isolate the learning hypothesis. 
If learning is primarily responsible for decay, then the subjects-both Partners 
and Strangers-should be unaffected by the restaxt and their eventual trend 
towaxds the free-riding equilibrium should continue. 
At odds with the simple learning hypothesis, Andreoni observed a strong 
restart effect in the Partners treatment, '9 and a similar but weaker effect in the 
Strangers treatment. 
After reporting his results, Andreoni concluded that "neither strategies nor 
learning can be supported as explanations of decay in public goods experiments" 
(Andreoni 1988, p. 300), and that, in order to claxify such a phenomenon, we 
need to consider a richer set of behavioural motivations such as altruism, social 
norms, or regret. 
One problem in Andreoni's experimenta. 1 design is that his restart was not 
announced at the beginning of the experiment and the restart announcement 
(i. e., that the experiment would be replicated) was not carried through to com- 
pletion. As pointed out in the previous chapter (and as Andreoni himself ar- 
gues) '20 such 
deceptive practices are not recommended in economics experi- 
ments. 
Accordingly, both Croson (1996) and Burlando and Hey (1997) built in a 
restart into their procedures from the beginning. In their experiments, subjects 
were explicitly told that they would play two subsessions with a short break in 
the middle. 
In Croson's study, the restart effect was significant in the Partners condi- 
tion, 21 and insignificant but present in the Strangers condition. 
22 Both these 
results are consistent with those of Andreoni and contrary to the simple learn- 
ing hypothesis. Rather, according to Croson, they seem to provide evidence in 
favour of strategies. 
While Croson's experiment was a replication of Andreoni (1988) in which 
all ten restart rounds were reported, Burlando and Hey slightly altered 
An- 
dreoni's original design. Particularly, they allowed for a Partners (Strangers) 
"Akerloff and Dickens (1982) speak about the relevance of cognitive dissonance in eco- 
nomics. The classical reference for the phenomenon is Festinger 
(1957). 
"Partners' contributions increased sharply from the last round of the original game to the 
first round of the restart game. 
"Cf., Andreoni (1988, p. 295). 
2'Specifically, the average contribution in period 10 of the original gaane was 4,54 tokens, 
while that in period 1 of the restart game was 11.54. 
22 Here, the average contribution was 2.48 in round 10 of the original game, and 6.21 in 
round 1 of the restart game. 
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subsession following a Strangers (Partners) subsession and, if having two Part- 
ners subsessions (before and after the break), for a changing of the Partners 
in the second one. Such a design was adopted in order to study vaxious ef- 
e fects, including the so-called sequencing ffeCt23 and the relative strength of 
the restart phenomenon when a Strangers session follows or when a Partners 
session follows. 
Table 4.3 shows Burlando and Hey's experimental results in all various treat- 
ments. 
Table 4.3: Burlando and Hey's (1997) experiment: Differ- 
ences in percentages dumped before and after the restart. 
Total York Turin 
Partners then Strangers -4.5 -12.8 +3.8 
Strangers then Paxtners -3.9 -5.3 -2.5 
Partners then Partners a -16.3 -16.7 -15.9 
Partners then Partners b -0.6 -5.6 +4.4 
Strangers then Strangers -1.2 -2.4 0.0 
' Same partners. 
b Different partners 
A look at the data reveals that the greatest reduction in free-riding occurred 
when the two subsessions were both Partners sessions and, in particulax, when 
the Partners in the second subsession were the same as in the first one; this 
abets the strategies hypothesis. In contrast, the smaJlest fall in free-riding 
occurred when again both subsessions were Partners but the members of the 
group changed from the first subsession to the second. The second smallest 
restart effect was when both subsessions were Strangers sessions; this is clearly 
at odds with the simple learning hypothesis. 
Burlando and Hey's findings confirm, therefore, those previously found by 
both Andreoni and Croson and cast further doubts on the relevance of simple 
learning as an explanation for the observed decay in cooperation. Rather, their 
results appear to suggest that "subjects well understand both the potential ben- 
efits of sociaJly optimaJ behaviour and the importance of their fellow-paxtners 
understanding it also... With different paxtners, or with a new set of strangers, 
subjects could not be sure that other subjects appreciated the potential bene- 
fits from mutual cooperation, or were less inclined to bet on their group mates' 
23 Namely, whether subjects' behaviour in either Strangers or Partners sessions is influenced 
by prior experience in a different session. 
4.3 How well do these theories perform in laboratory settings? 66 
willingness to cooperate" (Burlando and Hey 1997, p. 57). This leads Burlando 
and Hey to conclude that: "... subjects are less concerned with strategic play 
against their partners and more concerned in understanding how their fellow 
subjects perceive the game" (Burlando and Hey 1997, ibidern). 
The final-round effect 
According to theory, any attempt of socially desirable behaviour should collapse 
completely in the final round of any session: in the Partners session, the scope 
for strategic behaviour disappears; in the Strangers session, all subjects should 
have learnt that zero contribution is the dominant Nash equilibrium. 
Andreoni found that contribution rates were least in the final round (the 
10th) both for Partners and for Strangers, but still above the zero investment 
level. Furthermore, in his experiment, the decay of average contributions in the 
last round was stronger in the case of Partners than in the case of Strangers. 
Weimann corroborated Andreoni's results. In his experiment, there was a 
clear final-round effect not leading to a (pure) free-riding outcome, and Part- 
ners showed a significantly stronger decay in their last round's contributions 
than Strangers. 
As fax as Croson's experiment is concerned, she found that in the final period 
of both the original and the restart games average contributions reached their 
minimum and that the final-round effect was stronger in the Paxtners groups 
than in the Strangers groups. 
In Burlando and Hey's experiment, if one considers as final period the end 
of the restart game (which is, indeed, the true end of the game since their 
subjects knew they would play again after the break), one has a confirmation 
of the increase in free-riding in the last round in comparison with the previous 
round. As to the Partners-St rangers distinction, instead, Burlando and Hey 
observed more cooperation from Strangers than Partners only in the last round 
of the first subsession (the original game), while the opposite was true for the 
second subsession (the restart game). 
Besides a confirmation of the importance of repetition on behaviour, the 
main points emerging from the four experiments described in this section are 
that cooperation prevails in public goods games against the Nash prediction, 
and that the simple learning hypothesis cannot be supported as an explanation 
of the decay phenomenon observed in these kinds of games. To the contrary, 
the reported observations appear to be compatible with different possible forms 
of strategic and non-standard behaviour, 24 though Andreoni's results and some 
24 If, by following Harsanyi, we define the behaviour of fully rational individuals as'standard', 
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findings of Burlando and Hey seem to contradict the reputation-building hy- 
pothesis. 
With respect to the various theories of cooperative behaviour, although 
these four experimental studies find space and scope for them, they were not 
designed to shed light on any particular hypothesis or to provide settings for 
comparing them. 
4.3.2 The noise versus altruism hypotheses 
This section concentrates on four experiments expressly designed to separate 
confusion from alternative cooperative theories. 
The possibility of confusion being the explanation for the findings reported 
in Subsection (4.3.1) was first proposed by Palfrey and Prisbey (1992). They 
asserted that the presence of altruism does little to explain the counter-intuitive 
results in Andreoni (1988) since in that experiment there was a lot of statistical 
variation across trials, which suggests that the data were noisy. Because of 
the usual experimental designs, 'noise' (in the sense of statistical deviation 
from the theoretical prediction) could only manifest itself as overcontribution. 
As a consequence, the importance of systematic findings such as altruism and 
strategic play has been overstated. Instead, according to Palfrey and Prisbey, 
most of the observed anomalies can be accounted for as background noise. 
To prove their point, they run an experiment in which each agent's marginal 
rate of substitution (hereafter, mrs) between the private and the public good 
was varied throughout the different periods. The results which Palfrey and 
Prisbey obtained in this eaxly study appear to be indecisive, but they continued 
on this line of enquiry with clearer experiments in later papers. 25 
To address the questions posed by misunderstanding and confusion, An- 
dreoni (1995a) devised another experiment which represents the first system- 
atic attempt to separate the hypothesis that cooperation in public goods ex- 
periments is due to kindness, altruism, or warm-glow from the hypothesis that 
cooperation is simply the result of errors or confusion. 
In this paper, Andreoni discarded reputation-building as an explanation for 
the lack of the dominant strategy in the laboratory (since subjects were found 
cooperating also in Strangers sessions) and concentrated only on two hypothe- 
ses: 1) the kindness hypothesis, according to which the free-riding hypothesis, 
we can correctly axgue that all models analysed in Section (4.2)-which axe outside of the 
classical, full rationality approach-provide examples of models of non-standaxd behaviour. 
25 Palfrey and Prisbey's 1996 and 1997 papers will be discussed in depth later in this section. 
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in its pure form, is incomplete and subjects have tastes for cooperation; 26 and 
2) the confusion hypothesis, according to which subjects have somehow not 
grasped the true incentives, due either to the experimenters' failure to ade- 
quately convey them or simply to their incapability of deducing the dominant, 
strategy. 
To distinguish between these two hypotheses, Andreoni compared a Regular 
condition (i. e., a standard public goods experiment) with one in which social, 
cultural and strategic incentives to cooperate were subtracted off, thus leav- 
ing confusion as the most reasonable explanation for cooperation. His design 
included, in fact, a second condition, the so-called Rank condition, in which 
subjects were paid according to their experimental earnings rank in compar- 
ison to the other subjects in their group rather than according the classical 
voluntaxy contribution mechanism. Specifically, the subject with the highest 
experimental earnings got the highest monetary payments, with payments de- 
creasing with rank; if there were ties, the payoffs were split among those who 
tied . 
27 Note that such a payment scheme converts the standard positive-sum 
public goods game into a zero-sum game. 
The important feature of the Rank condition is that, while preserving the 
dominant strategy equilibrium of the Regular condition (the way to get the 
highest rank in the group is to be the biggest free-rider, Le, to contribute zero), 
its rewaxd scheme offers no incentives for cooperation (if three subjects coop- 
erate they can all raise their own experimental earnings, but the experimental 
earnings of the other subjects will increase by even more). 
Since in the Rank condition subjects had information about their rank and 
were paid according to rank (whilst in the Regular condition subjects did not 
know their rank and got paid their experimental earnings), and since the rank 
information-apart from the payment by rank-could alter behaviour, An- 
dreoni introduced a third condition, the RegRank, for control. In this third 
condition, subjects had the same information on their rank as the Rank sub- 
jects, but they were paid according to their experimental earnings like the 
Regular subjects. 
Hence, Rank and RegRank conditions were identical except for the method 
of payment; as a consequence, the difference in cooperation between these two 
conditions provides an estimate of the number of subjects who understand 
26 While there axe various specific alternatives which may capture this (such as pure aJtruism 
or waxm-glow giving), Andreoni was not interested in discussing or investigating on them. He 
wanted only to distinguish the relevance of such an attitude, besides the specific reasons for 
it or the forms it may take. 
27 Paying subjects according to their rank was also done by Bolton (1991). 
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the incentives but cooperate out of kindness. On the other hand, since the 
difference in cooperation between Regular and RegRank conditions was only due 
to information on rank, it can be attributable to either kindness or confusion. 
The top panel of Table 4.4 lists the percentage of free-riders in any one 
round of Andreoni's experiment. 
Table 4.4: Andreoni's (1995a) experiment: Percentage of subjects contributing 
zero to the public good per round. 
Round 
Condition 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 9 10 
Regulax 20 12.5 17.5 25 25 30 30 37.5 35 45 
RegRank 10 22.5 27.5 40 35 45 50 67.5 70 65 
Rank 35 52.5 65 72.5 80 85 85 85 92.5 92.5 
Kindness: 
R, ank-RegR, ank 25 30 37.5 32.5 45 40 35 17.5 22.5 27.5 
As % of 100-Regulax 31.3 34.3 45.5 43.3 60.0 57.1 50.0 28.0 34.6 50.0 
Confusion: 
100-Rank 65 47.5 35 27.5 20 15 15 15 7.5 7.5 
As % of 100-Regulax 81.3 54.3 42.4 36.7 26.7 21.4 21.4 24.0 11.5 13.6 
Either: 
RegRank-Regulax -10 10 10 15 10 15 20 30 35 20 
As % of 100-Regulax -13.0 11.4 12.1 20.0 13.3 21.4 28.6 48.0 53.8 36.4 
As can be seen, Rank subjects free-rode the most, and Regular subjects the 
least. This suggests that subtracting incentives for kindness reduces consider- 
ably contribution. 
The bo-ttom of Table 4.4 uses the Rank condition by itself and the com- 
parisons between Rank and RegRank and between Regular and RegRank in 
order to sepaxate cooperation into each of the possible motives for every round. 
The measures of kindness and confusion reported in such a table indicate that 
over rounds 1-6 the total amount of cooperation was stable but the amount 
of confusion was declining rapidly and that of kindness was increasing; after 
round 6 confusion was rather stable, but kindness fell. Such a pattern points to 
a possible explanation for the decay phenomenon observed in public goods ex- 
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periments: "when individuals who start off confused finally learn the dominant 
strategy, it appears that they may first try to cooperate but then eventually 
turn to free-riding. This could suggest that, for some subjects, kindness may 
depend on reciprocity" (Andreoni 1995a, pp. 897-898). 
Andreoni's conclusions from this study can be summarised as follows: 
- both confusion and kindness are significantly present and merit greater 
consideration than what received; 
- confusion is especially apparent in the experiment because errors can only 
be in one direction (and so will not be averaged out of the aggregate data); 
- the focus on learning in experimental research should shift to include studies 
of preference for cooperation.. 
Palfrey and Prisbey (1996) maintained that Andreoni's paper and conclu- 
sions were only a partial recognition of the relevance of noise in explaining coop- 
erative behaviour. According to them, "a careful study... designed to precisely 
measure the relative contribution of each of the various proposed explanations 
has not yet been caxried out... The typical experimental designs do not permit 
precise measurement of the separate contribution of these diverse effects: al- 
truism, reputation-building, and noise" (Palfrey and Prisbey 1996, p. 410). As 
a consequence, they proposed an experiment specifically designed to sort out 
these effects and directly measure the separate contribution of each. 
Their study's basic premise was the statistical decomposition of individual 
behaviour into a systematic component (the decision rule) and a residual com- 
ponent (the noise, or error). In their opinion, in the context of linear voluntary 
contribution games, attention can be limited to very simple decision rules, called 
cutoff decision rules, in which individuals contribute if and only if their mrs 
between the private good and the public good is less than or equal to some 
critical value. 28 As for the noise component, Palfrey and Prisbey interpreted 
it as a random variation (over time) in subjects' observed decision rules due to 
extraneous factors which axe impossible to measure. 29 Given this interpreta- 
tion of the noise, they expected experience to lead to a decrease in noise and 
considered such a decrease as evidence of learning. 
In order to estimate the distributions of decision rules and error rates, Pal- 
frey and Prisbey systematically varied each subject's mrs. In every period, the 
mrs were independently drawn, for each individual, from a range of different 
28Perfectly self-interest behaviour is a special case where the critical value is 1; whilst, 
altruistic or reputation-building behaviours would be consistent with decision rules where the 
critical value is set higher than 1. 
29These factors would include, for instance, computational errors or errors associated with 
leaxning by doing. 
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values, such that for some values contributing nothing to the public good was 
the dominant strategy, while for other values the dominant strategy was to con- 
tribute everything to the public good. The variation of the mrs across periods 
generates data about decisions in different situations. 30 
Then, to break down the systematic component of decision rules and iden- 
tify the relative importance of altruism and strategic (reputation-building) be- 
haviour, Palfrey and Prisbey followed Andreoni's (1988) approach and used 
the Part ners-Strangers design. If reputation-building is relevant, then Part- 
ners should exhibit decision rules with higher critical points than Strangers. In 
addition, Partners should show significantly more decay. 
Let us now describe the details of Palfrey and Prisbey's experiment and the 
findings they obtained. They considered group of N subjects, each endowed 
with a divisible amount Xi of a private good which could be either kept or 
contributed to a public good. The marginal rate of transformation between the 
public and the private goods was one-for-one, and individual i's payoffs were 
generated by the following function: 
Ui (Xi, X-i) = vxi +VE xj + ri (Xi - xi), (4.5) 
joi 
where xi is individual i's contribution, V is the marginal value of the public 
good and it is the same for all individuals, ri is the marginal value of the private 
good and it is private information. 31 
By varying ri (Vi G N) over a sequence of 10 decision-periods, Palfrey and 
Prisbey were able to estimate i's decision rule Di(ri/V), where ri/V is i's mrs. 
Theoretically, such a decision ride should take the following form: 
Di(ri/V) 
01 if ri/V <1+ ai + ci, (4.6) 
Xj, otherwise, 
where ai is i's level of altruism and ci is a random error term. Such a rule 
represented the cut-point rule and the value ci =1+ ai was the cut-point. 
When ci =0 and the game has a finite number of periods, rule (4.6) coincides 
with the dominant-strategy rule. The inclusion of q accounts for the possibility 
of random errors or subjects' unpredictable behaviour. 
30None of the previous experiments varied individual incentives across decisions, nor did they 
provide explicit information about the distribution of incentives in the population. Palfrey 
and Rosenthal (1991) used an environment similar to the one explored by Palfrey and Prisbey, 
but the public good technology was step-level, not linear. 
31 In the experiment, the following parameters' values were chosen: N=4, Xi = 9, and 
V=6 or 10 points according to treatment. 
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Palfrey and Prisbey estimated subjects' decision rules by using the separate 
techniques of ordered probit and classification errors analyses. 
In the classification analysis, the authors proceeded by determining the rate 
of classification errors for each possible cut-point. For each token and for 
each subject i, i's decision was classified as an error if, under the hypothetical 
cut-point rule (4.6), i should have contributed the token but he did not, or i 
should have not contributed but he did. At the aggregate level, Palfrey and 
Prisbey estimated the common cut-point c* as the cut-point with the fewest 
classification errors. The common error rate e* was then set equal to the rate 
of classification errors if c* is the cut-point. 
Data showed that, for both the Strangers and the Partners treatments, c* 
1. This, according to Palfrey and Prisbey, suggests homogeneity of subjects' 
decision rules and no evidence either for aJtruism or for reputation-building. 
However, since in their experiment Strangers exhibited an higher error rate than 
Partners, the authors maintained that their data support the 'noise' hypothesis 
as explanation of the differences between the two treatments. 
An alternative approach used by Palfrey and Prisbey to measure an 'average 
decision rule' among subjects was the ordered probit analysis, in which they 
estimated the probability of any number of tokens contributed as a function 
of the mrs. 32 The results obtained with such an analysis confirmed those just 
described. Specifically: 
1) more noise in the Strangers treatments than in the Partners ones: strangers 
had flatter expected contribution curves and, therefore, a higher error rate; 33 
2) reduction of noise with experience: inexperienced subjects exhibited flatter 
response curves than experienced subjects; 
3) effect of 10-period repetition similar to experience effect: the response curves 
were steeper in the last half of a 10-period session than in the first half, even 
if the average contribution rate was unchanged. Such a result contradicts past 
findings of significant decay in contribution rates. But, according to Palfrey and 
Prisbey, there is no contradiction at all. "It simply means that the observed 
decay in past experiments was due to learning, not reputation7 (Palfrey and 
Prisbey, 1996, p. 422). This lack of reputation effects was also documented 
in the less decay found in the Partners treatment than in the Strangers one 
(although the difference was not statistically significant). 
From all these results, Palfrey and Prisbey's concluded that the observed 
32 This analysis implicitly assumes that all subjects use the same decision rule and that the 
random error terms Ei have a normal distribution with mean zero. 
33 Analysis at individual level then demonstrated that this might be due to more individual 
errors, more vaxiance across subjects, or a combination of both. 
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violations of the dominant-strategy prediction in voluntary contribution ex- 
periments axe due neither to altruism nor to strategic reputation-building be- 
haviour, but to statistical fluctuations in subjects' decisions, manifested as ran- 
dom noise in the data. 
Although the amount of noise in the data may explain the observed co- 
operation, Palfrey and Prisbey's findings appear doubtfIA for two reasons. First, 
their choice of the cutoff decision rule may significantly influence the results. 
Second, the great relevance attributed in the design of the decision problems 
to the mrs may influence players' behaviour, inducing them to concentrate on 
that aspect. 
In a more recent paper, Palfrey and Prisbey (1997) used the same design 
as in their 1996 paper to separate errors, linear altruism and 'warm-glow'. 34 
Also in this study, they focused on two aspects of the data: identifying errors 
or background noise (namely, observed behaviour which is inconsistent with 
standard theory) and measuring response functions. They estimated such func- 
tions at both the aggregate and the individual levels by using probit models 
and dichotomising the contribution decision (so that Vi E N, xi E 10,11). 
Allowing for warm-glow and linear altruism, the representative individual 
i's utility derived from the two options contr(ibuting) and not-contr(ibuting) 
was: 
Ui (contr) =V1: xj +V+ -yi + ai 
1: prj + 
jý4j joi (4.7) 
+ai(N- I)VExj +ai(N- 1)V+ci 
jý4j 
Ui (not-contr) =VE xj + ri + ai 
1: prj + ai (N - 1) V 
1: xj, (4.8) 
joi joi j: Ai 
where V, ri, and xi are as in Eq. (4.5), N is the number of players in i's group, 
-yi is i's warm-glow term, and prj denotes the benefits that subject j :ýi derives 
from his private account. ai and ci are (as in (4.6)) player i's linear altruism 
and error terms, respectively. Palfrey and Prisbey assumed that the error terms 
were independent, identical, normally distributed random variables with mean 
0 and standard deviation a. Note that, in the linear altruism model, i's utility 
34 As pointed out on p. 51, the last term-introduced by Andreoni (1989; 1990)-is meant 
to capture the utility which individuals derive from the act of contributing per se. 
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is a linear combination of his own earnings and the earnings of the other (N - 1) 
members of his group. 
Given Eqs. (4.7) and (4.8), the net utility from contributing is: 
Ui=Ui(contr)-Ui(not-contr)=, yi+(V-ri)+ai(N-1)V+ei. (4.9) 
Assuming that subject i would contribute if and only if Ui > 0, this gives the 
following dichotomous probit model: 
ci > (ri - V) - -yi - ai(N - I)V, (4.10) 
where the right-hand side contains all the elements of the subject's utility 
function which determine his choice xi. Inequality (4.10) was therefore the 
decision rule of this model. 
First, Palfrey and Prisbey carried out an aggregate analysis. Accordingly, 
the warm-glow and altruism effects were assumed to be the same across indi- 
viduals; i. e., Vi E N, -yi = -y and a, = a. Given the specification of the subject's 
decision rule and utility functions (4.9), by estimating a constant term and 
the coefficients of the variables (V - ri) and V, Palfrey and Prisbey obtained 
estimates of -y1a, 1/a and a(N - 1)/u, respectively. Thus, through algebric 
manipulation, they could directly estimate the occurrence of error (a), warm 
glow (-y) and linear altruism (a). 
Palfrey and Prisbey controlled also the effects of three more variables: expe- 
rience, which took value of 0 for decisions in the first ten-period sequence and 
1 for decisions in the second ten-period sequence; period, which varied from I 
to 10; and endow, which was 0 if the endowment was indivisible and I if it was 
divisible. 
From such aggregate probit analysis, Palfrey and Prisbey found strong ev- 
idence for warm glow and errors, but not for linear altruism. They also found 
that experience and repetition were significant explanatory variables, 35 both 
leading to a decline in contribution rates. But much of this decline was due to 
a reduction in error rates rather than to a change in the underlying decision 
rule. 
Palfrey and Prisbey further broke down the aggregate analysis at the in- 
dividual level by including a dummy variable for each individual, from which 
they estimated the actual distribution of individual warm-glow effects. 36 They 
found that considerably less than half the subjects had a warm-glow term signif- 
MThe coefficient on the endow treatment variable was, instead, insignificant. 
36 Palfrey and Prisbey felt confident that this specification captured the key component of 
subject heterogeneity in their experiment. 
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icantly greater than zero, and that no subject exhibited a significantly negative 
warm-glow term. 
Thus, this study's findings support those in Palfrey and Prisbey (1996) by 
suggesting that the decay phenomenon observed in public goods experiments 
is the result mainly of a reduction in the amount of subjects' decision errors 
combined with a lower variance in the distribution of individual warm-glow 
effects. It is not due to an overall decline in warm glow. This implies that 
"players do not become significantly more selfish with experience"; " rather, 
their preferences were shown to be relatively stable with respect to experience. 
A further answer to the relative importance of cooperative or altruistic mo- 
tives and errors in explaining the established contribution result comes from 
Brandts and Schram (1997). In their attempts "to take the study of voluntary 
contributions to public good one step further", 38 they proposed a new design 
for voluntary contribution mechanism experiments, in which subjects were re- 
quested to supply a complete 'contribution function' in every period, deciding 
a priori on their contribution level for different possible mrs. The main advan- 
tage of this new design is that it yields very rich information about individual 
behaviour, since in every period subjects made a number of decisions equal to 
the number of different mrs. Moreover, the values of the mrs were chosen such 
that for some of them it was a dominant and efficient strategy to contribute 
everything to the public good, for others it was dominant but not efficient to 
contribute nothing (the normal dilemma situation), and for others it was both 
dominant and efficient to contribute nothing. 
This design avoids a possible problem of Palfrey and Prisbey's design, 
namely a kind of instability into the environment induced by their having an 
independent random drawing for each individual in each period. Nevertheless, 
it preserves the important advantage of not concentrating exclusively on corner 
solution situations. 
Brandts and Schrwn's experament consisted of various sessions, each of 
which was run twice: once in Amsterdwn and once in Barcelona. Twelve sub- 
jects (divided randomly in 3 groups of 4) took part in every session that was 
implemented in a sequence of 10 decision-rounds. The task of the subjects was 
to invest 9 tokens in any of two accounts: A, the group account (yielding an 
identical amount of money to every member of the group), or B, the private 
account (yielding money to the subject alone). In each round, the division had 
to be made for 10 different situations characterised by different mrs, obtained 
"Cf., Palfrey and Prisbey (1997, p. 842). 
38 Cf., Brandts and Schram (1997, p. 3). 
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keeping the payoff to the public account constant but varying that to the pri- 
vate account. After each subject had finalised the division of tokens for all 
situations (i. e., mrs), one of these was randomly selected to be played and the 
experiment proceeded to the next period. 
Three treatments were studied: 1) homogeneous versus heterogeneous situ- 
ations, 2) partial versus full information and 3) paxtners versus strangers 
The first treatment varied the way in which the mrs were selected. In the 
heterogeneous situation, a mrs was chosen sepaxately for each individual (like 
in Palfrey and Prisbey's experiment) whilst in the homogeneous situation, the 
monitor selected a mrs per group. 
The second treatment (partial versus full information) controlled for the 
amount of information received by the subjects. In the partial information 
case, only the actual investment in the group account was given; 
39 in the full 
information case, each subject was told the sum of investments in the public 
account for each of the mrs separately. 
The last treatment distinguished a Partners case and a Strangers case like 
in Andreoni 1988. 
Brandts and Schram started the presentation of their results with an aggre- 
gate data analysis. They estimated two types of contribution functions, both of 
which were step functions. In paxticular, they considered a 1-step contribution 
function (which starts at any level x of tokens and has at the most a downwaxd 
step towards a lower level y of tokens)40 and a m-step contribution function 
(which allows for multiple steps, at any location (i. e., mrs) and for any number 
of tokens between 0 and 9 to be allocated at any mrs). For each of the two 
step functions, that minimising the sum of squared errors was chosen as the 
one best characterising subjects' aggregate behaviour. 
For all treatments together, Brandts and Schram calculated the best step 
functions over all periods and for period 10 only. 
The estimated m-step contribution function for all periods presented four 
steps; and the one for period 10 exhibited three steps. For the first two mrs 
(when it is a dominant strategy to contribute everything) the value of both 
these step functions was 9, and for the last two mrs (when it is both dominant 
and efficient to contribute nothing) their value was zero. Therefore, subjects in 
Brandts and Schram's experiment appeaxed to recognise the different situations: 
39Notice that this is not very informative for the heterogeneous situation, since a player did 
not know on which mrs the others' decisions were based. 
40The 1-step function with x=9 and y=0 is that investigated by Palfrey and Prisbey 
(1996). They minimised absolute errors, but, in their case, this is equivalent to minimise the 
sum of squared errors. 
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(in the aggregate) they did invest all their tokens in the public account when 
it was a dominant strategy to do so, while they did not put anything in the 
public account when it was inefficient to do so. In addition, the estimated m- 
step function overall periods predicted contributions of 12 out of 54 tokens in 
situations 3-8, where standard theory predicts zero. 
As for the class of 1-step functions, within it, the sum of squared errors 
was minimised when x=9 and y=1, with the downward step at mrs=1. 
Standard theory would predict a 1-step function with the step from 9 to 0 
tokens at mrs=1. This is the optimal 1-step function in Brandts and Schram's 
data if they set the restriction y=0. So only imposing this restriction, it is 
possible to argue that subjects behaved according to the theory. 
The authors, then, claimed that the m. -step function gives a better estimate 
of their data than the restricted I-step function. However, from an econometric 
point of view, this is a difficult claim to prove since Brandts and Schram did 
not correct for the number of degrees of freedom used. 41 
When all possible combinations of the three treatments were tested, only 
the main effect of full versus partial information was found to be statistically 
significant. Apparently, at the aggregate level, giving better information about 
the (sum of) the others' contributions yielded higher contributions. 
By turning the attention to Brandts and Schram's analysis of behaviour 
across individuals, their approach was to derive a representative step function 
for each subject and to classify individuals according to the characteristics of 
their step function. 
Specifically, the subjects whose step functions had only one step from 9 to 0 
between situations 2 and 3 were called individualists since they behave strictly 
according to the game-theoretic prediction. The subjects who exhibited step 
functions with more than one step between situations 3 and 8 (implying positive 
investments in the public account when the dominant strategy would be to 
invest zero) were classified as semi-individualists or cooperators depending on 
the number of tokens contributed. Subjects who deviated from the dominant 
strategy in situations 9 and/or 10 (implying positive contributions when zero 
contributions is both dominant and efficient) were defined altruists. 
Their data showed that the share of individualists (and semi-individualists) 
was 43.3%; that of cooperators was 31.8%, which became 42.7% by including 
altruists; that of unclassified was 14.1%. 
As for the effects of the three treatments at the individual level, Brandts 
4 'According to the authors, the integer values of the steps in the functions made it difficult 
to come up with a statistical test which would allow them to correct for the number of degrees 
of freedom. 
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and Schram expected that they should affect the behaviour of cooperators but 
not that of individualists (who are supposed to maximise private earnings ir- 
respective of the treatment they are in). Results confirmed these expectations. 
For the groups of individuaJists and unclassified, no significant treatment effects 
were found. For the cooperators, however, three significant effects were detected 
which can be summarised as follows: in Partners, full information yielded more 
cooperation than partial information; under full information, Partners cooper- 
ated more than Strangers; and in the heterogeneous case, Partners cooperated 
more than Strangers. These effects seem to imply that cooperators contributed 
more when it was easier to find out if other cooperators were present in the 
group. 
A further question addressed by Brandts and Schram was whether the pres- 
ence of multiple steps in the function characterising aggregate behaviour could 
be interpreted as (tacit) cooperation or as errors. The authors indicated two 
main reasons why the noise hypothesis could not be a full explanation of their 
data. First, the errors were not symmetric around mrs=l. Second, a large frac- 
tion of individuals consistently (over 10 periods) contributed substantial amount 
to the public account, while, in an errors interpretation, one would expect these 
individuals sometimes to contribute much and sometimes to contribute little. 
Finally, Brandts and Schram investigated the presence of 'other-regarding' 
motivations in their data. First, they analysed warm-glow and linear altruism 
by estimating a model based on that introduced by Palfrey and Prisbey (1997). 
Then they added reciprocal altruism by following the formulation proposed by 
Levine (1998). 42 
The evidence from the first analysis provided support for both linear aJtru- 
ism and warm-glow. The presence of a positive and significant linear altruism 
term contrasts with Palfrey and Prisbey's findings. In addition, when Brandts 
and Schram estimated the warm-glow terms in model (4.10) at the individual 
level and considered the concentration of waxm-glow in groups for periods 1 and 
10, they found that such a concentration in specific groups was much larger in 
period 10 than in period 1. In the standard interpretation, waxm-glow is a 
trait which should not be affected by interaction with others. This, according 
to Brandts and Schram, suggests that model (4.10) may be misspecified. 
Levine's (1998) model aJlowed the authors to incorporate reciprocal altruism 
in (4.10). Results from this extended model showed a slight increase in the 
warm-glow term, a virtually unaJtered value for the error a, and a positive and 
42 In Levine's (1998) model, the weight attributed to the others' income depends on what 
the others' level of altruism is believed to be. Levine found support for his model in data from 
various kinds of experiments, including voluntary contribution mechanisms. 
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significant value of the parameter that brought reciprocity in the model. 
Brandts and Schram's experiment makes it evident that the important is- 
sue is no longer whether cooperation takes place, but what kind of cooperative 
model best explains the data. While Palfrey and Prisbey (1997) attributed ob- 
served contributions to a combination of warm-glow and error, Brandts and 
Schram cast some doubt on the warm-glow being the only kind of other- 
regarding behaviour. Indeed, their experimental results indicated that some 
kind of reciprocal motivation is necessary to explain the data. This also means 
that the lineax altruism model is not sufficient as a cooperative model. Other 
aspects of public goods dilemma need, therefore, to be considered among which 
the role of reciprocal motivations and their weight in comparison with alterna- 
tive theories of cooperation. 
4.3.3 Framing, altruism, reciprocation and distributive con- 
cerns 
Andreoni (1995b) tried to address the puzzling question of the diversity of out- 
comes generated by public goods experiments with respect to an important col- 
lection of other experiments with externalities, such as common-pool resource 
and oligopoly experiments, which (unlike the former) tend to confirm the Nash 
equilibrium prediction. He noticed that one main difference between these two 
categories of experiments is that in public goods experiments subjects are asked 
to generate negative externalities while, in all the others, subjects generate pos- 
itive externalities. Since, in Andreoni's opinion, such a difference aJone might 
explain the gap between the results, he examined the effects of positive and 
negative framing on cooperation. 
Thus, he compared a standard public good game (that he called positive- 
frame condition since, in it, the subject's choice is modelled as contributing to 
a public good which has a positive benefit to other people) with one obtained 
by simply framing the subject's choice as purchasing a private good that, since 
the opportunity cost is investing in the public good, makes the others worse off. 
This was the negative-frame condition which, aside from the different decision 
framing, preserved the subjects' incentives: in it, a self-interested player still 
had a dominant strategy to free-ride. 
In his experiment, Andreoni used 80 subjects (40 for each condition). Partic- 
ipants played the game for 10 rounds and, in order to avoid reputation building, 
they were randomly assigned to new groups each round. 
Andreoni found that the difference between the two conditions was quite 
striking and statistically significant, with subjects being much more coopera- 
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tive in the positive-frame condition than in the other. In particular, average 
contributions were 33.6% in the positive frame and only 16.2% in the negative 
frame. The difference, round by round, between the two conditions went from a 
minimum of 4.9% to a maximum of 26.1%, with an average of 17.4%. A Mann- 
Whitney rank-sum test rejected the null hypothesis of no difference between 
conditions at a level of significance beyond the 0.001 percent. 43 
Similar results were obtained with respect to the percentage of subjects who 
chose the dominant strategy of free-riding during each iteration of the game. 
On average, 63.5% of negative-frame subjects free-rode in any round, which 
was nearly twice the rate of positive-frame subjects (34.5%). In addition, the 
difference between frames increased over the course of the experiment. 
The hypothesis that the negative frame made the incentives clearer to the 
subjects was rejected on the basis of a post-experimentaJ questionnaire. Only 
one subject in the positive-frame session failed to recognise what choice on his 
part would maximise his payoffs. 
Hence, according to Andreoni's data, framing the choice as a positive exter- 
nality substantially increases cooperation over framing the decision as a negative 
externaJity. 44 
From such a result Andreoni deduced that the positive frame of the game 
causes certain behaviours that are not activated at the same degree by framing 
the decision as a negative externaJity, and that, in order to explain this, it is 
necessary to go beyond an assumption of pure altruism. 45 Thus, Andreoni's 
conclusions were that "there must be some asymmetry in the way people feel 
personafly about doing good for others versus not doing bad: the waxm-glow 
must be stronger than the cold-prickle" (Andreoni 1995b, p. 13). 
As emphasised earlier, another line of experimental inquiry into subjects' 
contributing behaviour focused on the role played by reciprocity theories and 
on their relevance with respect to alternative models of cooperative behaviour. 
Bolton, Brandts and Katok (1997) (henceforth, BBK) considered six dif- 
43 This test organises the data by subjects and is normally distributed. It was conducted 
by first calculating the mean contribution level for each subject and then ranking subjects by 
these means in the joint sample. Under the null hypothesis, the sum of the ranks should be 
equal across conditions. 
44 This result was somehow questioned by the evidence reported in Burlando and Hey (1997). 
As pointed out earlier, in this paper, the authors were not interested in a compaxison of 
framing, but they had a sort of negative frame (different from that of Andreoni) since they 
rephrased the problem in terms of public bad instead of public good. Their results were in 
between those registered by Andreoni (1988) and those registered by Weimann (1994), both of 
whom used a positive frame. Thus, Burlando and Hey's conclusions were that other differences 
(like nationaJity) are more relevant than the kind of framing explored by Andreoni. 
"'Since the payoff space was identical in both frames, caxing only about the others' payoffs 
(as pure altruism models state) is not sufficient to generate the differences observed. 
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ferent hypotheses for contributions in dilemma games. Each hypothesis was 
classified in two ways: 1) by whether the key concept was altruism, mistakes or 
norms of cooperation; 46 and 2) by whether the hypothesis was strategy seinsi- 
tive (in the sense that its predictions about contributions depend on information 
about others' behaviour). 
Table 4.5 summarises the six hypotheses 'constructed' by BBK. 
Table 4.5: Classification of BBK's hypotheses by key concept and strategy 
sensitivity. 
Strategy Sensitive Strategy Insensitive 
Altruism 
Norms of Cooperation 
Mistakes 
Distributive altruism Joint payoff maximisation 
Direct reciprocity Unconditional cooperation 
Misidentification Random errors 
Since these hypotheses were tested in a simple two-person dilemma game, 
I shall use this type of game in order to describe them. For this purpose, let 
us indicate the two players with A and B, and let XA and XB denote their 
respective monetary payoffs. 
Distributive altruism asserts that distributional concerns are central, and 
it relates to the equity (or inequality aversion) models discussed in Subsec- 
tion (4.2.2). 47 According to this hypothesis, contributing player A has pref- 
erences over the 'commodity bundle' (XA, XB), which (by following Becker's 
(1974) public good model) was interpreted as 'social income'. In order to obtain 
sharp predictions, it was assumed that both arguments in the utility function 
were normal goods. 48 Distributive altruism is strategy sensitive because A's 
contribution depends critically on B's contribution which affects the available 
social income. 
According to the alternative concept of altruism, joint payoff maximisation, 
contributing player A prefers a higher value Of XA + XB to a lower value, so 
that only efficiency matters, distribution does not. Such hypothesis is strategy 
insensitive since contributions are independent on A's expectations of what B 
will do. 
As for the two norms of cooperation, direct reciprocity says that player A 
"As will be clarified later, by norms of cooperation BBK mean those theories which re- 
formulate the choice rule of orthodox game theory and which have been discussed in Subsec- 
tion (4.2.3). 
47 In such models, indeed, players axe assumed to care about the distribution of payoffs 
between self and the rest of the group. 
48 The latter assumption implies that as the available social income rises, A's choice of both 
XA and XB rises. 
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contributes more than the minimum only if he expects B to do likewise (so 
it is strategy sensitive), whilst unconditional cooperation states that player A 
contributes a positive amount independent of what he expects B to do (so it is 
strategy insensitive). 49 
Finally, the two mistakes hypotheses axe the ones identified on p. 58 exactly 
as random errors and misidentification. The former asserts that contributing 
player A chooses his strategy randomly and it is, therefore, strategy insensitive. 
The latter claims that player A, failing to recognise the dominan't strategy, 
contributes a positive amount because this is the social norm he associates 
with the everyday game. Misidentification may be strategy sensitive because, 
by observing B's behaviour, A could learn the equilibrium of the game. 
In order to test these hypotheses, BBK exploited their being strategy sen- 
sitive or not. Accordingly, they run three different treatments which varied 
what A knew about B's choice. The uninformed treatment was a standard 
simultaneous-move dilemma game: player A chose a level of contributions be- 
tween I and 6 without knowing B's choice, and player B chose one of two levels 
of contributions (either I or 2) without knowing A's choice. The informed treat- 
ment differed from the previous one in only one way: player A chose contingent 
on B's choice; that is, A made two choices, one for each of B's potential con- 
tributions., 50 Finally, the dictator treatment was as the uninformed treatment, 
except that, in it, B had only one choice (i. e., contributing 2); this made A 
a 'dictator'. The dictator game shares two important features with dilemma 
games: A's dominant strategy is to contribute the minimum possible, and de- 
viations from such a dominant strategy increase joint payoffs. 
Let §A be player A's mean contributions. By thinking of the informed 
treatment as composed of two halves: one for A's choice when B chooses I and 
one for A's choice when B chooses 2, the prediction of each hypothesis about 
ýA'S pattern across treatments (i. e., about how §A will (or will not) shift) can 
be summarised as depicted in Table 4.6.51 
In the experiment, each subject played in two treatments whose correspond- 
-12 ing games were one-shot (i. e., were played just once). A and B roles were 
49Notice that unconditional cooperation is what I referred to as Kantian behaviour, while 
direct reciprocity is a simplified version of Sugden's principle of reciprocity. 
5OThis game is strategically equivalent to having B choosing first and A choosing after being 
informed of B's choice. Such a method provides a more complete portrait of A's behaviour. 
Although, according to standard theory, asking a subject for a conditional choice is equivalent 
to asking for a choice after he sees his partner's move, these two methods can produce modest 
but significant differences in results (cf., Camerer et al. (1996)). 
5'See 1313K (1997, pp. 12-13) for an explanation of this table's entries. 
52 According to BBK, the simplicity of their game made repetition for the sake of learning 
about the environment unnecessary. 
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Table 4.6: BBK's (1997) experiment: Predictions about player A's 
mean contributions. 
Hypotheses Predictions 
Joint Payoff Maximisation §U A §Il = A §12 = A ýD =6 A 
Distribiltive Altruism §12 A 
§D > A 
§U > 
A- 
§Il 
A 
Unconditional Cooperation §U A §Il A §12 = A §D A 
Direct Reciprocity T2 §; i > -11 9A §D; A §12 U> Il A> §A - 
jA 
Random Errors §U A 
§Il 
A 
§12 = A 
§D 
A 
Misidentification §Il A 
W; 
A §U > A- §D A 
U Uninformed treatment; Il = Informed treatment when B chooses 1; 
12 Informed treatment when B chooses 2; D= Dictator 
alternated between treatments and subjects were not told the outcome of the 
first game prior to playing the second (thus, the experiment had a 'no feedback' 
design). 
Data analysis showed that contributions were higher in the dictator treat- 
ment and in the informed treatment when B chooses 2 than in the other two 
treatments. Specifically, in terms of Table 4.6 notation, the experimental results 
can be stated as follows: 
§12 = §D > §U = §Il (4.11) AAA 
BBK, then, considered which of the six hypotheses had the reasonably ac- 
curate predictive power so as to explain the results summarised in (4.11). They 
found that all strategy insensitive hypotheses as well as misidentification failed 
to capture one (or more) aspect(s) of the observed pattern. of comparative stat- 
ics, and that direct reciprocity failed not only in capturing observed features 
but also because some of its predictions were not detected. Only distributive 
altruism appeared to be both sufficient and necessary to explain the data. Suffi- 
cient because by itself it was consistent with (4.11); i. e., it matched the observed 
pattern of contributions. Necessary in that no combination of the remaining 
five hypotheses was consistent with (4.11). 
Their findings led the authors to two conclusions. First, an explanation of 
contributing behaviour must be strategy sensitive. Second, out of the strategy 
sensitive hypotheses, only distributive altruism seems to be an appropriate basis 
for modelling contributing behaviour. Thus, BBK's study-suggesting a role 
for distributional considerations-supports equity theories as a plausible expla- 
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nation for cooperative behaviour; these theories affirm, indeed, that it suffices 
to consider preferences over payoff allocations for explaining cooperation. 
The lack of any evidence for direct reciprocity appears a quite surprising 
result. The high contributions of player A in the dictator game (where B does 
nothing) demonstrated that not all contributions can be attributed to rewarding 
partners for doing the same. On the other hand, the failure to observe higher A's 
contributions in the informed treatment when B chooses 2 (and so he performs a 
worthy act) confirmed that the proportion of subjects behaving in accordance 
with reciprocal motivations was negligible. Nevertheless, there may be some 
doubts about the power of the statistical tests used by BBK to prove such 
a result. 53 In addition, the fact that the informed treatment was divided in 
two paxts and the tests were conducted separately for each paxt might have 
influenced the results by hiding some direct reciprocity. 
Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (1998) extended the experiment of BBK to a 
test of two hypotheses, both of which were considered as two characterisations 
of reciprocity: the intentional hypothesis and the distributional hypothesis. The 
former asserts that reciprocity is triggered by well or ill-intended acts so that 
the reciprocal agent must interpret whether an action was intended to help or 
hurt him; once determined, he responds with what he considers a fair return. 
The alternative characterisation of reciprocity is on the line of the equity the- 
ories and says that the reciprocator simply acts to implement his exogenous 
preferences over payoff distributions, independently of any assessment of in- 
tentionality. Results of this experiment con-firmed those of BBK by providing 
strong evidence for distributional preferences and, thus, for equity theories. 
However neither the ERC model nor the Fehr-Schmidt model can explain 
results such as Blount (1995) and Charness and Haruvy (1999). 
Blount's (1995) experiment looked for evidence of equity in two ways. Sec- 
ond mover rejections in a standard ultimatum game were compared first with 
rejections in a treatment in which an outside party, receiving no payoff for the 
game, named the proposal, and second with rejections in a treatment in which 
the proposal was randomly selected. Applied in the most straightforward man- 
ner, equity models predict the same rejection rate in all three treatments. The 
experiment contradicted this prediction: the 'minimum acceptable offer' aver- 
aged 12% of the pie in the random treatment, but 29% in the outside party 
treatment. 
53 In particular, the authors statistically compare contribution distributions in the various 
treatments by using a t-test of the difference between means (which checks for a location 
shift) and an empirical X2 -test whose p-values were averages from five 20.000 trial samplings 
of the contingency table distribution. 
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Chaxness and Haruvy (1999) applied Blount's framework to a gift-exchange 
54 
game with employers and employees, where the source of the wage differed 
across treatments and was known to be generated or by a self-interested em- 
ployer (the standard treatment), or by a draw from a bingo cage (the random 
treatment), or by the experimenter in advance (the outside party treatment)- 
The authors' aim was to assess the relative success of three approaches to co- 
operative behaviour (altruism, equity and intentional reciprocity) in explaining 
their data. They found that equity models outdid pure altruism explanations 
when employers determined wage, but that the former were inferior to the latter 
when wages were determined exogenously. Thus, "... it seems that, despite the 
important insight they provide, neither the simple altruism nor the pure equity- 
based models can explain behavior in the experiments analyzed in this paper" 
(Charness and Haxuvy 1999, p. 25). On the other hand, also the conventional 
model of reciprocity (which does not explicitly address distributive concerns) 
was found unsuccessful, while a formulation of reciprocity which nests altruism 
as a special case did well. Such results led the authors to conclude that "any 
successful model must accommodate the concerns of altruism, distribution and 
reciprocity" (Chaxness and Haruvy 1999, p. 28). 
A further experiment directed to distinguish between alternative behavioural 
theories was carried out by Croson (1998b), whose results contrasted with those 
of Bolton, Brandts and Katok (1997), and Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (1998) 
since they provided strong support for reciprocity theories over either theories 
of altruism and commitment. 
She run four separate experiments designed to distinguish among these the- 
ories by comparing their statics predictions. In all experiments, she used a 
typical voluntary contribution mechanism environment as that described in 
Subsection (2.3.2), where N=4, m= 25, and MPCR=0.5. The mechanism was 
implemented in two sequences of 10 rounds each. Subjects played the first 10- 
period game, and then were told that there was enough time to play a second 
identical 10-period game (as in Andreoni (1988)). 55 
In the first of her four experimental studies, Croson tested the comparative 
54 A classicaJ experiment involving the gift-exchange ganie was proposed by Fehr et W. 
(1993). In this experiment, subjects assigned the role of firms offer a wage to those assigned 
the role of workers. The worker who accepts the wage then chooses an effort level. The higher 
the level chosen, the higher the firm's profit and the lower the worker's payoff. The game 
is essentially a sequential prisoner's dilemma, in which the worker has a dominant strategy 
to choose the lowest possible effort. The only subgame-perfect wage offer is the reservation 
wage. 
55Doubts about the no announcement of the restaA from the beginning of the experiment 
have been expressed on p. 64 of this work, with respect to Andreoni's (1988) study. 
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static predictions of models of commitment, altruism and reciprocity by inves- 
tigating the relationship between an individual's contributions and his beliefs 
about the contributions of the others. 
Accordingly, in such a study, people's expectations about others' behaviour 
were elicited. Specifically, each period, before taking a contribution decision, 
subjects were asked to estimate the total number of tokens that the other three 
group members would contribute to the public good in the upcoming decision 
period. Subjects were compensated for accurate estimates. 
Given Croson's interpretation of the three models, 56 in her experiment, 
models of commitment predict a zero relationship between subjects' contribu- 
tions and their expectations, models of altruism predict a negative relationship 
and models of reciprocity a positive relationship. 
Random effects regressions estimated either over all 20 periods or by sep- 
arating the first 10 periods from the second 10 periods of the game yielded 
identical results. Both reported a significant positive relationship between an 
individual's expectations and his own contributions. Such a result strongly 
supported reciprocity theories over the alternative two models. 
An analysis carried out at the individual level (by calculating the inter- 
esting relationship for every participant) revealed that 22 out of 24 subjects 
(almost 92%) exhibited a positive relationship, consistent with models of reci- 
procity; only two subjects presented a negative relationship; and no-one a zero 
relationship. 
Although all these findings appeared encouraging for reciprocity theories, 
it might be either that asking subjects to estimate the others' contributions 
led them to think reciprocally where they would not otherwise (an 'elicitation 
hypothesis'), or that the repeated-game nature of the experiment caused the 
positive relationship rather than reciprocity per se (a 'reputation hypothesis'). 
In order to verify these two possibilities, Croson run two more experiments 
for control. Neither of these further experiments involved the elicitation of 
expectations about others' action. 
Except for the exclusion of the estimation stage, the experiment directed 
to test the elicitation hypothesis was identical to the first one. Twenty-four 
subjects, different from the previous subjects but from the same subject pool, 
participated in this experiment, arranged in 6 groups of 4. 
Here, Croson was interested in the relationship between individuals' own 
contributions and the actual total contributions of the other group members. 
A zero relationship is predicted by commitment theories, a negative relationship 
56She adopted the models of altruism, reciprocity and commitment presented in Subsec- 
tions (4.2.2) and (4.2.3). 
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by altruism theories, and a positive relationship by reciprocity theories. 
Random effects regressions estimated for both the previous and this new 
experiments reported, in accordance with the reciprocity hypothesis, a signifi- 
cant positive relationship. Analysis at the individual level showed that, in the 
previous experiment, 21 out of 24 subjects exhibited a positive relationship be- 
tween their own contribution and the actual contributions of the others, only 3 
exhibited a negative relationship and no subject exhibited a zero relationship. 
The pattern in the experiment without the guessing stage was similar: 19 out 
of 24 subjects exhibited a positive relationship, only 5a negative relationship 
and no-one a zero relationship. 
Therefore, even if there were some differences in the level of contributions 
between the two studies, results from this second experiment demonstrated that 
the comparative statics of reciprocity models remain the most consistent with 
the data even when expectations are not elicited. Such a result allowed Croson 
to reject the elicitation hypothesis. 
As pointed out earlier, a further concern of the author was that the observed 
positive relationship arose from some sort of reputation-building rather than 
from reciprocity. Hence, to directly test this reputation hypothesis, Croson 
run a third experiment, in which she implemented Strangers sessions: after 
each period, subjects were randomly re-assigned to new groups of four. If 
the previously observed positive relationship was due to reputation issues, one 
should observe a zero relationship in the experiment with Strangers. 
At odds with the reputation hypothesis and consistent with reciprocity mod- 
els, a significant positive relationship between own and others' actual contri- 
butions was detected in this experiment as well. In addition, by comparing 
the interesting relationship at the individual level, Croson found that most of 
the subjects (almost 71%) exhibited a positive relationship. In contrast to 
the previous experiments, however, 4 subjects displayed a zero relationship; 
closer inspection of the data revealed that such relationships were generated 
by subjects who fully free-rode (i. e., contributed zero) throughout the entire 
experiment. 57 
Thus, while there were more free-riders and lower contributions in this 
experiment than in the previous ones, results were still supportive of the com- 
parative statics of reciprocity theories over those of commitment and altruism. 
Having demonstrated support for reciprocal concerns in three different set- 
tings, Croson turned to a fourth study in which she provided a chaxacterisation 
57This result of more free-riding in Strangers experiments than among stable groups of 
Partners appears consistent with Croson's (1996) previous experimental research. On this 
topic, see also Keser and van Winden (2000). 
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of the type of reciprocity which individuals exhibit. 
As stated in Subsection (4.2.3), Sugden's model of reciprocity suggests that 
agents will match the minimum contribution of the others. In contrast, we can 
imagine different types of reciprocity in which subjects try to match the average 
contribution of the others, or even the maximum. Croson (1998b) specifically 
addressed this question by carrying out an experiment where she distinguished 
among these different specifications of reciprocity. 
In this further experiment, Partners treatments were used, no elicitation of 
beliefs was made, and all parameter values were the same as in the previous 
experiments. However, in contrast to the previous experiments, after each 
period, subjects were informed not only of the aggregate contribution of the 
other three group members, but also of their individual contributions. Thus, 
subjects could attempt to match the maximum, the minimum or the middle 
contribution of their fellow members. 
Data from this study demonstrated that middle reciprocity was a better pre- 
dictor than either minimum or maximum reciprocity, which means that subjects 
tried to match the median or average contributions of the others rather than 
the minimum (as Sugden suggests) or the maximum. 
Croson's (1998b) experimental studies, therefore, indicate reciprocal con- 
cerns as the main factors which motivate people to make voluntary contribu- 
tions in social dilemma situations. According to her data, players act as though 
part of their objective is to match the contributions of the other group members. 
4.4 Summary and conclusions 
An overall look at the experimental literature taken up in the previous section 
reveals that in some cases the results are in quite sharp contrast. The experi- 
ments dealing with the issues of learning and experience (with which I began 
the discussion) found evidence for strategic and non-standard behaviour, but 
not for simple learning. 
In an experiment expressly designed to separate the hypothesis that coop- 
eration is due to kindness, altruism or waxm-glow from the hypothesis that it 
is simply the result of errors or confusion, Andreoni (1995a) found out that on 
average half of all cooperation comes from subjects who understand free-riding 
but choose to cooperate out of some form of kindness. 
By allowing for interior solutions, Palfrey and Prisbey (1996,1997) at- 
tributed the observed contribution and the decay phenomenon to a combina- 
tion of waxm-glow and error (rather than to altruistic or strategic behaviour). 
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However, in a related model, Brandt and Schram (1997) cast doubt on the 
warm-glow being the only kind of non-selfish motivation: while confirming 
that linear altruism is not sufficient as cooperative model, their study indicated 
that reciprocal concerns matter as well. 
On the other hand, in a simple two-person dilemma game, Bolton, Brandts 
and Katok (1997), and Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (1998) did not find evi- 
dence for direct reciprocity but for distributive altruism (preferences over payoff 
distribution consistent with Becker's utility functions for public goods games). 
Instead, in a typical voluntaxy contribution mechanism envirom-nent, Croson 
(1998b) provided strong support for reciprocity theories over theories of altru- 
ism or of commitment. 
These divergences among results and interpretation of them imply that the 
issue of which approach best explains the data remains open. 58 Each of the 
models of cooperative behaviour considered can, in fact, explain outcomes in 
only some subset of the various experimental settings. No model has shown 
itself to be able to account for all observed cooperation. This suggests that 
some of the reasons for people voluntarily contributing to public goods remain 
to be found. 
Thus, the challenge is to construct a model of cooperative behaviour (from 
principles consistent with the capability and the limitations of the human mind) 
which can explain previously inexplicable cooperation. This will be the purpose 
of Chapter 5, where I will propose a new explanation of what motivates people 
under different circumstances including voluntary contributions to public goods. 
The basic premise of this study is that I am not looking for one grand theory 
capable of explaining all significant phenomena in the games we are interested 
in. Indeed, in my opinion as well as in that of other authors, 59 many factors 
influence human behaviour and it is (probably) impossible to capture all of 
them in a single model. 
"We must, however, take into account the different features of the designs as well as the 
different purposes which the various experiments pursued. 
59See, for example, Bolton (1998); and Charness and Haruvy (1999). 
Chapter 5 
The persuasion hypothesis: 
what it is and how it works 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I shaJI propose a new alternative hypothesis about what moti- 
vates people to voluntarily contribute. 
The hypothesis is relatively simple. It rests on two principles that seem to 
have a strong common sense. An agent understands the benefits that he himself 
can obtain if the public good is provided and, consequently, he contributes in 
order to persuade his partners to perform such an action. Indeed, in a repeated 
game where verbal communication is forbidden, the only way that a player has 
got to signal information to the others is by his choices of moves as the game 
proceeds. Thus, if a subject grasps the advantages that he (himself) can have if 
all group contribute to the public good, he may decide to contribute a constant 
amount along a sequence of decision periods in order to set an example to his 
'selfish' fellow members and push them towaxds his same choice. 
The fundamentaJ assumption upon which I build my behavioural hypoth- 
esis is that, at the start of the game, a persuasive player must be sure that 
from a certain period onwards (let us say from period M onwards) his selfishly- 
maximising partners will follow his contributing decision. Only if an agent holds 
this expectation, it makes sense for him to unconditionally contribute (i. e., to 
contribute independently of the others' behaviour) for the first p periods of the 
game. 
What happens then if, in the Mth period, the persuasive agent reaJises that 
the other group members are actually not willing to modify their attitude and 
keep on free-riding? It seems reasonable to suppose that, if his expectations 
are not fulfilled, he gives up his constant contribution and starts following an 
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alternative decision rule. 
Specifically, I assume that, in all periods after p, the persuasive player recip- 
rocates the others' decisions. Such a reciprocal behaviour is here taken to mean 
that, from period M+1 forward, he perseveres with his constant contribution 
as long as he observes that everyone else does so; otherwise, he modifies his 
contribution in the direction of the others' average contribution in the previous 
period. This implies that he increases (decreases) his contribution if it was 
below (above) the average of the others. 1 
Two key observations from former dilemma games experiments have formed 
the basis for the development of my ideas. 
First, the frequency with which an individual chooses to cooperate after 
several cooperative outcomes have occurred. Such a frequency implies that the 
individual does not take advantage of the others' willingness to cooperate by 
switching to the immediately rewaxding (defecting) strategy. This seems to 
support a theory of reciprocity (according to which an individual's regard for 
the utility of the others depends on how 'kind' the others are towards him). 
But, if reciprocity is the principle underlying behaviour, it is not easy to 
explain a second key observation; namely, that people tend to repeat coopera- 
tive choices after they have just cooperated without reciprocation. Experimental 
evidence shows, indeed, that there exist subjects who cooperate even if their 
group members do not do the same. Pure altruism might, probably, account 
for this result. However, in contrast with altruism theories, previous experi- 
mental findings report that cooperative subjects change their attitude towards 
the others if they refuse to modify their selfish behaviour. 
An hypothesis as that proposed in this chapter-under which, a subject 
cooperates unconditionally for M periods by expecting that, in t=P, the others 
will follow his behaviour, and then he reciprocates the others' observed decisions 
(so that he will stop cooperation if his expectations are not fulfilled) -appears 
to fit the reported observations 4Taite well. 
5.2 The persuasive player: an automaton with a bit 
of rationality 
Let us define the period after which a player expects that all the others will 
follow his contributing decision as the reciprocity-test-period of a persuasive 
'Keser's (1997) and Croson's (1998b) experimental studies addressed explicitly the question 
of which type of reciprocity individuals exhibit. Both authors found that behaviour is oriented 
towards the average (rather than the minimum or the maximum) contribution of the other 
group members in the previous period. 
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agent. Previous section's description and introduction of my hypothesis should 
make it evident that, given this kind of expectation, a persuasive player can 
be thought of as an automaton who, during the game, behaves according to 
a predefined set of instructions. These require him to contribute a constant 
amount until period M, and to switch to a reciprocal rule thereafter. 
Although he acts on the basis of programmed instructions during the game, 
the persuasive agent is allowed to have some kind of rationality at the outset of 
the game. Indeed, in period 1, he is required to solve a maximisation problem: 
he must compute his optimal level of contribution, gp, on the assumption that 
the other players will each contribute the Nash equilibrium amount until period 
(p - 1), and will thereafter continue to do so unless he plays gp throughout, in 
which case they will contribute 9p. 
5.2.1 The persuasive player's rational calculus 
Let us consider a very general voluntary contribution mechanism decision en- 
vironment. 
Let us suppose that in the model there are N individuals who interact for 
T periods, and a single public good. In any one period t, each individual i is 
endowed with income mi, t =m (Vi and Vt), which can be either privately con- 
sumed or invested in the public good. This is produced by the linear technology: 
Yt = E3ý='i gj, t- 
In every period, the utility of each individual i is an increasing function of 
the quantity of public good provided, yt, and a decreasing function of his own 
contributions, gi, t: 
Ui, t = U(gi, t, yt) Vi EN and Vt E [1, T] 
where alli, t1agi, t < 0, and alli, tlayt > 0. Let us indicate with g* the symmetric 
2 fully-rational Nash equilibrium of the game. 
In such an environment, the maximisation problem faced by persuasive 
agent i can be modelled as follows: 
T 
inax 1: U(gi, t, yt) 9i'l t=l 
2 Notice that the equilibrium can be taken to be symmetric since all individuals have iden- 
tical utility functions and initial endowments. 
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subject to: 
gi, t = gi, l Vt E [1, T], 
E 
gk, t:::::::::: (N-l)g* VtE[1, /. Z-11, (5.2) 
k: 7ýi 
and 
gk, t ::::::::: (N - 1)gi, l Vt T]. (5.3) 
k94-i 
Constraint (5-1) reflects the persuasive agent's conviction to contribute al- 
ways the same amount. Constraints (5.2) and (5.3) specify the initial beliefs 
that the persuasive agent entertains about the behaviour of each other member 
k of his group throughout all game. 
By substituting the constraints into the objective function, i's decision prob- 
lem is equivalent to: 
max V(p, gi, l) gi'l (5.4) 
= (M - 1) x U(gi,,, gi, l + (N - 1)g*) + 
[T - (p - 1)] x U(gi,,, Ngi, j). 
Differentiating with respect to gij and solving yields the wnount gp that 
the persuasive player contributes constantly for p periods, before starting re- 
ciprocating the others' behaviour. That is: 
gp (p) C argmax V (p, gi, 1) 
9i'l 
Given a (known) utility function, problem (5.4) implies the existence of a 
relationship between gp and p, which allows us to derive testable restrictions. 
Consider, for instance, a 2-person game with: 
U(gi, t, yt) = (mi, t - gi, t)yt Vi = 1,2 Vt G [1, T] (5.5) 
where yt =: gi, t + gj, t. 
The reaction function of player i, here, is: 
g"t =2 M"t -2 ilt 
Let us assume symmetry at mit = mj, t = 1, so that the equilibrium is 
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g* = 1/3 and the social optimum is §= 1/2. 
Utility function (5.5) implies the following optimisation by the persuasive 
agent: 
max Ut - 1) x (I - gi, i)(gi, l + 1/3) + [T - 1)] x (I - gi, 1)2gi,,. 9i'l 
The solution of this problem is: 
T- N2(p - pp =3 
2T - 
(5.6) 
It can be seen that if p=T+I (i. e., if the player believes that the others 
will never be persuaded to contribute pp), then the optimal choice is gp = 1/3, 
which is the Nash equilibrium. At the other extreme, if p=1 (i. e., if the 
player expects that his partners will be somehow instantly persuaded), then 
the optimal choice is gp = 1/2, which, in this symmetric case, corresponds to 
the unique social optimum. For values of M between I and T+1, the solution 
gp lies strictly between 1/3 and 1/2. Therefore, the higher is the persuasive 
player's reciprocity-test-period, the lower is the amount that he chooses to 
contribute until then. 
Eq. (5.6) represents a testable restriction insofar as we know the player's 
reciprocity-test-period: given his p, if the agent is found contributing an 
amount different from that determined by (5.6), we can infer that he is not 
solving maximisation problem (5.4) and, therefore, that he is not following a 
persuasive strategy. 
Since it is not easy to obtain irdormation about the value of p, more useful 
in this respect is the inverse of Eq. (5.6): 
T2- +11 (5.7) 
3 9p 
which gives an estimation of the persuasive agent's reciprocity-test-period. 
Thus, if an agent is observed to contribute some constant amount gp for more 
periods than those given by (5.7), without being followed by each of his group 
members, then we can infer that he is not playing according to the persuasion 
hypothesis. 
Consider, as a further example, a symmetric 3-person game with a Stone- 
Geary utility function of the form: 
U(gi, t, yt) = (w - gi, t - a)' (yt + b) 
1 -' Vi = 1,2,3 Vt E [1, T], (5.8) 
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where yt = E3=1 gj, t, and w is an underlying level of income greater than i 
(gi, t + a), and therefore greater than i's endowment M. 3 
Eq. (5.8) can be alternatively expressed as: 
In U(gi, t, y) =a In(w - gi, t - a) + (I - a) ln(yt + b). 
In this symmetric case, the (fully-rational) Nash equilibrium is: 
= 
(1 - a)(w - a) - ab (5.9) 
1+ 2a 
so that for 0<a<1 and for (3w + b) <a<w-b, one obtains 
O<g* <W. 4 
Furthermore, one can identify a (symmetric) social optimum as that § which 
maximizes a In(w -g- a) + (I - a) In(3g + b). Thus: 
3(l - a)(w - a) - ab 
3 
Notice that for the values of a and a specified before, and (in addition) for 
b>0, we have 0< g* <§<w. 5 
Let us consider now persuasive agent i's maximisation problem. Here, this 
is: 
max x [(w - gi, l - a)'(gi, l + 2g* + b)'-')] + 
, qi, l 
+ [T - 1) ]x [(w - gi, l - a)' (3gi, l + b) 
l-')] 
With such a problem, the equivalent of (5.6) cannot be explicitly obtained. 
Nevertheless, we can derive a testable restriction-equivalent of (5.7)-which 
3 Thanks to this last assumption we can never have: (w - gi, t - a) <0 in Eq. (5.8). 
4 Since 0<a<1, the denominator of (5.9) is positive. Therefore, g* >0 if (1 - a)(w - 
a) - ab > 0, which implies a<w-1 "a b. 
On the other hand, we have g* <w if (1 - a)(w - a) - ab < [1 + 2a]w ==* (1 - a)a > 
-3aw - ab; solving the last inequality yields a>- 1'. 
(3w + b). 
5Specifically, §> g* if [3(l -a)(w -a) -abj[1+2a] > 3[(1 -a)(w -a) -abl, which implies 
[3(l - a)(w - a) - ab] > -1b. If b>0, then the right hand side of the 
latter inequality is 
3 
negative. Hence, §> g* whenever the left hand side of the inequality is greater or equal to 
zero; i. e., whenever 3(1 - a)(w - a) > ab that yields to have: 
a<w-ab 1 -a 3' 
If the parameter a is set such that g* > 0, it must be a<w-b. Provided that b>0, the 
latter inequality implies inequality (5.11). 
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takes the following form: 
p= 
B"[aC - 3(l - a)A] (5.12) 
a)A - aB] + B'l[aC - 3(l - a)A] 
where A =- w-9p -a, B =-gp+2g* +b, and C=- 3gp+b. 
Knowing the parameters a, a and b, Eq. (5.12) allows us to calculate the 
value of p corresponding to each level of contribution. Thus, if an agent is 
observed to contribute some constant amount gp for more periods than stated 
in (5.12) without being followed by each of his partners, then we can infer that 
he is not pursuing a persuasive strategy. 
It can be shown that, also in this case, the relationship between P and gp is 
inverse. To prove this, instead of using the rather complicated expression (5.12), 
we can proceed along the following reasoning lines. 
We know that, unless V(p, gp) ý! V(p, g*), the amount gp > g* can never 
be optimal. Thus, a necessary condition for gp to be optimal is that: 
(it - 1)A'Bl-" + [T - (p - 1)]A'Cl-' > T(w - g* - a)'(3g* + b)'-', 
from which: 
p<T 
Ac'Cl-a - (w - g* - a)'(3g* + b)'-cl + 1. (5.13) Ac'Cl-a - AaB'-c' 
Now, notice that A'Cl-' =- (w - gp - a)(3gp + b)'-a, and that the latter 
expression is the persuasive player's single-period utility when he, together with 
each of his partners, plays gp, i. e. AIC1-I -= U(gp, 3gp). 
On the other hand, 
AIB 1-1 -= 
(w - gp - a) ' (gp + 2g* + b) 1 -1, which is the persuasive player's single- 
period utility when he plays gp and both the others play g*, i. e., AaBI-a = 
U(gp, gp + 2g*). By definition, a decrease in gp leads U(gp, 3gp) to decrease, and 
U(gp, gp + 2g*) to increase. As a consequence, ceteris paribus, the fraction on 
.6 iven T, this induces a rise in M. the right-hand-side of (5.13) will increase C. 
Consider, finally, a symmetric 3-person game with a linear utility function 
of the form: 
(gi, t, yt) =r (1 - gi, t) + vyt Vi = 1,2,3 Vt E [1, T] - 
(5.14) 
Let us assume that, Vi and Vt, gi, t E 10,11, and that the paxameters r and v 
satisfy the constraints: r>v and 3v > r. Given these inequalities, the unique 
'5The fraction denominator's decrease (caused by the decrease in A'C'-' as well as by 
the increase in A"Bl-') is, indeed, greater than the numerator's decrease (due only to the 
decrease in A"Cl-'). 
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subgame perfect equilibrium is g* =0 and the unique social optimum is §=1. 
In such a frame the problem that a persuasive player faces in the first period 01 
is to choose either to cooperate or to defect (i. e., to set either gij =I or gij = 0, 
respectively) on the assumption that his paxtners will each defect until (p - 1) 
and they will continue to do so unless he cooperates throughout, in which case 
they will cooperate from periods Y to T. Thus, it will pay him to cooperate 
(rather than defect) if and only if- 
(p - 1)v + [T - (p - 1)]3v > Tr, 
wbich yields: 
T 
3v -r (5.15) 
2v 
Eq. (5.15), as previous Eqs. (5.7) and (5.12), is a testable restriction: if, 
in a game with utility function (5.14), an agent is observed to cooperate for 
more periods than those given by (5.15), without being followed by each of his 
partners, this would mean that he is not a persuasive type. 
5.2.2 Minimum periods of cooperation necessary for identifying 
a persuasive player 
In this subsection, I will show that, in order to identify an individual as a 
persuasive player, he must cooperate for at least three rounds. Distinguishing 
between a persuader and other players' types would be, otherwise, hard. 
Let us suppose, indeed, that, in one of the games analysed in the previous 
subsection, player i contributes a constant amount Pi greater than the equi- 
librium, g*, only for the first two periods, and that in the meantime (i. e., in 
t= 11 2) gk, t = g*, Vk =yý i. If player i decreases his contribution in the third 
period so that gi, 3 = 9*, then i may be a strategic player (as defined in Chap- 
ter 4, Subsection (4-2.3)), or he may be following a tit-for-two-tat strategy 
(according to which a subject starts playing by cooperating twice, and then 
either he perseveres with cooperation or he shifts to defection depending on the 
others' decisions). If, instead, ceteris paribus, gi, 3 = 9i, then the tit-for-two- 
tat strategy cannot any longer provide reasons for i's behaviour, neither can 
the reputation building/strategies hypothesis. On the basis of the assumption 
made in Chapter 4, a strategic player stops being uncertain about the ratio- 
nality of his partners (and stops, therefore, his pretension to be a cooperative 
type) whenever he observes the others to play the dominant strategy for two 
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consecutive periods. This implies that the strategies hypothesis cannot explain 
the behaviour of a player who does not give up his constant contributions in 
t=3 even if he has observed the others to free-ride throughout. Thus, only 
some other explanation can give reason of the fact that a player keeps on his 
contributing behaviour in t=3 when his partners are free-riding. Such an 
alternative explanation, I suggest, can be found in a player's willingness to 
persuade the others to follow him. 
5.2.3 The relationship between a persuader's contribution and 
the others' behaviour 
Let gp, t be the contribution of a persuasive player in period t. Then, on the 
basis of my previous analysis, gp, t must be: 
1) independent of the others' behaviour until period p (where M> 3); in fact, 
Vt E [1, p]: gp, t = gp (p) E argmax V (p, gij); 
gi " 
2) positively related to the others' behaviour thereafter; in fact, Vt + 1, T], 
the persuader must reciprocate his partners' contribution. According to the 
definition of reciprocity given in the Introduction of this Chapter, this implies 
either that gp, t remains constant (if, Vk :ýA gk, t-1 = gp(A)); Or that gp, t 
changes in the direction of the other group members' average contribution in 
the previous period (which means that gp, t decreases or increases depending on 
whether it was, respectively, above or below the average of the others). 
In this case, therefore, the relationship between a persuader's contribution 
and the behaviour of his partners can be described by the following two deriva- 
tives: 
Vt C [l, M] (M ýý 3) : 
a9p, t- = 0; (5-16) 
'0 
Ek74-p gk, t- 1 
Vt c LM + 1, T] : 
agp, t- > 0. (5.17) a Z4k74-p gk, t- 1 
Relationships (5.16) and (5.17) can be seen as additional testable restric- 
tions: by regressing the contributions of a subject on the total contributions of 
his partners in the previous period, if the slope of the regression line does not 
change (from zero to positive) in period M, then we can infer that the subject 
is not following a persuasive behaviour. 
Let us consider now a 3-person game where each individual is characterised 
by the linear utility function (5.14), and where, Vi and Vt, gi, t = 10,11. Given 
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the binary dimension of the strategy set, a definition of reciprocity with respect 
to the average of the others' contributions is misleading: if player i cooperates 
in t=p and only one of his fellow members reciprocates him, then, if i is 
a persuasive player, (according to the above definition of reciprocity) gi,,, +, 
should be equal to 0.5, which is not a feasible strategy. 
On the other hand, a definition of reciprocal behaviour that requires an 
individual to keep on cooperation if only one of the other two players cooperates 
might sound overly restrictive. It appears more plausible to allow a reciprocator 
to switch to defection as soon as he realises that one of his partners is defecting. 
Rabin (1993) described a model which captures this type of reciprocity. 
By using the 'psychological games' introduced by Geanakoplos et al. (1989), 7 
Rabin developed a concept of equilibrium (the so-called fairness equilibrium) 
which reflects explicitly the notion that people desire to be kind to those who 
signal kindness through their actions and to hurt those who signal hostility 
through their actions. Although Rabin's model technically applies to 2-person 
games in the normal form, the intuition behind it can be extended to 3-person 
games by assuming that a person chooses not to cooperate (and hence to punish 
everybody) whenever he faces the alternatives of rewarding the partner who has 
cooperated or hurting the partner who has defected. 
In the 3-person game under consideration, a similar assumption implies that 
if, after period M, a persuasive player observes that one of his paxtners fails to 
reciprocate, then he will be punishing also the other by deciding to defect. The 
equivalent of relationships (5.16) and (5.17) can be, in this case, expressed as 
follows: 
Vt E [1, p] (p : ý! 3) : gp, t =I even if Vk : A: p gk, t-I = 0; (5.18) 
Vt E [p + 1, T] gp, t 
0 if Ik :Aps. t. gk, t-1 = 0; (5.19) 
1 otherwise; 
where p must be not greater than the value given by (5.15). 
The behavioural pattern resulting from (5.18) and (5.19) defines, clearly and 
completely, how (in a 3-person game with the lineax utility function (5.14)) a 
strategy should evolve in order to be classified as persuasive. 
7 These games differ from the conventional ones because, in them, payoffs depend not only 
on players' actions but also on players' beliefs. 
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5.3 Game-theoretic consequences of the persuasive 
strategy 
Purpose of this section is to show how a fully-rational (in the sense of orthodox 
game theory) player should behave against persuasive players, when there is 
complete information about the distribution of types in the population, and 
about their reciprocity-test-period if persuasive types. 
Consider a N-person game with utility function (5.14): 
U(gi, t, yt) = r(I - gi, t) + vyt Vi EN Vt E [1, T] I 
where r>v and Nv > r. 
I will prove that, in such a game, if the distribution of types is such that 
(N- 1) players are persuasive with identical or different reciprocity-test-period, 
and if this is common knowledge, then it will be fully-rational for the Nth player 
to cooperate for some periods. 
Let us staxt such a demonstration by supposing that N=2, and that player 
1 is a persuasive player with reciprocity-test-period A ! ý_ T(2v - r) /v + 1.8 Then, 
player 2 knows that his partner cooperates unconditionally (i. e., whatever player 
2 does) for p periods, and reciprocates thereafter (which means that from A+1 
onwaxds, 1 plays whatever 2 has played in the previous period). 
Given the (known) unconditional cooperation of player 1, it pays player 2 
to defect until period M-1. Indeed, if he does so, he gets (M - 1) (, r + v); if 
he does not (and, therefore, he cooperates), he gets (p - 1) 2v; since r>v, the 
former is better (in terms of payoff-maximisation) than the latter. 
But from period p+1 onwaxds player I's decision rule changes in the sense 
that Vt E [p +11 T]: 91, t = 92, t- 1. Knowing this, how should rational player 2 
behave in the time interval between p and T? 
Since the last play is just a one-shot version of the game, a rational player 
should defect in the Tth period, no matter what the prior history might be. 
The latter along with the information about player I's behaviour implies the 
following. If, from p to T-1, player 2 cooperates, he gets 2v throughout and 
(r + v) in the last period. If, instead, from p to T-1, player 2 defects, he gets 
(r + v) in period p, and r thereafter. Thus, cooperation will be preferred to 
defection ifi [(T- 1) -M]2v+ (r+v) > (r+v) + [T- (/-z+ 1)]r. Since 2v > r, a 
fully-rationaJ player should cooperate between period p and period T-1, and 
defect in T. 
Keeping all the other aspects of the gwne constant, let us increase the 
8 This inequality is the equivalent of (5.15) with 2 rather than 3 players. 
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number of players to 3 (i. e., let us suppose N= 3). If, in this case, player 
1 is the only persuasive player and both the other players are fully-rational, 
then the (complete-information) Nash equilibrium requires the latter to defect 
throughout the game. 
However, if it is common knowledge that players I and 2 are both persuasive 
types with identical reciprocity-test-period p (which, here, is not greater than 
the value given by (5.15)), then the fully-rational strategy is like that found 
before: rationaJ player 3 should defect for M-1 periods, cooperate from M to 
T-1, and defect in T. The rationality of the defective choice over the first 
p-I periods and in the finaJ period derives from the fact that, by definition, 
r+ 2v > U. The rationality of the cooperative choice between it and T-1 
can be explained as follows. If, during this time intervaJ, player 3 defects, he 
gets (r + v) + [T - (p + 1)]r; if, on the contrary, player 3 cooperates, he gets 
[(T - 1) - p]3v + (r + v). Since 3v > r, it is fully-rational to cooperate. 
By generalising these results, we can state: 
Proposition 5.1 In a N-person game where each individual is characterised 
by the linear utility function (5.14), and where there is complete information 
about the distribution of types in the population, if (N - 1) players are per- 
suasive with identical (known) reciprocity-test-period P, then full-rationality 
(based on maximisation of monetary payoffs) requires the Nth player to defect 
for p-1 periods, to cooperate in the interval from p to T-1, and to defect in 
T. 
Let us suppose now that, ceteris paribus, the persuasive players' reciprocity- 
test-periods are different. Specifically, let us assume that the game involves 
three players, two of whom (players I and 2, for instance) are (known) persua- 
sive types with pi > P2- 
In this case, player 3 knows that: 
(a) until period [12 both the others cooperate, whatever he decides to do; 
(b) from period A2 onwards, player 2 reciprocates the others' behaviour, in the 
sense that Vt E [P2, T]: 92, t = minfgl, t- 1,93, t- I while player I continues to 
unconditionally cooperate up to period pl; 
(c) from period pi onwards, also player 1 reciprocates (in the sense of player 2) 
the others' behaviour. 
Then, knowing (a), fully-rational player 3 should defect until period A2 -L 
In fact, if he cooperates, he gets (A2-1)3v; if he defects, he gets (P2-1)(r+2v). 
Since r>v, the latter is preferred to the former. 
Knowing (b), fully-rational player 3 puts forward his strategy in each period 
from A2 to P1 - 1- If, in this time interval, he defects, he gets r+ 2v in P2 and 
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r+v thereafter. If, instead, he cooperates, he gets (111 - P2)3v. It can be seen 
that cooperation pays more than defection if (A 1- A2)3v >r+ 2v + [p, - (P2 + 
1) ] (r + v), which implies: 
v 
r 
(5.20) P2 > ýV- 2v - r* 
Thus, a fully-rational player cooperates from P2 to M, -I only if the number 
of periods between P2 and pi is greater than the value given by (5.20). 
Finally, knowing (c), fully-rational player 3 decides his strategy over the 
remaining T-p, periods. During this time interval, if he defects, he gets 
(r + v) in period MI and r thereafter. If, on the contrary, he cooperates, he gets 
3v for [(T- 1) -Mj] periods and (r+2v) in the final period (where, remember, he 
defects whatever the history of the game so far). Thus, cooperation is preferred 
to defection if [(T - 1) - pj]3v + (r + 2v) > (2v + r) + [(T - (p, + 1)]r. Since 
3v > r, player 3 will maximise his pecuniary payoff if he cooperates from A, to 
(T - 1) and defects in T. 
The result found in case of three players can be generalised to a N-person 
game as follows. 
Proposition 5.2 In a N-person game where each individual is characterised 
by the linear utility function (5.14), and where there is complete information 
about the distribution of types in the population, if (N - 1) players are persua- 
sive with different (known) reciprocityýtest-period such that p, < /L2 < ... < 
ILN-1, then full-rationality requires the Nth player to behave as follows: 
a) to defect for the first p-I periods; 
0) to cooperate in the interval included between two consecutive reciprocityý 
test-periods if the number of periods in each of these intervals is greater than 
the critical value given by (5-20); 
-y) to cooperate from AN-I to (T - 1); 
6) to defect in T. 
Thus, the (known) presence of persuasive players affects the behaviour of a 
fully-rational individual in that it pushes him to cooperate for some periods. 
Despite the results obtained m this section, in the following discussion, 
whenever I refer to the Nash equilibrium, I will mean the equilibrium in the 
sense of orthodox game theory, i. e. the equilibrium without persuasive players 
(unless otherwise stated). 
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5.4 The persuaded player: a later-reciprocator of 
the others' maximum contribution 
The persuasion hypothesis offers a specific chaxacterisation of interactive be- 
haviour, in the sense that the type of interaction in which the persuasive and 
the persuaded agents are engaged distinguishes my approach to cooperative 
behaviour from alternative ones. In the traditional models of altruism, for in- 
stance, the efficient cooperative outcome can be achieved if altruistic subjects 
face other people with their same attitude. Similar lines of argument apply to 
both the strategies hypothesis and the reciprocity theories, where only one type 
of individual needs to exist in order to justify cooperation in social dilemma 
situations. 9 
At odds with what happens in these theories, a persuasive process is mean- 
ingful and can succeed in promoting cooperation only if, in a group, besides a 
subject who, at the outset of the game, puts probability one on the fact that all 
the others, from M onwards, will start contributing as much as he does until p, 
there exist other members with 'selfish' attitudes but willing to change them. 
That is to say, in the relationship of persuasion, some group members must 
take the role of respondents in the sense that, during the interaction, they must 
be disposed to modify their own initial choices to make them converge on the 
same position as that of the persuader. 
Under this aspect, the persuasion theory may appear similar to the imita- 
tion hypothesis. According to the latter, players can be distinguished in two 
categories: on the one hand, there are the 'good' players who get each period 
the most profitable outcome (and, hence, they do not change their strategy); 
on the other hand, there are the 'bad' players who modify their strategy by 
imitating the successful others. 10 It is exactly the interaction between 'good' 
and 'bad' players that, in the imitation story, provides reasons for the evolution 
of a particular strategy. 
Apart from the requirement to have two distinct types of players, my hy- 
pothesis is quite different from the models of imitation. A first difference is 
that, while the process of imitation consists in a repetition of those strategies 
that have proved most successful, the persuaded subjects might also not imitate 
9Particulaxly, in strategic contexts, the relevant figure is the player who plarces a positive 
probability on the fact that his partners axe irrational and so he plays strategicaJly against 
them. While, in reciprocity models, who matters is the individual willing to sacrifice his own 
material well-being to rewaxd those who treat him adequately. 
'OSee Offerman and Sonnemans (1995, p. 2) for a distinction between good players (the 
ideal Bayesian observers) and bad players (the imperfect Bayesians) in the imitation process. 
5.4 The persuaded player 104 
successful others. " A further difference is that, while in the imitation models 
only one part of the interactive process is 'active' (in the sense that he does 
something) and this is the person who imitates his successful group members, 
in the persuasion process the position of both paxts is active. 
This section aims to define concisely and completely the category of the 
persuaded player. 
Specifically, I shall assume that a persuaded player is an individual who 
selfishly-maximises his own payoff up to some period 0, and then he starts 
reciprocating his partners' maximum contribution. 
Consider, for instance, the symmetric 3-person game with the linear utility 
function given in (5.14). Assume that one of the players is of the persuasive 
type and that he unconditionally cooperates for M periods. Then, if a subject 
is observed to defect up to period 0<p, and to cooperate thereafter or until 
at least one of his partners cooperates, then we can infer that the subject is a 
persuaded type. 
Likewise, in a 3-person game where all individuaJs are chaxacterised by 
the Stone-Geary utility function (5.8) and by identical initial endowments, 
if a subject is observed to contribute an amount correspondent to the Nash 
solution (5.9) for 0 periods and to reciprocate the others' maximum contribution 
thereafter, then we can classify him as a persuaded player. 
In general, in a repeated symmetric public goods game, the persuaded 
player's contribution, gPd, t, evolves as follows: 
vt E [l, 0] : gPd, t 9*; (5.21) 
Vt G [0 + 1, T] : gPd, t -2:::: MaXIGk, t-11 
(5.22) 
where g* is the symmetric fully-rational Nash equilibrium of the game, and 
Gk, t-I identifies the set of the contributions of the persuaded player's fellow 
members in period t-L 
But why a person should eventually modify his optimising behaviour and 
shift to this kind of reciprocal rule? 
I argue that a subject may be induced to act according to the scheme just 
proposed for two reasons. The first one is that, since contributing is profitable 
only if it is chosen contemporaneously by other group members, the agent wants 
1 'A persuasive player may get, in fact, the minimum possible payoff over a long sequence 
of periods, which depends on his reciprocity-test-period. It is therefore not on the basis of 
the persuasive player's former payoffs that, in my hypothesis, people decide to modify their 
strategy. 
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to be sure that some of his partners actually make this choice before abandoning 
the fully-rational strategy. Previous experimental studies suggest that people 
insist on entertaining doubts about the motives and chaxacter of their fellow 
members. In particular, the restart effect documented in public goods games 
indicates that some subjects are really interested in trying to reach the effi- 
cient outcome, and that it is their uncertainty about the others' behaviour that 
restrains them from contributing. A In the light of these observations, a per- 
suaded player can be thought of as an individual whose uncertainty disappears 
in period 0. 
The second reason that I suggest for explaining the persuaded agent's be- 
haviour is simply that, at the staft of the game, he has not grasped the benefits 
connected with contributions; being a fully-rational player, he has just chosen 
the strategy which maximises his monetary payoffs. Then, by observing one of 
his partners (the persuasive player) deviating constantly by such a strategy, he 
re-examines the incentives of the game, realises that contributing is mutually 
profitable, and so he starts following the other's behaviour. 
Of course, it is not said that in a same group, besides a persuasive player, 
there exist persuaded players. The lack of these two different types of individ- 
uals leads the persuasive player to lower his contribution after period A (when 
he is required to follow a reciprocal rule). The failure of attempts to persuade 
may explain the high initial levels of contributions and the decay phenomenon 
observed in a great number of repeated public goods experiments. 
5.5 A comparison with other theories of cooperative 
behaviour 
I shall now directly compare the theory of persuasion with some of the theories 
of cooperative behaviour considered in Chapter 4 (Section (4.2)). For each 
of these alternative theories, I will derive a number of testable restrictions by 
using, in each case, the non-linear utility function (5.8) as well as the linear 
function (5.14), so as to make it evident how they differ from my approach to 
cooperative behaviour. 
5.5.1 Theories of commitment 
The staxting point of the persuasion hypothesis is that, for p periods, an in- 
dividual chooses to contribute a constant amount, irrespective of whether the 
others actually make this contribution (or, better, even if he believes that the 
12 cf. 
, Buriando and Hey (1997). 
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others will each play the fully-rational Nash equilibrium). For this reason, 
the persuasion theory is in the spirit of Kant's categorical imperative and may 
appear similar to commitment theories. 
Nevertheless, while in Kant's moral and in theories of commitment "agents 
suppose that the others will continue to act as they do at the decision date", 13 in 
the theory of persuasion, a player must believe that, if he contributes a constant 
amount gp up to period M, all his partners will modify their initial 'selfish' 
choice and will contribute gp from period p until the end of the game. Only if 
Ids expectations are fulfilled, the persuasive player will keep on contributing gp 
throughout the game. 
Hence, the following proposition can be asserted: 
Proposition 5.3 Persuasion and commitment theories differ in that, under the 
former, a subject's unconditional contribution takes place only over A periods 
and rests on his expectations that (from period p forward) every other member 
of his group will converge towards his same contribution. 
The difference between my hypothesis and theories of commitment can be 
explicitly shown by considering which kinds of predictions the latter make in 
a symmetric 3-person game where each individual can be described by the 
Stone-Geary utility function given in (5.8). 
The assumption upon which commitment theories are based (i. e., that an 
individual makes whatever contribution he would wish others to make, irrespec- 
tive of whether they actually make this contribution) implies that, in order to 
decide how much to contribute, a Kantian type maximises utility function (5.8) 
subject to his belief that, Vk 54 i and Vt E [1, T], gk, t = gi, t. By substi- 
tuting this constraint into the objective function, the maximisation problem is 
equdvalent to: 
max (w - git - a)'(3gi, t + b)'-". gi't 
Differentiating with respect to gi, t and solving yields: 
3(1-a)(w-a)-ab 
, gc, t ý3- zi (5.23) 
where g*, t is the optimal level of contribution under commitment theories and C 
is the symmetric social optimum described in Eq. (5.10). 
Commitment theories predict, therefore, that an individual will contribute 
throughout the game a constant amount equal to the social optimum. This 
represents a testable restriction: if a subject is observed to contribute in any 
13 Cf., Laffont (1975, p. 431). 
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period an amount different from ý, then we can infer that he is not a Kantian 
type. 
Furthermore, Eq. (5.23) implies that 
vt E [1, Tj : 
(9gc, t 
= (5.24) 
19 E k: ý4-c gk, t- 1 
which is a further testable restriction: by regressing a subject's own contri- 
butions on those of his partners, if the slope coefficient differs from zero, this 
would mean that the subject is not following commitment theories' maximisa- 
tion problem. 
These predictions/ restrictions (derived by using the particular utility func- 
tion (5.8)) hold in any symmetric game, regardless of the function used to model 
each agent's preferences. Thus, for instance, if a Kantian type is involved in a 
finitely repeated 3-person game with the linear utility function (5.14), then he 
should cooperate throughout the game independently of the others' behaviour. 
5.5.2 Theories of reciprocity 
According to reciprocity theories, individuals should rewaxd those who treat 
them adequately, and punish those who do harm them. Sugden's (1984) reci- 
procity principle (described in Chapter 4, Subsection (4.2.3)) affirms that any- 
one who benefits from the public good has moral obligations towards those who 
contribute; roughly speaking, this means, not that a person must always con- 
tribute, but that he must not take a free-ride when other people axe contribut- 
ing. Thus, under Sugden's theory of reciprocity the non-maximising/contributing 
behaviour would be followed because people share some principle of justice. 
A similar axgument suggests that the following proposition is true. 
Proposition 5.4 Persuasion and reciprocity theories differ because, under the 
former, an individual's contributions are not conceived as moral obligations 
towards the others, so that if everyone is free-riding such an obligation ends. 
Indeed, for M periods, a persuasive agent is predicted to contribute even if all 
the other people in his group are free-riding. 
To see in which way the moral obligation upon which a reciprocator bases 
his choice affects his behaviour, consider once again utility function (5-8) and 
utility function (5-14). In either case, a subject who acts in accordance with 
Sugden's reciprocity principle maximises his own utility subject to the con- 
straint: gi, t =- min(g*, 9k, t-1)i where g* is the optimal level of contribution CC 
under commitment theories, since it is (in Sugden's model) the contribution 
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that a subject would most prefer that everyone should make. Let g;, t be the 
solution of this maximisation problem. 
Then, in the game with the non-linear utility function (5.8), we can prove 
that g* < g;, :! ý §, where g* and § are, respectively, the Nash solution (5.9) rt - 
and the social optimum (5.10). In fact, if min(g, *,, 9k, t-0 = g*, agent i has the C 
obligation to contribute at least g, *,, which entails g; t If min(gc*, gk, t- 1) C r, 
9k, t-1 = g*, agent i has the obligation to contribute at least the amount asso- 
ciated with the Nash solution. On the other hand, one can never have either 
g, *, t < g* (because the individual would find that self-interest dictates a larger 
contribution) or g;, t >§ (because the individual would be contributing more 
than he is obliged to). Hence, a subject who bases his choice on Sugden's reci- 
procity principle will contribute more than the amount of equilibrium only if 
everyone else in his group does so as well. 
One interesting implication of the model is that an increase in the others' 
contributions should induce the reciprocator to increase his own contribution. 14 
Hence, we can assume the following: 
Vt E [l, T] : 
agr*, t > 0, (5.25) 0 Ek74-r gk, t-1 
which represents a testable restriction on reciprocal behaviour, contrasting with 
the analogous relationships (5.16) and (5.17) relative to the persuasion hypoth- 
esis, and with relationship (5.24) relative to commitment theories. 
Suppose now that each individual's preferences can be described by the 
linear function (5.14). In case of 3 players, the moral constraint to which the 
reciprocator's utility is subjected leads g*, to evolve as follows: r,. 
(5.26) 9r, 1 1; 
Vt G [2, T] gr*, t 
0 if 3k: ýk r s-t- gk, t-I 0; (5.27) 
1 otherwise. 
Thus, whenever a subject is observed not to cooperate in the first period 
and/or not to defect in any of the following periods as soon as he observes 
defection from one of his partners, this would imply that he is not a reciprocal 
type. 
"See Sugden (1984) for a proof. 
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5.5.3 Theories of altruism 
As said in Chapter 4 (Subsection (4.2.2)), altruism theories posit that individu- 
als are motivated by a concern for other people's welfare. Hence, they maximise 
a utility function which is defined over a broader domain than that required 
by the traditional theory of pure self-interest, and which includes (in addition 
to their own) either the consumption or the utility of the others. This implies 
that, insofar as his contribution maximises the social welfare, an altruist may 
contribute to a public good even when he does not benefit directly from it. 
This is not true for a persuasive player who decides how much to contribute 
by maximising his own pecuniary payoffs subject to an a priori set of beliefs 
about the others' behaviour throughout the game. Given these expectations, a 
persuasive player will contribute only if he (himself) derives benefits from such 
a decision. 
Thus, we can affirm the following: 
Proposition 5.5 Persuasion and altruism theories differ in that, under the 
former, a subject having a well-defined (a priori) probability distribution over 
the others' type contributes only towards those public goods from which he 
(himself) derives private benefits. 
In a parallel to the analysis carried out with respect to commitment and 
reciprocity theories, let us identify the altruist's behaviour both in a 3-person 
game with the linear utility function (5.14), and in a 3-person game with the 
non-linear function (5.8). 
In the former case, if we model altruistic preferences like in Eq. (4.3), and 
if the weight -y denoting the concern that the altruist expresses for the others' 
welfare is such that: -y > (r - v) / (2v), 15 then an alt ruist's optimal decision, ga*, t, 
is to choose throughout the game the cooperative alternative independently of 
what the others do. Thus, provided that the altruist's weight on the others' 
welfare is greater than a critical value, we have: 
Vt E [1, T] : ga*, t = 11 (5.28) 
which is a testable restriction for the game under consideration. 
Let us now derive a testable restriction when the utility function has the 
non-linear form (5-8). With such a function, it seems reasonable to describe 
"By using function (5.14)'s paxameters values, Eq. (4.3) becomes: 
Vi = r(l - gi, t) + 3-yvyt + (1 - ^f)VYt + ^tPrk, t- 
Thus, cooperation is preferred to defection if and only if 3^fv + (1 - ^f)v > r. The latter 
inequality is satisfied for each value of -y greater than [r - v]/[2v]. 
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altruistic preferences as below: 
V(gi, ti Yt) U(gi, ti Yt) X [H U(gk, ti Yt)l (5.29) 
k5l-i 
Thus, the aJtruist's maximisation problem is: 
max (w - gi - a)"(y +X [11(71) -A- a)'(y + 9i't ký4-i 
or, equivalently 
max a In(w - gi, t - a) + (1 - a) In(yt + b) + gi't 
+ -), [a 1: In(w - gkt - a) + (1 - a) 
1: In(yt + b)]. 
kj4i k54-i 
If the altruist regards both the other members of his group in the same way 
(i. e., if both the others are the same for him), then the problem becomes: 
max aln(w-gi, t-a)+(I-a)(1+2-y)ln(yt+b)+-(aPrk, ti 9i't 
where Prk, t - 
Ek, 4-i In(w - gk, t - a) are the benefits that the other two group 
members derive from their private consumption. 
The solution of this problem is: 
(1 - a) (w - a) [1 + 2-yj - a(Ek, 4-i gk, t + b) (5-30) ga, t -a+ (1 - a)[1 + 2-y] 
It can be seen that if the game is symmetric (i. e., if gj, t = g*, t, Vj = 1,2,3), a 
then, for -y = 1, ga*, t = [3 (1 - a) (w - a) - ab] 
/3 which is the social optimum, 
given by (5.10). For values of -y between 0 and 1, the solution g*, t lies strictly a 
between the Nash equilibrium given by (5-9) and §- 
The altruist's reaction function (5-30) allows us to derive a useful testable 
restriction. By differentiating such a function by the others' contribution, we 
find: -a/ [a (1 - a) (I + 2-y)]. Since a and -y axe both positive, this implies: 
aga, t 
_<0. (5.31) 
'9 Ekgta gk, t-1 
Thus, by regressing a player's contributions over those of his partners, if the 
slope of the regression line does not come up to be negative, then we can infer 
that the player is not an altruist. 
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5.5.4 Reputation building/ strategies hypothesis 
Andreoni's (1988) strategies hypothesis is a theory of rational behaviour in the 
sense of Kreps et al. (1982). According to it, when the information about the 
other types is incomplete, if a fully-rational and selfish player believes that there 
is a small chance that the others are irrational (i. e., non-payoff maximising), it 
may be rational for him to contribute in order to build reputation. Toward the 
end of the game, however, the value of this strategic play decreases: in the last 
round, the free-riding strategy is always optimal. 16 
The following proposition can, therefore, be asserted. 
Proposition 5.6 Persuasion and strategies theories differ in that the former 
is not a theory of rational behaviour. A persuasive player's contributions are 
not caused by his uncertainty about the others' rationality. On the contrary, a 
persuader decides how much to contribute on the assumption that each of his 
partners is, at the outset of the game, fulýy-rational and as such he will play 
the dominant strategy for the first /. z -I periods. 
Let us consider how strategic play evolves in a 3-person game where each 
individual has the linear utility function (5.14). Both the hypothesis of in- 
complete information about the others' types and my own assumption that 
a strategic player needs to observe his partners defecting for two consecutive 
periods before dissolving his doubts about their rationality lead strategies to 
have a 3-phase structure. In an initial phase, which lasts two periods, strategic 
players cooperate in order to build reputation. In an end phase, which coincides 
with the last period, they defect, whatever the history of the game so far. The 
behaviour in the intermediate phase is determined by the contribution of the 
other players in the previous two periods, in the sense that, Vt E [3, T- 1], a 
strategic player cooperates only if one of his fellow members has not defected 
in each of the previous two periods. Hence, if g*, t indicates the contribution of 
a strategic player in period t, we have: 
Vt 11 2: gý*,, t =1- (5.32) 
Vt E [3, T- 1] gs*, t 
0 if 3k 7ý s s. t. gk, t-2 = gk, t-I =: 0; (5.33) 
1 otherwise. 
1'3Because there is no future, contributing to the public good cannot induce any further 
contribution by the other players, and so there is no reason for a strategic player to contribute. 
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98, T : -:: 
()- (5-34) 
Thus, unless a subject is observed to cooperate for the first two periods, to 
defect in the last period, and to defect in any period from 3 to (T - 1) as soon 
as he observes one of his partners to defect for two consecutive periods, then 
the subject cannot be considered a strategic type. 
Likewise, in a 3-person game where all individuals have the non-linear util- 
ity (5.8) and identical initial endowments, we can think of strategies as char- 
acterised by a 3-phase structure. In this case, however, given the non-binary 
dimension of the strategy set, it is not easy to define clearly and completely 
how strategic behaviour should evolve in the intermediate phase-17 No problems 
exist, instead, for the initial phase and the end phase. 
Indeed, in the end phase (which coincides with the last period of inter- 
action), a strategic individual must play the fully-rational Nash equilibrium 
contributing g* to the public good (where g* is given by (5.9)), whatever the 
history of the game so far. 
In the initial phase (which lasts two periods), a strategic player, who be- 
lieves that both his partners are irrational and that as such they will contribute 
an amount greater than the dominant-strategy equilibrium, tries to build rep- 
utation as a cooperative type himself. If he supposes that the other players will 
each contribute the amount g> g*, then (in order to build reputation) he must 
contribute g as well. This implies the following optimisation: 
max(w - gi)t - a)a(yt + b)'-' 
9i't 
subject to: 
gk, t = 2[6g + (1 - 6)g*], 
and 
gi't = 9, 
where J (0 <6< 1) is the probability that i attaches to the likelihood that his 
fellow members which each play p rather than g*. 
By substituting the constraints into the objective function, the maximisation 
"I will come back to this point later on. 
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problem becomes: 
max a In(w - a) + (I - a) ln(g + 2[bg + (1 - 6)g*] + b). 9 
The solution to this is: 
9, *, t a)(w - a) - 
2a(l - 6) 9*_ 
ab (5.35) 
1+ 2J 1+ 2J* 
It can be seen that if 6=1, then g*, t = [3(l - a)(w - a) - ab]/3 which 
(in this symmetric case) corresponds to the unique social optimum, ý, given 
by (5.10). For values of 6 between 0 and 1, the solution g*, t lies strictly between 
the Nash solution, g*, given by (5.9) and 
By differentiating (5-35) with respect to 6, we find a positive derivative. 
This confirms that higher values of 6 increase the amount of contribution. 
Insofar as we know the value of 5, Eq. (5.35) represents a testable restriction: 
given 6, if an agent is observed to contribute, in the first two periods, an amount 
different than stated in (5.35), then we can infer that he is not following strategic 
optimisation. 
As for the evolution of strategies in the intermediate phase (which lasts from 
period 3 to period T- 1), this depends on the others' behaviour, in the sense 
that whenever a strategic player observes that, for two consecutive periods, 18 
one of his fellow members does not contribute as much as him, then he changes 
his decision. 
The theory does not specify the form of this change. Kreps et al. (1982) 
confine their attention to games of the prisoner's dilemma type. In such games, 
a player has to choose only from two alternatives, which implies that, if he 
wants to stop cooperation, then (by excluding randomised strategies) he can 
just defect. On the contrary, in the game under consideration, if a player intends 
to change his decision from one period to the next, then he can choose among 
a range of possible contributions and he can follow several alternative decision 
rules. 
With respect to this issue, previous experimentaJ work helps. Keser (1999), 
for instance, found that behaviour in this intermediate phase can be described 
by reciprocity in the sense that it changes in the direction of the others' average 
contribution in the previous period. 
"The length of this time interval derives from my own assumption 
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5.6 Final thoughts 
The economic analysis of cooperative behaviour is still an open matter. In the 
past few yeaxs various theories have been proposed to explain such behaviour 
but none of them appeaxs able to provide reasons for all, or even most, of the 
observed regularities. 
The hypothesis of persuasive behaviour suggested in this chapter aims to 
unravel previously inexplicable cooperation. It is relatively simple, and rests on 
two principles that seem to have a strong common-sense. People understand 
which group's action is most beneficial for them and, consequently, they try to 
induce their partners to perform it. 
Since in a repeated game where verbal communication is forbidden, the only 
way that a player has got to signal information to the others is by his choices of 
moves as the game proceeds, a persuasive agent contributes a constant amount 
up to a certain period p, by expecting that, from such a period onwards, the 
other players will each be willing to modify their initial 'selfish' choice and 
to contribute as much as he does. Then, if his expectation is fulfilled, the 
persuasive agent perseveres with his constant contribution as long as he observes 
that everyone else does so as well. Otherwise, he modifies his contribution in 
the direction of the others' average contribution in the previous period. 
Hence, the persuasion theory is compatible with both the observed successes 
and the observed failures of voluntaxy cooperation. 
In principle, it deserves to be taken seriously as one among several ways 
to explain individuals' underlying motivations for choosing actions that do not 
maximise their monetary payoffs (especially in early stages of repeated social 
dilemma games). 
In practice, since it generates testable predictions/restrictions which differ 
from those of earlier theories, its capability of accounting for previously inex- 
plicable behaviour can be empirically verified. 
The next two chapters report on a series of public goods experiments which 
are designed in order to test directly the persuasion hypothesis and separate it 
from earlier theories of cooperative behaviour. 
Such an empirical analysis will start by considering a very simple 3-person 
public goods game where each player is characterised by the linear utility func- 
tion (5.14). 
Then, the voluntary contribution mechanism environments in which people 
interact will be complicated by taking into account games with the Stone-Geary 
function (5.8). 
Chapter 6 
My 'simple' experiment 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to verify by means of the experimental method if subjects' 
attempts to persuade can explain why, in early decision rounds of repeated. 
public good games, people are systematically found to contribute more than 
predicted by complete-information non-cooperative models. Or, to put this in 
a slightly different way, the purpose of this chapter is to examine whether the 
provision of public goods through voluntary contributions might be motivated 
by an individual's expectations of inducing his partners (who are free-riding) to 
do what is best for the group (and, hence, for themselves) rather than selfishly 
maximising own earnings. 
As a first step towards more decisive conclusions about the possibility of 
persuasion being an explanation for previously inexplicable cooperation, the 
domain for such a test is, here, a simple three-player dilemma game with the 
linear utility function given in (5.14). 
There are some novelties in the way in which the experiment is designed that 
make it appropriate for my reseaxch question. Indeed, it combines behaviour 
with belief-elicitation and (what is less common) with an investigation into 
subjects' motivations for their own decisions. Asking subjects to motivate their 
decisions is not only a very straightforward way to obtain insights into their 
decision rules, but it should also induce them to be more concentrated on the 
game, and to think seriously about the problem that they face. 
Key aspects of the experimental implementation of the voluntary contribu- 
tion mechanism used in this study are reported in the next section, where I 
describe the constituent game (around which the experiment was constructed), 
and I explain the organisation of each single decision round. 
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6.2 The constituent game and the decision round's 
structure 
The laboratory version of the voluntary contribution mechanism utilised in the 
experiment presented here was implemented in a sequence of 6 repeated games, 
or 6 phases. 
Each phase consisted of 10 repetitions of a simple 3-person symmetric game, 
where the subjects' decisions were binary and a representative individual's pay- 
off function in any one period was given by the linear function (5.14): 
(gi, t, yt) =r (1 - gi, t) + vyt - 
The values of the parameters v and r were chosen to meet the inequalities 
r>v and 3v > r. Thus, each subject had a dominant strategy to contribute 
zero (which, using backward induction, is also the unique subgame-perfect equi- 
librium of the repeated game). The maximum payoff to the entire group is 
attained, however, if in each repetition all subjects contributed one. 
The decision of having groups of size three rather than two (and, therefore, 
of making subjects playing a public goods game rather than just a prisoner's 
dilemma) finds its justification in the fact that the former allow for the verifi- 
cation of some issues that cannot be explored using the latter. With 3-person 
games, for instance, we can verify how cooperative subject i reacts when only 
one of his fellow members cooperates. Does subject i reciprocate the cooperative 
partner? Or, instead, does the defecting behaviour of the other partner lead him 
to defect and to punish, in such a way, also the other group member? Since the 
answer to this question is cruciaJ in testing some of the predictions /restrictions 
identified in Chapter 5, the choice to have groups with more than two subjects 
seemed to be unavoidable. 
Then, among all possible group sizes, I decided for groups of three in order 
to create a simple and clear decisional environment. ' Almost all previous public 
goods experiments axe based on N-person games (where N is usually equal to 
4 or 5), in which subjects can provide the public good at any level between their 
initial endowment and zero. In such settings, each player must think about the 
behaviour of many other people whose contribution decisions lie over a wide 
range. So, how the individual player interprets (and reacts to) the behaviour of 
his partners is difficult to observe in these experiments. Since the study reported 
in this chapter is only a first test of the persuasive behaviour hypothesis, the 
"Simplicity is a good feature of experiments. You are more likely to understand what you 
have learned" (Ledyard 1995, p-176). 
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experiment was designed so as to implement the simplest possible environment. 
The latter appears to be a game where, every period, subjects have to choose 
only from two alternatives while keeping their mind on the decision processes 
of only other two people, which is exactly the 3 (players) x2 (strategies) game 
used here. This (simple) starting point represents a necessary step towards 
more complicated stages. The experimental investigation of any new hypothesis 
should proceed gradually. The inefficiency of doing everything in one single step 
is, in fact, well known. 
Despite its simplicity, the possibility that, in my constituent game, a sub- 
ject chooses to cooperate out of con sion cannot be discarded. This choice A 
is, indeed, the only 'mistake' which-from a game theoretic point of view- 
a subject can make. Hence, one may interpret an individual's cooperative 
choice as an error and attribute it to his confusion. In addition, because of 
its repeated nature, even egotistical subjects may decide to cooperate in (early 
periods of) the game because they play strategically and want to conceal their 
rationality. Thus, alternative equilibrium concepts, like the sequential equilib- 
rium/strategies hypothesis, may be invoked to explain cooperation. 
A very straightforward way to obtain insights into subjects' decision rules, 
and better understand the relationship between people's actions in public goods 
settings is to directly ask them both to motivate their own decision and to 
speculate about the motivation of the others. For this reason, I included in the 
experiment a questionnaire through which I collected motivational information. 
In addition, I elicited expectations about the others' future behaviour. 
Thus, any single period was divided into two stages: the decision stage and 
the questionnaire stage. 
The decision stage 
Instead of telling the participants the payoff function (5-14), 1 presented the 
game in terms of Fig. 6.1, where X denotes the private good, Y the public 
one, and where the binary choice between X and Y is equivalent to the choice 
between contributing either nothing (gi = 0) or all (gi = 1) to the public good. 2 
Hence, in each decision stage, each subject was asked to choose between X 
and Y, by knowing that if he chose X, only he would receive r tokens; 3 while 
if he chose Y, each subject in his group would get v tokens, with r>v and 
2 Actually the game was shown in Fig. 6.1's format only in the instructions. Particular 
values for v and r were inserted, in fact, during the experiment. I will say more about the 
values of these parameters later. 
3 The token was the unit of experimental money. The exchange rate between token and 
real money was: 1 token = 0.2 pence 
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(a) r if all three group members choose X 
(b) r+ v if one person in the group chooses Y 
X/ (c) r +2v if both the other two fellow participants choose Y 
Y (d) 3v if all three group members choose Y 
(e) 2v if one person in the group chooses X 
(f) v if both the other two fellow participants choose X 
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Figure 6-1: Form in which the constituent game was presented to subjects. 
3v > r. Given these inequalities, the fully-rational Nash equilibrium (generated 
by own-payoff maximisation) is for each player to select X, while the social 
optimum requires each subject to choose Y. 
The questionnaire stage 
Every period--after having selected an action from the two that were permitted, 
and having observed the decisions of his partners--each player was requested: 
1) to indicate the main reason for his own period-decision; 
2) to guess the motivation behind his fellow members' decision; 
3) to predict his fellow members' next decision. 
Subjects answered the first two questions by picking out-for each of them- 
one of five different alternatives (see Tables A. 1 and A. 2 in Appendix A). They 
had to type X or Y on their keyboard to state their expectations about the 
others' next choices. 
In order to avoid the criticism of not providing participants with (monetary) 
incentives to answer the questionnaire seriously and honestly, subjects were 
compensated both for right guesses of the others' motivations and for accurate 
predictions. In particulax, participants were told that, each round, in addition 
to their earnings from the decision stage, they would be rewarded with 30 tokens 
if they guessed correctly the motivations lying behind the last choice of both 
their partners, and that they would get a further 30 tokens if their predictions 
about both the others' next choice turned out to be right. 
Such an incentive scheme could be accomplished (and subjects themselves 
could believe in it) only if the others' possible motivations were in a limited 
number. For this reason, rather than allowing participants to write down the 
motivations for their decisions on their own, I gave them a list of alternatives 
which is perfectly symmetric to the list given for answering the second question, 
as can be seen by comparing Tables A. 1 and A. 2. 
A look at these tables reveals that they lack any answer explicitly corre- 
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sponding to the persuasion hypothesis (e. g., "I want to persuade the others"), 
or to any other of the hypotheses of cooperative behaviour presented in the 
previous chapter. I deliberately omitted these kinds of motivations from the 
questionnaire in order to avoid the criticism of influencing the subjects' thinking 
process by suggesting them specific behavioural rules. 
While the examination of the relationship between a subject's action and 
his beliefs about the motivations underlying others' behaviour is peculiar to my 
experimental design, there have been previous experiments which attempted to 
investigate the relationship between an individual's decision and his expecta- 
tions about his fellow members' next decision. 4 However, in a departure from 
most of these earlier studies, in the experiment presented here, expectations 
were elicited in period t for period t+I after a subject had observed the actual 
choices made by the others in 0 Such a procedure was followed for practi- 
cal reasons: that is, in order to make subjects answer all three questions in a 
unique stage so as to divide each period into two parts only. Since the question 
asking the subject to speculate about the others' motivation can be answered 
only after observing the others' decision, and since it seems reasonable to ask 
people to motivate their own decision once they have aJready taken it, if I want 
people to answer all three questions in one single step, then the questionnaire 
stage must inevitably come after the decision stage. If, by following Croson 
(1998a, 1998b), I had elicited expectations before decisions, each single period 
would have been composed of three parts: a first paxt in which subjects had to 
predict the others' next choice; a second part in which they had to take their 
own decision; and, finally, a third part in which they had to answer the other 
two questions. This would have made the experiment itself too complicated for 
the subjects, and the program (for running it) too difficult to implement. 
The only problem with such a procedure is that we do not get information 
about expectations prior to the first decision-round. 
'For economic examples of experiments which elicited expectations in public goods settings 
see Messick et al. (1983); Schroeder et al. (1983); Poppe and Utens (1986); Fleishman (1988); 
Weimann (1994); and Croson (1998; 1998b). There is also a large literature in psychology that 
concentrated on the elicitation of individuals' expectations in prisoner's and social dilemma 
games (cf. Kelley and Stahelski (1970); Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976); Dawes et al. (1977); 
and Mess6 and Sivacek (1979)). 
'In both Croson's experiments (1998a; 1998b) the guess treatment consisted of an addi- 
tional estimation stage before each game. 
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6.3 Experimental parameters and procedures 
The computerised. experiment was run in the laboratory of the Centre for Exper- 
imental Economics (EXEC) at the University of York (UK). 6 It was organised 
in two sessions with 12 subjects for each session (so that a total of 24 people 
took part in this experiment). Each session consisted of two perfectly identical 
subsessions. 
6.3.1 About the first subsession 
The first subsession was divided in three different phases (or supergames), each 
of which was a 10-fold repetition of the game reported in Fig. 6.1.7 
Phases were distinguished according to: 
1) the groups composition; i. e., subjects interacted in the same group during 
an entire phase, while groups were randomly formed anew from a Phase to the 
next one; 
2) the value of the mrs, which (given utility function (5.14)) is simply the ratio 
v/r. 
The main reason for having Partners treatments is that, in non cooperative 
games, a player can pursue a persuasive strategy only if his fellow members 
do not change after each period. Paxticipants were informed that they would 
remain in the same group throughout each phase. They were also told that the 
composition of their groups would randomly change from a phase to the next 
one, and that they could not expect to meet the same fellow members again in 
a later phase. 8 
As for the mrs, this was varied by changing, from phase to phase, the 
reward v for choosing the cooperative alternative, which took values of 25 in 
the first phase, 33 in the second phase, and 44 in the third phase. The return r 
from selecting the defecting alternative was instead always 50, both across and 
during the phases. 9 
'The program for running the experiment was developed by myself and by the EXEC 
programmer Norman Spivey. 
7 Given the simplicity of the problem presented to the subjects and the provided definition 
of persuasive play, ten iterations are considered enough to understand if a subject follows a 
persuasive strategy and if he succeeds in it. 
8 Given the experimental design (3 supergames played sequentially by groups of three play- 
ers), subjects never would meet the same partners in a later phase only if at least 12 people 
participate in the experiment. This is exactly the number of subjects who took part in each 
session. 
gThe values of v were chosen so that the inequalities r>v and Nv >r hold. Since 
r= 50 and N=3, the lower and upper bounds between which v has to lie are 17 and 49, 
respectively. Furthermore, into this range, I decided for the described values on the basis of a 
pilot experiment. 
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The difference in the mrs allows me to investigate if subjects modify their 
pattern of behaviour according to phase and, in particulax, if they become more 
cooperative from a phase to the next one. Let Pi, t(j) be player i's penalty for 
choosing the cooperative alternative Y in round t of phase j when both his 
two fellow members choose X; that is, Pi, t(j) = (v - r). Then: Pi, t(l) = -25, 
Pi, t(2) = -17, Pi, t(3) = -10. Therefore, while in the first phase a cooperative 
player can lose 25 tokens each round, in the last phase his loss is 10 tokens. 
Hence I expect to see a greater number of participants deciding to contribute in 
the last phase. This opinion is reinforced by the fact that incentives to defect 
(given by - Pi, t(j))'O decrease, whilst gains to be achieved by coordinating on 
the Paxeto optimal outcome increase across phases. 
Subjects were shown the game they had to play only when the new phase 
started. Such a procedure was followed to eliminate the possibility of 'order 
effects' due to participants' knowledge of increasing values of v. 
6.3.2 About the second subsession 
By definition, somebody cheats if in the last period he plays the dominant strat- 
egy. A crucial difference between strategies hypothesis and the other theories 
of cooperative behaviour discussed in Chapter 5 is that, whilst according to 
the former a player should always cheat, the latter never ask for cheating if all 
group members are cooperating. 
In order to verify if (and how) the behaviour of a cooperative subject would 
change whenever he does not cheat but his partners do, and study, therefore, 
whether the attitudes of 'experienced' subjects towards choosing the cooperative 
alternative is influenced by previous interactions, I included in my experiment a 
second subsession which was an exact repetition of the first one' 1 and crucially I 
did not inform participants of this. Indeed, any information about the contents 
of subsession 2 was given after the end of subsession 1. At the start of the 
experiment, however, subjects were told that the experiment would be longer 
than that just explained in the instructions, and that they would be required 
to stay in the laboratory for an hour more. 12 
Such an experimental design permits us to verify: 
1OPlayer i's incentive to defect is given by his payoffs when he plays the dominant strategy 
while the other members of his group cooperate, Le. r+ 2v, minus his payoffs if he continues 
playing cooperatively, i. e. U. Therefore we have: [(r + 2v) - (3v)] = (r - v) = -Pi, t(j). 
11 This means that the same three phases described in Subsection (6.3.1) in the same succes- 
sion, with the same paxameter values, and with the same group composition were performed 
twice. 
"This bit of information was given in order to avoid deceptive practices that axe not rec- 
ommended in economics experiments (cf., Hey (1991, p. 119), and Ledyaxd (1995)). 
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1) if subjects defect in the last period of each phase of the first subsession (the 
presumed end of the plays) even if the partners axe cooperating; 
2) in what ways cheating on the part of his fellow members influences the 
behaviour of each player in the second identical subsession. If a player does 
not cheat, but his partners do, he might take a dislike to the others and so 
modify his previous attitudes towards them. This change will be reflected in 
his successive choices. 
6.3.3 Subject pool 
Subjects were undergraduate and graduate students of the University of York. 
Students were volunteers recruited by announcements on several information 
boards in the University buildings and by mail-shot invitations. Upon their 
arrival at the laboratory of EXEC, they received a copy of the instructions 
for the first subsession. 13 These instructions were also read aloud. The un- 
derstanding of these instructions was checked in a short computerized exercise 
program. Each subject had to go through this program individually. Then, the 
subjects were randomly arranged in four groups of three, and played the first 
10-period game (i. e., the first phase). They made their decisions anonymously 
via computer terminals and did not communicate with each other in any other 
way. 
During the experiment, at the end of each round, participants were shown 
information (by means of a -results table' displayed on their computer screen) 
on their own experimental earnings for the round just finished as well as on the 
choices and corresponding earnings of each of their partners. 
It was explained that all the decisions took in each round (i. e., the choice 
between X and Y as well as the answers to the questionnaire) were binding and 
that end-of-experiment rewards would be based on the sum of earnings from 
all rounds. Subjects were told that the value of each experimental money (i. e. 
of each token) was 0.2 pence. The average payoff, earned in about two hours, 
was approximately 10 English pounds. 
6.4 Constructing the alternative hypotheses 
The linear utility function around which this experiment is constructed has 
been used in Chapter 5 in order to illustrate alternative hypotheses of coop- 
erative behaviour. In that context, I have also derived, for each theory, a 
13Complete copy of the instructions is reported in Appendix A. 
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number of testable predictions/ restrictions. The latter, together with the mo- 
tivational/beliefs data collected through the questionnaire, provide the set of 
criteria to be used here in order to construct the different hypotheses, or player 
types, open to investigation. 
Viewing each hypothesis as a player type should lead us to consider it invari- 
ant, for any individual subject, over the six phases; it seems, in fact, reasonable 
to expect a player to retain his own type throughout the experiment. 
Some features of the design might, nevertheless, affect such a reasonable 
expectation. First, the fact that phases were characterised by different mrs 
might induce subjects to modify their behavioural pattern according to phase; 
from the initial laboratory work on free-riding, it is well known that the size of 
the mrs is one of the most significant factors in influencing people behaviour. 14 
Second, to the extent that phases 4,5, and 6 were a new start of phases 1,2, 
and 3 respectively, this might have a bearing on the behaviour of a player, who 
(in the light of his experience) might be induced to change his strategy (and, 
therefore, his type) when he re-faces the -same paxtners. Third, previous inter- 
action, although with different partners, might influence a subject by leading 
him to re-consider his strategy when a new phase starts. Thus, if one of these 
three circumstances takes place, we might well observe a player to modify his 
type throughout the experiment. 
6.4.1 The persuasive type 
In this experiment, a persuasive strategy is concisely and completely defined by 
restriction (5.15) (on the maximum number of periods for which a persuasive 
player can cooperate unreciprocated, i. e., without being followed by each of his 
partners), and by the behavioural pattern resulting from (5.18) and (5.19). 
Substituting the parameters T, r and v with their actual values into (5.15), 
.56 
in phases 1 and 4, M :58 in phases 2 and 5, and it < 10 in we obtain p- 
phases 3 and 6.15 
Thus, in each phase of this experiment, a player will be taken to be of the 
persuasive type if he is observed: 
(a) to choose the cooperative alternative in each period from I to P regardless 
of the others' behaviour throughout; 
(b) to shift to defection in any of the following periods as soon as he observes 
defection from one of his partners. Unless both the others are cooperating, this 
14 On this topic see, for instance, Ledyard (1995). 
15 Since p can be an integer number only, the decimal numbers have been rounded to the 
smallest nearest integer. 
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shift must be detected no later than the 6th round in phases 1 and 4, and no 
later than the 8th round in phases 2 and 5. This means that if a subject is 
found to cooperate, unreciprocated, for more than 6 periods in phases I and 4, 
and for more than 8 periods in phases 2 and 5, then he cannot be classified as 
a persuasive type. As for phases 3 and 6, in them, a persuasive player might 
cooperate, unreciprocated, for all 10 periods. 
The questionnaire's data allow us to add further testable restrictions on 
persuasive behaviour. 
Let us first consider the relationship between choices and expectations. My 
definition of a persuasive player as an 'hard-wired' individual who is allowed to 
have some kind of discretion/rationality only at the outset of the game implies 
that, once the player has solved his first period's maximisation problem and 
has decided his strategy (on the basis of an a priori and well-defined set of 
beliefs about the others' behaviour throughout the game), he cannot anymore 
optimise. His a priori beliefs may well change when the game is actually played, 
but this change has no bearing on his 'automatic' behaviour. The predefined 
set of instructions given to the persuasive player require him to cooperate for 
p periods and to reciprocate the others' behaviour thereafter. Such a program 
does not allow for changes in behaviour based on changed expectations. 
One of the most relevant consequences of this definition of a persuasive 
strategy is that it induces a player to never defect and to never expect defection 
as long as he observes cooperation from each of the other players. The per- 
suasive agent has, in fact, solved his maximisation problem on the assumption 
that both he and his partners will play the cooperative alternative from period 
p onwards; therefore, if, during this time interval, the others are observed to 
cooperate, the persuasive player can neither deviate from cooperation, nor can 
expect them to defect. 
As for the reason indicated for his period-decision, in order to be classified 
as persuasive a subject must motivate his cooperation of the first P periods by 
selecting either alternative C16 or alternative E, 17 providing, in the latter case, 
a personal motivation somehow related to the persuasion hypothesis (e. g., "I 
wanted to persuade the others", or "If we all choose Y, then each will benefit"). 
The cooperative choices (if any) made after p can be explained by C, E as well 
as by A. 18 While the (possible) defective choices must be motivated by A, B, 19 
16That is: "If all 3 group members took this choice, we would obtain the highest payments" 
17 This alternative gave the subject the possibility to type his own reason on his keyboaxd, 
if none of those suggested could justify his period-decision. 
18By choosing A, a subject attributes his period-decision to the past behaviour of his fellow 
members. 
19That is: "Whatever my fellow-participants would have chosen, this choice assured me 
6.4 Constructing the alternative hypotheses 125 
or 
6.4.2 The reciprocal type 
The behaviour of a subject who bases his choice on Sugden's reciprocity prin- 
ciple evolves as given by (5.26) and (5.27). The latter represent two testable 
restrictions which axe used here in order to identify a reciprocal type. Thus, in 
each phase of this experiment, a subject will be classified as a reciprocator if 
be is found: 
(a) to cooperate in the first round; 
(b) to shift to defection in any of the following rounds as soon as he observes 
defection from one of his partners. 
Also under reciprocity theories, a subject can change his behaviour (and 
shift, therefore, from the initial cooperation towards defection) only on the basis 
of the others' observed behaviour. The moraJ obligation that the reciprocator 
has towards his partners leads him to cooperate until at least one of the others 
does so as well. 
As for his motivational answers, a reciprocator must match his cooperative 
choices with alternative A or C, and his defecting choices (if any) with aJterna- 
tive A, B, or D . 
20 Either choice can be justified by alternative E; in this case 
it must be possible to relate the provided personaJ reason with reciprocal be- 
haviour (e. g., "I have just reciprocated the choice of my partner", or "I wanted 
to punish (to reward) my paxtners who were hostile (kind) towaxds me"). 
6.4.3 The strategic type 
As pointed out in Chapter 5, strategic behaviour is characterised by a 3-phase 
structure. In the setting under consideration, these 3 phases are concisely and 
completely defined by (5.32), (5.33) and (5.34). Thus, in each 10-period phase 
of this experiment, a subject will be taken to be of the strategic type if he is 
observed: 
(a) to cooperate for the first two periods whatever his partners do, but only 
if he expects cooperation from each of them; the latter implies that unless a 
subject, in t=1, expects both his partners to cooperate in t=2, then the 
subject cannot be considered of the strategic type; 21 
(b) to defect in the last round, whatever the history of the game so far; 
higher payments than those I could obtain by choosing the other action". 
20That is: "This choice gave my fellow-participants the lowest payments". 
2'A strategic individual attaches a small probability to the likelihood that his playing part- 
ners axe not fully-rational (i. e., they use dominated strategies). This implies that he must 
expect cooperation from them. 
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(c) to defect in any period from 3 to 9 as soon as he observes one of his partners 
to defect for two consecutive periods. 
As for his motivational data, a strategic type has to motivate his cooperative 
choice of the first two periods by picking out aRernative C, and his defecting 
choice of the last period by picking out aJternative B. The choices in the inter- 
mediate time interval must be matched with alternative A or C, if cooperative 
choices; and with alternative A or B, if defecting choices. In any period, any 
choice can be justified by E, insofar as the reason given on his own is related 
with strategies (e. g., "I want the others to think that I will cooperate if they 
do"). 
6.4.4 The Kantian type 
In this experiment, a Kantian type must cooperate throughout each phase, 
independently of (his expectations about) the others' behaviour. 
He must choose alternative C (or E) to explain his constant cooperation. 
6.4.5 The altruistic type 
The evolution of altruistic behaviour in the game used here is given by (5.28). 
According to the latter, if y (i. e., the altruist's weight on the others' welfare) 
is such that -y > [r - v]/[2v], then an altruist's optimal decision is to choose 
the cooperative alternative throughout each phase independently of what (he 
expects) the others (to) do. 
By using this experiment's paxameters' values, we obtain: -y > 0.5 in phases 
1 and 4; -y > 0.25 in phases 2 and 5; and -y > 0.125 in phases 3 and 6. 
Since -y is an unknown vaxiable, I cannot really detect an altruistic type 
in this experiment . 
22 The only possible test on altruistic behaviour is the fol- 
lowing: unless a subject cooperates for all 10 periods of a phase regardless of 
(his expectations about) the others' behaviour, then the subject cannot be an 
altrudst. 
6.4.6 The persuaded type 
Restrictions (5.21) and (5.22) of previous Chapter 5 concern a persuaded player's 
behaviour. Applied to this experiment, they lead us to consider of the persuaded 
type a subject who, in any 10-period phase, is observed: 
(a) to defect until some period 0, regardless of (his expectations about) the 
22 A subject might, indeed, be an altruist and, nevertheless, decide to defect throughout a 
phase because his own ^f is less than the critical value corresponding to that phase. 
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others' behaviour; 
(b) to cooperate thereafter if at least one of his partners is observed to cooper- 
ate. 
A persuaded type must pick out alternative B to justify his prior defection, 
and alternative A or C to justify his later cooperation. 
6.4.7 The Nash type 
In Chapter 5 (Subsection (5.3)), 1 have shown that, in a N-person game, where 
there is complete information about the distribution of types in the population, 
if (N - 1) players axe persuasive, then it will be fully-rational for the Nth player 
to cooperate for some periods. 
In this experiment, the lack of complete information about the others' types 
leads a subject who wants to selfishly maximise his own-payoff (whatever the 
decision of the others) to defect in each repetition. Thus, a subject will be 
considered of the Nash type if he defects throughout a phase whatever (his 
expectations about) the others' behaviour. 
As for his motivational answers, a Nash type player must match his repeated 
defection with alternative A, B, or E (giving, in the latter case, a personal 
motivation related to his desire to maximise his own monetary payoff). 
6.4.8 Summary of the criteria used in identifying a player type 
By summarising, three aspects of the data are here taken into account in order 
to classify a subject as a particular type: 
(1) the maximum periods of unreciprocated cooperation that a subject ex- 
hibits; 
(2) the relationship between a subject's choice and his partners' observed 
behaviour; 
(3) the reason a subject indicates for his own period-decision; i. e. the way 
in which he answers the first question of the questionnaire stage. 
As for point (1), three of the theories considered allow us to derive a testable 
restriction relative to this issue. Such a restriction can be expressed, in general 
form, as follows: "a subject cannot be considered of type W if he cooperates, 
unreciprocated (i. e., without being followed by each of his partners), for more 
periods than -r. " Then, if V stands for persuasive, -r equals 6 in phases 1 and 
4; 8 in phases 2 and 5; and 10 in phases 3 and 6. If W stands for reciprocal, r 
equals 1, regardless of the phase played. If W stands for strategic, -r equals 2, 
whatever the phase played. 
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This restriction does not apply to a Kantian type or to an altruistic type, 
who, on the contrary, must be observed to cooperate even if unreciprocated 
throughout each phase. For the altruist, such an unconditional cooperation 
takes place only if his weight on the others' welfare is greater than a critical 
value. 
As for point (2), four of the six cooperative hypotheses investigated here 
predict a specific kind of relationship between choices and others' behaviour. A 
persuasive type and a reciprocal type must not defect as long as both the other 
group members do not defect. A strategic type must not defect as long as one 
of his partners does not defect for two consecutive periods. A persuaded type, 
who defects in all periods from I to 0, must not defect afterwards if at least one 
of bis partners cooperates. 
As for point (3), the match motivation-decision that must be observed for 
each type has been given in the previous subsection. 
6.5 Aggregate results 
In presenting my results, I shall start with an aggregate description of the data. 
Figure 6.2 shows the aggregate average of cooperative subjects separately for 
the 10 periods of the 6 phases. 
An analysis of these data makes the following observations possible. 
Observation 6.1 In all periods, the percentage of people contributing is signif- 
icantly different from zero, but also significantly less than the efficient outcome 
of 'all group cooperating'. 
Observation 6.2 Cooperation tends to fall with repetition in general, although 
a closer look at the period-by-period data reveals that, during this downward 
trend, the percentage of cooperators remains at an (almost) constant level for 
more than two consecutive periods. 
Observation 6.3 Subjects do not play their dominant strategy Zn the final pe- 
riod; in particular, a substantial amount of contributions is reported at the end 
of subsession 1 (the 'presumed' end of the game). 
Observation 6.4 Each positive variation in the mrs is accompanied by an 
increase in cooperation. 
It can be shown that the increase in cooperation across phases is statistically 
significant. Pooling data over phases, (under the assumption of independent ob- 
servations) I use a test of proportions, which is based on a binomiaJ distribution 
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Figure 6.2: Average of subjects cooperating in each phase. 
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(calling giving a success and free-riding a failure), to compaxe cooperation in 
each pair of phases. 
Let pi and pj denote the population proportions of successes (i. e., of coop- 
erators) in phases i and j (respectively), where the population proportions of 
successes in phase i (Vi = 1,2,..., 6) is defined as the number of cooperative 
choices detected in phase i out of a total of 240 choices (10 period-choices x 24 
subjects) divided by 240.1 test the null hypothesis HO : pi - pj =0 against the 
alternative Hi : pi - pj > 0. The decision rule is to reject HO in favour of HI if 
A -pi --z> za, aL+n I 0) ( ni nj 
23456789 10 2456789 19 
456789 10 456789 10 
456789 10 456789 10 
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where Pi and Pj are the observed sample proportions for phase i and phase j, 
respectively; ni = nj = 240 is the number of observations; PO is the estimate of 
the common proportion under the null hypothesis, given by: 
Po = 
iPi + njl5j 240fii + 240fi 
ni + nj 480 
and ýýjj is the value obtained by comparing the proportions of cooperators in 
phase i and phase j. 
Results of these tests are depicted in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: z-statistics for the dif- 
ferences in cooperators' proportions 
between phases. 
Subsession 1 Subsession 2 
1.53+ ýý5,4 = 6.02*** 
Z3,2 = 5.39*** '4,5 = 4.28*** 
ýý3,1 = 6.86*** ý6,4 =9 
*** 
< 0.001 +p<0.10 
As can be seen, the null hypothesis of equality of cooperators' proportions 
between phases can be rejected at significance levels beyond the 1% for all 
comparisons, except for the one between phase 1 and phase 2, where the null 
hypothesis is rejected only at the 10% level. 
All observations from 6.1 to 6.4 are in line with the findings of previous 
experimental studies. What I want to test here is whether such a behaviour 
can be due to the fact that cooperators, after having understood the benefits 
of the efficient strategy, continue cooperating in order to induce defectors to do 
likewise. 
The finding that the percentage of cooperators versus defectors does not 
drop immediately to zero as well as the result that there is a substantial amount 
of cooperation in the tenth period of each phase of the first subsession might 
somehow support my hypothesis if two conditions were verified. First, if the 
constancy of the cooperators' percentage across more periods of the same phase 
means that they are actually the same subjects who keep on taking the coop-- 
erative choice. Second, if the last round's cooperators are people who were 
cooperating during most previous periods. 
These (and other) questions can be answered by turning to the analysis of 
behaviour across individuals. 
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6.6 Individual results 
It is well documented in the literature that individuals differ consistently with 
respect to behaviour in these kinds of experiments. Generally speaking, a first 
relevant distinction can be made between individualistic and cooperative sub- 
jects. Then, within the latter category, a further distinction regards individuals' 
motivations for cooperating. 23 In this subsection, I shall investigate whether 
any of the rival hypotheses presented in Section (6.4) can explain this experi- 
ment's data and provide justification for the observed cooperative behaviour. 
I first discuss the relationship between an individual's choice and his re- 
sponses to two of the questions in the questionnaire stage. These answers will 
be used to verify subjects' understanding of the game. Next I shall present a 
classification of subjects according to the criteria listed in Subsection (6.4.8). 
After that, an analysis of behaviour across subsessions will allow for further 
conclusions. 
6.6.1 Testing subjects' confusion 
In my experiment, the only 'mistake' a subject can make-from a game theo- 
retic point of view-is to choose the cooperative alternative Y. Therefore, one 
may interpret an individual's choice of Y as an error and attribute it to his 
confusion. 24 First, I must rule out the possibility of confusion being the expla- 
nation of the observed cooperation and then I can go on to investigate which 
theory of cooperative behaviour best justifies subjects' decisions. 
Participants' motivations of their own period-decisions as well as their 
guesses about others' motivations allow for a test of the confusion hypothesis. 
A subject's reason for his own period-decision shall be defined as 'inconsis- 
tent' if it cannot explain in any way the decision for which it is given. 
Let us consider the different alternatives among which paxticipants are asked 
to pick out in order to motivate their own choices, and that are reported on 
Table A. 1 of Appendix A. Inconsistency is found, for instance, when a subject 
motivates his choice of Y by selecting alternative B which is clearly referring to 
the Nash equilibrium strategy; or when he declares to choose an action because 
of the past behaviour of his fellow members who have never played that action. 
"The claim that individuals differ with respect to their motivation for cooperating coincides 
with everyday experiences as well as with the results of experiments made, among others, by 
Maxwell and Ames (1981); Carter and Irons (1991); Andreoni and Miller (1993); Brandts and 
Schram (1997). On this topic, see also Weimann (1994); Offerman et al. (1996); and Burlando 
and Hey (1997). 
24 See Andreoni (1995a); Palfrey and Prisbey (1996,1997)- and Brandts and Schram (1997) 
for a discussion about 'confusion' and 'noise' in public goo! experiments. 
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The choice of alternative E when the specification of the other reasons is missing 
is also considered inconsistent. 
AnaJysis of this kind of inconsistency reveals that 34 out of a total of 1440 
motivations are inconsistent, and that only 11 of these concern the cooperative 
choice. Experimental data, then, show that: 
e in the first phase, only I out of 24 subjects selects twice Y by giving each 
time inconsistent motivations for this choice; 
o in the second phase, another subject-who exhibits a cooperative behaviour 
over all 10 periods-provides 5 times inconsistent motivations; 
9 the remaining 4 inconsistencies are spread over all six phases and across 
different individuals. 
These findings lead to the following observation. 
Observation 6.5 People in my experiment do not seem to be cooperative out 
of their confusion about the monetary incentives of the game. 
To test the robustness of such an observation, I shall use subjects' responses 
to the second question of the questionnaire stage; i. e., their guesses of the others' 
motivations. Table A. 2 in Appendix A lists all alternatives available to subjects' 
in order to answer this question. 
In this case, I shall adopt the expression inconsistent guess to indicate a 
contradiction between the others' observed behaviour and the alternative picked 
out in order to motivate that behaviour. 
Results from this investigation demonstrate that, throughout all the experi- 
ment, only 2.7 percent of subjects who choose Y provide inconsistent guesses of 
their counterparts' motivations. Among them, there are both the subjects who 
answered inconsistently the first question of the questionnaire. Such a result 
leads me to attribute their cooperative choice to a mistake and to consider them 
as confused subjects (see the classification of subjects reported in Table 6.2). 
Of particular interest here is the percentage of cooperators who motivate 
the others' defecting choice by picking out aJternative B from those listed in 
Table A. 2. Such a percentage refers, in fact, to people who play cooperatively 
even if they have grasped the true incentives of the game. Their choice of Y 
cannot be therefore attributed to any mistake. My data reveal that, throughout 
all experiment, 57 percent of cooperating people make this combination. 
An important motivation for eliciting this kind of guesses is to see whether 
or not people, forced to think about the motivations behind others' behaviour, 
modify their own behavioural pattern. 25 
25 For instance, cooperating people might understand the equilibrium of the game after 
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If the simple act of asking for reasons behind others' choice makes individ- 
ual's behaviour really different, I should observe an instantaneous shift from an 
action to the other soon after the cited match is done. However, this instanta- 
neous shift is rarely observed. Particularly, no immediate shift occurs in phases 
1 and 3; whilst two shifts are observed in phase 2 (one from Y to X, the other 
from X to Y). 
A last result relative to this study deserves to be underlined. A subject is 
generally found to believe that others think like him when they make the same 
choice. This observation is in line with the findings of previous experiments. 
The analysis carried out in this subsection allows me to distinguish between 
selfish, confused and cooperative subjects. The purpose of the next subsections 
will be to explore further the source of the observed cooperation. 
6.6.2 Testing the alternative hypotheses of cooperative behaviour 
Here (unless otherwise stated) I use the criteria reported in Subsection (6.4.8) 
to classify subjects. In some cases, such criteria do not permit an explanation 
of the data and, therefore, do not allow the determination of which of the rival 
hypotheses best tracks the individual's behavioural pattern. When this occurs, 
the subject will not be arranged in any type/category, but will be considered 
unclassifiable. 
In addition, it is impossible to impute a specific type to a subject who 
cooperates in all 10 periods of a phase, while he observes and expects cooper- 
ation from each of his partners: except the strategic hypothesis, all the other 
cooperative hypotheses investigated in thiis study can account for this kind of 
behaviour. For this reason, whenever I observe groups whose members cooper- 
ate and expect cooperation one another throughout a phase, I win not arrange 
any individual subject in a particular category, but all members of the group 
will be considered always-cooperators. An always-cooperator identifies, there- 
fore, a subject who (at odds with an unclassifiable individual, whose behaviour 
cannot be explained by any theory) satisfies the criteria used here to identify an 
altruist, a Kantian player, a reciprocator and a persuasive individual, so that 
he may be any of these types. 
having matched other's choice of X with alternative B. Similarly, defecting people might 
appreciate the benefits of cooperation after the symmetrical (and opposite) match: other's 
choice of Y-(because of) alternative C. 
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First subsession's results 
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I shall begin my test of the various behavioural hypotheses by taking into ac- 
count data from the first subsession. Table 6.2 shows the distribution of the 
subjects among the different hypotheses/ types in each of the three phases of 
subsession 1.26 
Table 6.2: Distribution of subjects across the three 
phases of subsession 1. 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
Nash 8 7 5 
Confused I 1 0 
Reciprocal 0 11 0 
Kantian/ Altruist 0 2 1 
Strategic 2 1 3 
Persuasive 3 3 4 
Persuaded 0 3 0 
Unclassified 8 6 5 
Always-cooperators 12 0 16 
First of all, it can be seen that (in agreement with the data on average 
cooperation) the number of subjects playing the dominant-strategy Nash equi- 
librium decreases across phases. This confirms that people are less 'selfish' 
when the penalty for choosing the cooperative alternative decreases. 
As far as the cooperative subjects are concerned, inspection of Table 6.2 
reveals the following. 
a) Two subjects (one in phase 1, another in phase 2) are confused. As 
emphasised in the previous subsection, such an attribution derives from the 
fact that these subjects provide repeatedly inconsistent reasons for their own 
choice as well as inconsistent guesses of their counterparts' motivations. 
b) Only one subject (and just in one of the three phases) behaves in such 
a way that the classification criteria employed here lead me to consider him of 
the reciprocal type. 
c) Few subjects are of the Kantian or of the altruistic type. These subjects 
are found both to cooperate throughout a phase even if, in some periods, they 
expect defection from their partners and to motivate their constant cooperative 
26Remember that the three phases of the first subsession were distinguished according to 
the group composition and the value of the mrs. 
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choice by picking out, in each period, aJternative C. In this case, it is impossible 
to distinguish whether such subjects cooperate because they follow a Kantian 
morality or because they have aJtruistic preferences. 
d) In all 3 phases, we observe subjects classifiable as strategic individuals 
as well as subjects of the persuasive type. 
e) Three subjects (aJI concentrated in phase 2) behave as the persuaded 
type. 
f) Some subjects (whose number is particularly high in phase 3) may be of 
the altruistic, Kantian, reciprocal or persuasive type: they cooperate through- 
out a phase while observing and expecting cooperation from each of the others. 
As such, they are considered always-cooperators. Notice that the detection of 
this behavioural pattern implies that some of the paxticipants in this exper- 
iment do not cheat in the final period of a phase, but (against any possible 
rational model) they prefer to cooperate. 
g) FinaJly, a remarkable number of participants do not present readily in- 
terpretable data and, consequently, axe considered unclassifiable. Among these 
unclassifiable patterns of behaviour, we observe some homogeneity which is 
worth emphasising. For instance, a few subjects are found to staxt cooperating 
at a later stage of a phase, and to keep on this choice, unreciprocated, for some 
consecutive periods. All these subjects motivate their later shift to cooperation 
on their own and, in all cases, they provide a personaJ reason related to their 
desire to signal a willingness to cooperate. 27 
In summary, Table 6.2 shows that subjects are heterogeneous with respect 
to their motivations for cooperating, and that persuasion is a strategy followed 
by some of the people classified as cooperators. In addition, (in line with the 
corresponding value of M) the highest tendency to persuade is observed in phase 
3: in this phase, a subject can pursue a persuasive strategy-and cooperate 
unreciprocated-for all 10 periods. 
The distribution of types across phases reported in Table 6.2 further suggests 
that there is heterogeneity not only across individuals but also, within the same 
individual, across phases. Thus, although it seems reasonable to expect a player 
to retain his own type over phases, most subjects in this experiment appear to 
change their type according to phase. This can clearly be seen from Table 6.3, 
which displays the evolution of each subject's behaviour over all three phases of 
subsession 1, and also reports, for each subject, the period, v, (if any) in which 
he switches from cooperation to defection. 
27 One can find examples of this kind of behaviuur in Appendix C (where I report all indi- 
vidual data collected from this experiment) by looking at the data of 
Subject 15 in phase 1, 
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Table 6.3: Classification of each subject ac- 
cording to his type across the three phases 
of subsession 1. a 
Subject Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
1 P (v = 5) P (v 5) P (v = 4) 
2 U R (v 2) N 
3 U U S (v = 3) 
4 N U AC 
5 S (v=3) N AC 
6 N N N 
7 N C U 
8 N U P (V=9) 
9 U U U 
10 P (v = 5) U U 
11 U N N 
12 P (v=7) U AC 
13 C N U 
14 AC P (v = 9) N 
15 U Pd U 
16 N N P (v = 10) 
17 S (v = 10) S (v = 3) P (v = 10) 
18 U P (v = 5) AC 
19 U K/A AC 
20 U Pd S (v = 10) 
21 N Pd AC 
22 AC K/A S (v = 10) 
23 N N K/A 
24 N N N 
At each letter corresponds a, type: 
C=Confused; K/A=Kantian/Altruist; 
N=Nash; P=Persuasive; Pd=Persuaded; 
R=Reciprocal; S=Strategic; U=Unclassified; 
AC=Always-cooperators. 
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Examination of Table 6.3 reveals that only three subjects retain their own 
Subject 8 in phase 2, and Subject 7 in phase 3. 
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type throughout subsession 1. All the other subjects are found to fall, in each 
phase, under a different category/type. As pointed out on p. 123, two char- 
acteristics of the design might plausibly explain such a finding: the difference 
in the mrs across phases, and the experience gained by the subjects as the 
experiment proceeds. 
Second subsession's results 
There are two ways of analysing the data relative to subsession 2. One is 
to consider the two subsessions of my experiment completely independent so 
as to identify each player type as described in Section (6.4). By taking the 
same definition of type as reference point, we can examine if the experience 
gained by a subject in the first subsession affects his thinking process and his 
attitude towards the others so as to induce him to modify his type when he 
(unexpectedly) re-faces the same partners and the same parameter values. 
The other method is to see phases 4,5 and 6 as continuations of phases 1, 
2 and 3 respectively, in which case some player types are predicted to behave 
in the former phases differently than in the latter phases. 28 By looking at the 
data of the second subsession from this perspective, we can verify if subjects 
actually modify their type, or if, instead, their behavioural change (if any) is 
explicable in terms of the different prediction of the theory. 
I shall anaJyse subsession 2's data by using both procedures and I will show 
that they generate almost the same classification of the subjects. 
Let us start by assuming complete independence between subsessions. Using 
the criteria listed in Subsection (6.4.8) in order to classify subjects, we obtain 
Table 6.4 and Table 6.5. Table 6.4 shows the distribution of the subjects among 
the different hypotheses/types in each of the 3 phases of subsession 2. Table 6.5 
displays the evolution of each subject's behaviour from the fourth to the sixth 
phase. 
A comparison between Table 6.2 and Table 6.4 reveals that, while the distri- 
bution of players of the Nash-type in any phase of subsession 2 mirrors pretty 
much that observed in the corresponding phase of subsession 1, this does not 
apply to the distribution of cooperative types. In phases 4,5 and 6, subjects are 
found to distribute themselves among the aJternative cooperative hypotheses in 
a quite different way than that observed in phases 1,2 and 3 respectively. 
The main difference is detected between phase 3 and phase 6. In the latter 
phase, there is a significant decrease in the number of always-cooperators as 
281 Will specify later what each theory prescribes in a phase of the second subsession, in the 
light of the player's experience in the corresponding phase of the first subsession. 
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Table 6.4: Distribution of subjects across the three 
phases of subsession 2. 
Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 
Nash 9 7 3 
Confused 0 0 0 
Reciprocal 0 0 0 
Kantian/Altruist 0 3 1 
Strategic 4 6 14 
Persuasive 5 3 1 
Persuaded 0 0 2 
Unclassified 6 4 3 
Always-cooperators 0 1 0 
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well as in that of persuasive players in comparison with the former phase. At 
the same time, the number of players of the strategic type is noticeably higher 
in phase 6 than in phase 3 (14 versus 3). 
A comparison between Table 6.3 and Table 6.5 (i. e., a study of the same 
subject's behaviour across phases) reveaJs that aJ1 6 always-cooperators of phase 
3 become strategic players (with v= 10) in phase 6; all of them were cheated 
by one of their partners in the last period of phase 3. The same change towards 
strategies can be observed for 2 subjects who were persuasive, but did not 
succeed in their attempts of persuasion, in phase 3. Investigation into the 
motivations that these subjects provided for their own decisions demonstrates 
that aJl of them shift to defection in the final period of phase 6 because of the 
past behaviour of their fellow members. They matched, indeed, their choice of 
X with aJternative A. 
Thus, a first important result emerging from the analysis carried out in 
this subsection concerns the great effect of previous experience on people's 
behaviour: subjects are found to remember what happened in the first part of 
the experiment and, in the second part, they change their behaviour and their 
attitude towards the others' interests. 
Such a result can be interpreted in terms of the learning models discussed 
in Chapter 4 (Subsection (4.2.4)), and re-stated as follows: as subjects in my 
experiment gain knowledge about the others' type, the path describing their 
behaviour converges towards the non-cooperative, fidly-rational Nash equilib- 
rium. 
6.6 Individual results 
Table 6.5: Classification of each subject ac- 
cording to his type across the three phases of 
subsession 2. 
Subject Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 
1 S (v = 10) u S (v = 10) 
2 N K/A S (v = 10) 
3 u P (v = 9) S (v = 10) 
4 S (v 10) P (v = 5) S (v = 10) 
5 S (v 3) N S (v = 10) 
6 N N N 
7 N u N 
8 u u S (v = 10) 
9 S (v 10) S (v = 10) N 
10 P (v 5) S (v = 10) Pd 
11 N u S (v = 10) 
12 u AC S (v = 10) 
13 P (v = 5) K/A S (v = lo)_ 
14 u N S (v = 10) 
15 N S (v = 10) u 
16 N N K/A 
17 P (v = 6) S (v = 10) Pd 
18 N P (v=5) S (v = 10) 
19 u K/A S (v = 10) 
20 u N u 
21 P (v = 4) N S (v = 10)_ 
22 P (v = 5) S (v = 10) P (v=6) 
23 N S (v = 10) u 
24 N N S (v = 10) 
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Notice that the learning occurring here is only learning about the others' 
behaviour, not also learning about the incentives of the game and the dominant- 
strategy equilibrium. Indeed, Observation 6.5 as well as the analysis of incon- 
sistent guesses carried out in the previous subsection make it evident that indi- 
viduals in my experiment are not confused about the game. The learning go' g 
on here is, therefore, not of the kind described by Andreoni (1988,1995a) or by 
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those learning models which require confusion to be the principal explanation 
for cooperation. 29 
On the other hand, a comparison of Tables 6.3 and 6.5 also reveals that 
some subjects become more cooperative in the second subsession. Consider, 
for instance, subjects 4 and 21: both are Nash type in phase 1, while they 
are classified (respectively) as strategic type and persuasive type in phase 4. 
Observe, aJso, subjects 13 and 23: both are Nash type in phase 2, and become 
(respectively) a Kantian/altruist type and a strategic type in phase 4. Reason 
for these changes can be found in the restart effect. As emphasised in Chap- 
ter 4 (Subsection (4.3.1)), a break between two subsessions allows for what is 
called in psychology 'cognitive dissonance': a moment in which players stop the 
continuity of decisions and/or actions and re-think about what to do. 
To show that the restart effect plays actually a role in my experiment, let 
us compare the number of people choosing the cooperative alternative at the 
end of each phase of subsession I with the number of people choosing the same 
alternative at the outset of the corresponding phase of subsession 2. Inspection 
of Figure 6.2 clearly suggests that the average cooperation in period 10 of phases 
11 2 and 3 is less than that in period I of phases 4,5 and 6 respectively. This 
is confirmed by Table 6.6, which reports the number of cooperators in the last 
period of each of the first three phases and the number of cooperators in the 
first period of each of the second three phases. 
Table 6.6: The 'restart effect' in this experiment. 
Phase I Phase 2 Phase 3 
No. of cooperators in t 10 4 4 9 
Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 
No. of cooperators in t1 12 16 19 
Besides providing justification for the more cooperative behaviour exhibited 
by some subjects in the second subsession than in the first one, the presence 
of such a restart effect supports the observation that learning in the sense of 
Andreoni is not at work in this experiment. If this were the case, the subjects 
should be unaffected by the restart and they should continue to play the free- 
riding equilibrium. But this is not what we observe. 
If (rather than considering the two subsessions independent) we see phases 
41 5 and 6 as continuations of phases 1,2 and 3 respectively, this may have a 
29 Cf, e. g., Palfrey and Prisbey (1996.. 1997). 
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bearing on the way in which we can interpret the data relative to subsession 
2. Having observed that experience affects behaviour, since some cooperative 
types are predicted to behave differently when they axe 'experienced' individuals 
than when they have no experience at all, we can verify whether the change in 
behaviour observed for most subjects can be 'captured' and explained in terms 
of these different theoretical predictions. 30 
Let us therefore consider what each hypothesis prescribes with respect to 
behaviour in the second subsession, in the light of the players' experience in the 
first subsession. 
Two out of the six cooperative types investigated in this study (i. e., the 
Kantian type and the altruistic type) are predicted not to modify their pattern 
of choices in subsession 2, regardless of the knowledge acquired in subsession 1. 
The Kantian type (being guided by Kant's categorical imperative) must keep 
on undertaking that action which, when generalised, yields the best outcome 
to all agents. The altruistic type (having the others' welfare inherent in his 
utility function) should not be affected by the (possible) observed lack of other 
altruistic group members: he is expected to cooperate also throughout a sub- 
session 2's phase, insofar as his weight on the others' welfare remains greater 
than [r - vj/[2v]. 
In contrast with these two types, the behaviour of each of the other co- 
operative types changes with experience. In case of reciprocal, strategic and 
persuaded players, experience modifies behaviour at the outset of a phase, in the 
sense that these types of players may start a phase of subsession 2 with a choice 
which does not correspond to the first choice assigned to them by the classi- 
fication criteria discussed in Section (6.4). According to these criteria, in the 
first period of any supergame, a reciprocator and a strategic individual must 
cooperate, while a persuaded agent must defect. To what extent experience 
changes these predictions is discussed below. 
As far as a reciprocal player is concerned, we know that the moral obligation 
which he has towaxds the others leads him to cooperate whenever both the 
others cooperate too; on the other side, such an obligation ends as soon as 
he observes defection from one of them. This implies that if a reciprocator 
observes one of his fellow members to defect throughout (or in late periods of) 
any of the first three phases, then he can use this bit of information in the 
corresponding second subsession's phase and start such a phase with defection. 
Thus, a subject can be observed to defect in the first period of any phase of 
subsession 2 and be (nevertheless) considered of the reciprocal type if, in the 
30For instance, a subject classified as a Nash type in Table 6.4 might be a strategic type 
whose partners have defected in the first ten periods. 
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corresponding phase of subsession 1, he was a reciprocator whose partners have 
not cooperated. 
A strategic player, on the other hand, cooperates, in early repetitions of 
a game, only if he attaches some small probability to the likelihood that each 
of his playing partners is 'irrational'. This implies that if, in any of the first 
three phases, the strategic subject learns that at least one of the others is not of 
the irrational type, then, at the outset of the corresponding second subsession's 
phase, he has no longer interest in cooperating so as to build up reputation. 
Thus, a defecting choice by a strategic player in the first period of phase 4 
(say) is admitted insofax as, in phase 1, he followed, unsuccessfully, a strategic 
behaviour. 
Similarly to the reciprocator and the strategic player, the choice of the 
persuaded agent at the outset of any phase of subsession 2 depends on the path 
of behaviour that he has observed in the corresponding phase of subsession 1. A 
persuaded player should start a phase of subsession 2 cooperating (rather than 
defecting), if at least one of his playing partners has ended up the corresponding 
phase of subsession 1 with cooperation. 
As far as the persuasion hypothesis is concerned, we know that one of the 
most relevant consequences of the program defining a persuasive strategy is 
that it induces a player to never defect and to never expect defection as long as 
he observes cooperation from each of the other players. A prediction of defec- 
tion made when both the others are cooperating contradicts the assumptions 
upon which the persuasive player builds his optimisation problem of the first 
period. As such, it cannot be justified. Relying on this definition of a persuasive 
strategy, a subject cannot be of the persuasive type if he is found to conclude 
a phase of the first subsession with defection, while both he and his partners 
were cooperating up to then. 
Experience gained in the first subsession modifies the latter restriction in 
that, in the light of this experience, the persuasive player can modify the set 
of expectations about the others' behaviour which underlie the maximisation 
problem he faces at the outset of a phase in subsession 2 (when he is allowed 
to have some discretion/rationality). 
If his playing partners have defected throughout (or in later periods of) a 
phase of subsession 1, the persuasive player may well expect them to defect in 
the final period of the corresponding subsession 2's phase. As a consequence, 
his decision problem changes. He must now choose either to cooperate or to 
defect on the assumption that his partners will each defect until (M - 1) and 
they will continue to do so unless he cooperates throughout, in which case they 
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will cooperate from periods p to (T - 1) and defect in T, when he defects as 
well. Thus, it will pay him to cooperate (rather than defect) if and only if: 
(M - I)v + [(T - 1) - (p - 1)]3v +r> Tr, 
wbich yields: 
< (T- 1) 
3v -r 
2v 
The latter equation represents a testable restriction on persuasive behaviour 
with experienced players: given the defecting behaviour of his group members 
in a phase of subsession 1, if a player expects them to defect in the last period 
of the corresponding subsession 2's phase (whatever the history of the game 
so far), then, in order to be classified as a persuasive type, the player must 
be observed not to cooperate unreciprocated for more periods than those given 
by (6.1). 
Substituting the parameters T, r and v with their actual values into (6.1), 
we obtain M<5 in phase 4, p<7 in phase 5, and p<9 in phase 6. 
The instructions that the 'hard-wired' persuasive individual must now fol- 
low during the game are: cooperate until p; reciprocate the others' behaviour 
from (p + 1) to (T - 1) (which means: defect in any period in this time inter- 
val as soon as you observe defection from one of your paxtners); defect in T, 
whatever the others' behaviour so far. 
Thus, a subject who defects in the last period of any phase of subsession 
2, despite his own and his partners' cooperative behaviour until then, can be 
considered of the persuasive type if- 
(a) he is found, in t=9, to expect both his paxtners to defect in the last period; 
(b) such an expectation is justifiable by the defecting behaviour actually shown 
by his group members in the corresponding phase of subsession 1; 
(c) in providing the reason for his decision in t= 10, the subject is found 
to select alternative A so as to attribute (clearly) his defection to the past 
behaviour of his fellow members. 
If we examine subsession 2's data having in mind these different theoreti- 
cal predictions, the classification provided in Table 6.5 (and the corresponding 
distribution of types shown in Table 6.4) changes with regard to few subjects. 
First, all six always-cooperators of phase 3 who are categorised as strategic 
players in phase 6 of Table 6.5, can now be regarded as persuasive players; 
all these subjects expect their partners to defect in the last period, and all of 
them (as pointed out earlier) motivate their defective choice by picking out al- 
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ternative A. Likewise, subject 1, who is classified as strategic player in phase 
4 and in phase 6 of Table 6.5, becomes-if we allow experience to matter-a 
persuasive agent in both phases. Table 6.5's classification, finally, changes with 
reference to subject 8 and subject 13: both of them can now be categorised as 
persuasive players (rather than as strategic players) in phase 6. For all the other 
subjects, the classification remains unaltered. Thus, data analysis carried out 
by regarding subsession 2 as a continuation of subsession I confirms the impor- 
tance of learning about the others' behaviour (which leads people to converge 
towards the fully-rational Nash equilibrium) as well as the strong effect of the 
'restart' (which induces people to be more cooperative after a break stopping 
the continuity of their decisions). 
6.7 Concluding discussion 
In this chapter, I wished to assess the relative success of various models of 
cooperative behaviour in explaining this experimental data. My main aim was 
to verify if and to what extent my hypothesis of persuasive behaviour can 
explain previously inexplicable cooperation. 
The data led us to some important findings. First, the results provide 
clear evidence of heterogeneity with respect to motivations for cooperating not 
only across individuals, but also, within the sa; rne individual, across phases. 
Most of the subjects are found to modify their player type according to the 
supergame played. The change in the behavioural rule followed by a same 
individual subject over the six phases can be attributed to the different mrs 
which characterised phases as well as to the experience gained by the subject 
as the experiment proceeded. 
The great importance of previous experience to people's behaviour is a sec- 
ond major finding of this experiment. A crossed study of the same individual's 
behaviour in each phase of the two identical subsessions included in my experi- 
ment clearly reveals that most subjects modify, in the second subsession, their 
behaviour and their attitude towaxds the others' interests, in the light of the 
experience gained in the first subsession. In many cases, we observe that as 
subjects gain knowledge of the other players' type, their behavioural pattern 
converges towards the non-cooperative, fully-rational Nash equilibrium. This 
indicates that learning is at work in this experiment, although not leaxning in 
the sense of Andreoni (1988) (i. e., learning about the incentives of the game 
and the dominant-strategy equilibrium), but only learning about the types of 
the playing partners. 
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As for the ability of the rival hypotheses of cooperative behaviour to ex- 
plain the data, in order to determine how well each of them performs in this 
experiment, let us consider the percentage of subjects that, over all six phases, 
follow the classification criteria identified for each hypothesis so as to fall, in 
Tables 6.2 and 6.4, into the row corresponding to that hypothesis. We found 
that, out of a total of 144 individuals (24 subjects x6 phases), less than 1 
percent are of the reciprocal type; 5.5 percent are classified as Kant ian/altruist 
players; 21 percent behave as predicted by the strategic hypothesis; 3.5 percent 
are persuaded agent; and, finally, 14 percent act in accordance with my hypoth- 
esis of persuasive behaviour. If we consider phases 4,5 and 6 as continuations 
of phases 1,2 and 3 respectively-so as to alter Table 6.4 with respect to some 
entries-the percentage of persuasive players increases to 20%, while that of 
strategic players decreases to 14%. 
Thus, my data show that a quite reasonable percentage of the observed 
cooperative behaviour which cannot be explained by any of the previous theories 
is explicable with my new hypothesis. The study reported here is therefore 
encouraging for a theory of persuasion, but still preliminary. Further analysis 
must be undertaken before more decisive conclusions can be reached. Next 
chapter is aimed to Provide such a deeper analysis. 
Chapter 7 
A deeper experimental 
analysis: towards more 
decisive conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
Guttman (1986), Isaac and Walker (1992), Andreoni (1993), Chan et al. (1994), 
and Palfrey and Prisbey (1996,1997), among other authors, have criticised the 
design where the equilibrium lies on the boundary of the strategy set. They 
claim that subjects in the experiments might make mistakes when they take 
their decisions and, in the corner-solution situation, mistakes necessarily lead to 
non-zero contributions and therefore to excess giving. This, according to them, 
yields to an overstatement of the importance of altruism. As an alternative, 
these authors propose reward structures that produce interior equilibria. This 
approach allows mistakes by subjects to manifest themselves as either excessive 
giving or excessive non-giving. However, it has been argued, ' these designs 
introduce scope for potentially confounding effects. 
Since the main purpose of the study carried out in this chapter is to test the 
relevance of persuasion in an environment more complicated than that used in 
the previous chapter, two different public good situations are here analysed. In 
one, both the Nash non-dominant-strategy equilibrium and the social optimum 
lie in the interior of the strategy space; I shall refer to this as the basic game. 
In the other (the so called separation game), the social optimum does not 
change, while the Nash equilibrium is put in the corner of the strategy space 
and becomes a dominant-strategy solution. 
'See, for instance, Andreoni (1993); Keser (1996); and Sefton and Steinberg (1996). 
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A similax design allows me to verify if an agent tries to induce his 'selfish' 
fellow members to play in accordance with collective rationaJity (as predicted 
by the persuasive behaviour hypothesis) when it is not easy to perceive all 
the benefits connected with this decision, and to investigate how the agent's 
behaviour changes when the social optimum is still an interior solution but the 
source of confusion related to the subtlety of the Nash equilibrium is eliminated. 
7.2 The voluntary contribution mechanism environ- 
ments 
My discussion starts with a description of the voluntary contribution mechanism 
decision environments utilised in the experiment presented in this chapter. 
7.2.1 The basic non linear game 
The basic game used in this experiment belongs to the class of voluntary con- 
tribution mechanism games that induce a unique interior Nash equilibrium. 
In it, subjects played in groups of three. Each subject was endowed with 
9 tokens, and each had to decide how many of these tokens he wanted to con- 
tribute to a public good. The payoffs of representative player i (Vi = 1,2,3) 
were generated from the Stone-Geary utility function (5.8): 
U(gi, y) = (w - gi - a)'(y + b)'-". 
As pointed out in Chapter 5 (Subsection (5.2.1)), for -1', (3w + b) <a< 
w-1". b, b>0 and 0<a<I utility function (5.8) generates interior solutions. 
In the experiment, the following parameter values were chosen: w =: 13, a= 
-6.73, b=7 and a=0.58. Thus, as can be verified, the unique non-dominant 
Nash equilibrium is for each subject to invest 2 tokens, and the symmetric social 
optimum is where each subject invests 7 tokens. The two interesting outcomes 
are therefore put at a symmetric distance from the boundaries of the strategy 
set and are to a great extent separated the one from the other. 
In addition, the Nash equilibrium is unique in individual as well as in group- 
total donations: only the symmetric selection gi =2 for all i, and not any com- 
bination of individual contributions that results in the aggregate contribution 
of 6, constitutes an equilibrium. Thus, in my basic game, if subjects are found 
contributing, this excessive giving cannot be due to a coordination problem. 
In fact, if the equilibrium was unique in total, but not individual, donations, 
there would be multiple equilibria and subjects may not focus on the symmet- 
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ric selection; each subject might choose a strategy consistent with his preferred 
equilibrium, resulting in a strategy combination that is not an equilibrium. My 
reward structure does indeed eliminate this coordination problem. 
However, the lack of a dominant strategy makes the game more difficult to 
understand: subjects may be unable to calculate their Nash equilibrium strat- 
egy or they may find the concept too subtle. Subjects must still conjecture 
about the behaviour of the others in order to compute their optimal response. 
An incorrect calculation or a conjecture that others may not play their Nash 
equilibrium strategies would lead to departures from the intended equilibrium, 
and it is in this sense that the structure has been regarded as potentially con- 
fusing to subjects. 
I would add, however, that settings with interior solutions make also the 
social optimum less transparent and compelling to subjects who either may 
be incapable to understand the mutual benefits associated with it or may feel 
uncertain about their partners' ability to understand. 
7.2.2 The separation game 
My separation game eliminates the source of confusion related to the Nash 
solution: it exhibits, indeed, a unique dominant-strategy equilibrium. 
The parameters of the payoff structure were chosen so that the basic and 
the separation games shared some important features; under both games, sub- 
jects were given the same endowment of 9 tokens and the socially optimal 
contributions were identical. Nevertheless, in the separation game, equilibrium 
aggregate contributions, subjects' earnings from the equilibrium as well as from 
the social optimum, and subjects' monetary penalties for a deviation from the 
equilibrium were different. 
Specifically, in the separation game, subject i's (Vi = 1,2,3) net reward 
structure was the following: 
(w - gi - a)'(y + b)'-" + 16, if gi = 0; (1) 
11 (w-gi-a) 
2 
(y+b)'-" 
if gj > 0. (2) 
This means that, in the separation game, (for any combination of the others' 
contributions) the individual reward from contributing nothing was 16 units 
greater than the corresponding individual reward in the basic game; while the 
individual reward from contributing something was half of that in the basic 
game in the sense that, although the monetary benefits generated from the 
public good were the same in both games, in the separation game, a subject 
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who contributed a positive amount kept for himself only half of these benefits 
and gave the remaining half to a charitable institution. 
These changes are not triviaJ. Modification (7.1-1) transforms the game 
with a simple equilibrium (of investing 2 tokens in the public good) to a game 
with a dominant-strategy equilibrium (of contributing zero), and virtuaJly elim- 
inates subjects' confusion over the subtleties of computing a Nash equilibrium. 
Modification (7.1.2) transforms the game where subjects derive all the benefits 
from the production of the public good to a game where such benefits must be 
shared with a charity, and-if we assume that People support public goods out 
of self-interest (i. e., because of the earnings that they themselves can receive 
from them)-such a modification should eliminate any incentive to contribute. 
It may be argued that, in the sepaxation game, people contribute the amount 
of equilibrium because their confusion decreases in compaxison with that in the 
basic game, and not because their incentives to contribute are removed. If such 
an argument is true, in the basic game, we should observe, levels of contributions 
above as well as below the equilibrium given that, in it, subjects' understanding 
of the Nash solution is supposed to be less. On the other hand, if, in the basic 
game, contributions are biased above the equilibrium, whilst, in the separation 
game, they correspond to the equilibrium, this would mean that in the former 
game people have a reason for over-contributing which disappeaxs in the latter 
game. 
Let us suppose, however, that the modifications included in the separation 
game were the following: 
u Y) 
(w-gi-a)'(y+b)l-a, lfgi=0,1,2; 
(w-gi-a)"(y+b)'-' 
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if gi = 3,..., 9. 
In this case, the reasons for a persuasive player's over-contributions are elimi- 
nated, and the equilibrium still lies in the interior of the strategy space. Nev- 
ertheless, a similar reward structure seems to advise people that 2 is a 'crucial' 
contribution, and this may help them to sort the Nash solution out in the basic 
game. Bringing into participants' mind the game's solutions is not my intention: 
the basic game is, in fact, designed in order to test the persuasion hypothesis 
in a potentially confounding setting. 
7.3 Experimental design: parameters and procedures 150 
7.3 Experimental design: parameters and procedures 
The computerised experiment was run at the Center for Experimental Eco- 
nomics (EXEC) at the University of York (UK) .2 It was organised in three 
sessions with 24 subjects for each session (thus, a total of 72 people took part 
in my experiment). 
Each session was constructed around the non linear public good games de- 
scribed in Subsections (7.2.1) and (7.2.2), and consisted of three supergames. 
After having played a first basic supergame, in which the basic game was re- 
peated 10 times, participants were randomly re-assigned to a new group of three 
people 3 for playing a separation supergame which consisted of 10-repetitions of 
the separation game. Then, at the end of it, new groups of three played a 
further ten-period basic supergame. 4 
Subjects were informed that, at the start of each supergame, they would 
be randomly assigned to a group of 3 players and that the group-composition 
would remain constant during each supergame. Although they could recognise 
the other participants in the room, the subjects did not know the identity of 
the other individuals in their group. 
By following Andreoni's (1993) study, rather than telling the participants 
the exact functional forms (5.8) and (7.1) (which they might not understand), I 
presented the games in tabular forms with player i's own contributions as rows, 
the sum of others' contributions as columns, and the various U(gi, y) as entries. 
The payoff matrixes shown to subjects are reported in Tables B. 1 and B. 2 in 
Appendix B. 
In order to make it clear that (for any combination of the others' contri- 
butions) each token invested in the public good would return the same total 
earnings under both the games, I decided to present the payoffs in the separa- 
tion game as shown in Table B. 2; this matrix differs from Table B. 1 only in the 
first row, which corresponds to zero contribution. The alternative would have 
been to show the subjects their own net payoffs and tell them that (given a 
positive contribution) the amount earned would be matched by a donation to 
charity. The presentation of Table B. 2 was preferred because it points well out 
that the monetary benefits generated by the public good do not change and, 
2 Also for this experiment, the program software was developed by myself and by the EXEC 
programmer Norman Spivey. 
3 This groups' re-arrangement was aimed to eliminate any possibility of strategic play or 
motives like revenge and envy in the participants' behaviour. 
4 This repetition of the basic supergame with different groups was directed to investigate 
if, in this experiment (as in the previous one), the attitude of 'experienced' players towards 
the others is influenced by previous interactions. 
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therefore, that the socially optimal contributions are identical. 
On the other hand, in order to avoid misinterpretation on the part of the 
subjects and mental arithmetic (division by 2) to derive net earnings, as soon as 
a subject took a contribution decision, the line in the matrix corresponding to 
that contribution appeared underlined on his screen, displaying the net payoffs 
that he could earn from that decision; the subject was then asked if he was 
happy with his decision and, if not, he had the possibility to re-take it. 
Before the experiment started, subjects received a list of charities from 
which, at the end of the experiment, they were asked to pick out one, in case 
their output data revealed that (through positive contributions during the sep- 
aration game) they helped any. 
7.3.1 The endogenous questionnaire and the non questionnaire 
treatment 
In this experiment, as in the previous one, paxticipants were required to answer 
a questionnaire. Every period (after having taken a contribution decision and 
observed the contributions of their partners), they had to: 
(1) provide the main reason for their own decision; 
(2) guess the motivations behind both their fellow members' decision; 
(3) predict how much the others would contribute in the upcoming period. 5 
They answered the first two questions by picking out-for each of them- 
one of nine different alternatives. 6 They had to type a number from 0 to 9 on 
their keyboard to state their expectations about the others' next decisions. 
To provide them with incentives strong enough to answer the questionnaire 
seriously and honestly, players were compensated for right guesses of the other 
individuals' motivations and for accurate predictions. Indeed, each period, in 
addition to their earnings from the public good, subjects were rewarded with 
50 franCS7 if they guessed correctly the motivations lying behind the last choice 
of both their partners. They received a further 50 francs if their predictions of 
the others' next decision turned out to be right. 
The questionnaire stage and its payment scheme were included also in my 
first simple experiment. However, in a departure from this, here I run a control 
5It is worth reminding that it is a peculiarity of my experiment eliciting subjects' beliefs 
in 
t for (t + 1), after they have observed the others' actual contributions in t. Also in this case, 
this procedure was followed in order to make subjects answer all three questions in a unique 
stage so as to divide each period into two parts only. 
6 The lists of alternatives provided to subjects axe reported on pages 206 and 207 in Ap- 
pendix B. 
7 The franc was the unit of experimental money. The exchange rate between franc and real 
money was 1 franc = 0.5 pence. 
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treatment in which the questionnaire was not administered. 
In fact, the act of eliciting motivations, guesses about the others' motivations 
and expectations may influence subjects' behaviour by affecting their rate of 
cooperation. To check for this possibility, in one of the three sessions of this 
experiment, the questionnaire stage was removed, and each period subjects 
only made a contribution decision. I shall refer to this treatment as the non- 
questionnaire treatment. A comparison of the subjects' contributions in the 
settings with and without the questionnaire will reveal if the mere act of asking 
for questions influences their behaviour. 
7.3.2 The communication treatment 
Although throughout all my experiment communication by words was forbidden 
and players were not allowed to speak to each other, I introduced a condition in 
which participants could communicate the motivations for their own decisions; 
i. e., their answer to the first question of the submitted questionnaire. 
Among the structural mechanisms capable of affecting decision-making in 
dilemma situations, the effect of communication has been well established. In 
reviewing several studies, Dawes (1980) points out that the effects of communi- 
cation on 'group oriented' decision making are ubiquitous, i. e. present in all the 
examined works. Being confronted with an opinion from others appears to be 
more effective in promoting cooperative behaviour for subjects with a coopera- 
tive social motivation, than for those more individualistically or competitively 
motivated. 
Hence, in this study, when the questionnaire stage is included, two different 
experimental scenarios are analysed. In one-the communication treatment- 
participants communicated (non-optionally) the reason why they contributed 
that specific number of tokens to each other. Under this treatment, each subject 
knew that, at the end of each round, his own motivation response would be 
transmitted to the screen of his playing partners and that the motivation of each 
of the others would appear on his own screen. The other scenario-the non- 
communication treatment--did not include the transmission of these motives. 
It may be argued that the introduction of this kind of communication mod- 
ifies the nature of the game and the equilibria set. However, since no binding 
contracts or formal agreements can be closed, this communication is simply 
cheap-talk: it does not affect at all the payoffs and the unique equilibrium. 
Nevertheless, by comparing the choices in these different conditions, I can 
isolate the impact of the others' opinions on people's behaviour and I can verify 
if the type of communication I have used increases cooperation. 
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7.3.3 Subject pool 
The subjects were drawn from a list made (and updated every year) by EXEC, 
which consists primarily of undergraduate and graduate students of the Univer- 
sity of York who ask to be informed in advance about all the experiments going 
on. All the participants were volunteers recruited by mail-shot invitations. 
Upon their arrival, subjects were each seated at a computer terminal. Next 
to the screen, they found the list of charities that they could help through 
their decisions as well as a copy of the instructions. 8 These instructions were 
also read aloud. The subjects were then given an opportunity to ask questions 
before individually going through additional, computerised instructions. 
After each of them finished reading the instructions, participants were ran- 
domly arranged in eight groups of three, and played the first 10-period game 
(i. e., the first basic supergame). 
During the experiment, at the end of each round, subjects were shown 
information (by means of a 'results table' displayed on their screen) on their 
own experimental earnings for the round just finished as well as on the choices 
and corresponding earnings of each of their partners. In the communication- 
treatment, along with this information, the motivation response of each of the 
two paxtners was also available on the subjects' screen. At the end of the 
separation supergame, each subject was informed about the total donation that 
he gave to charity. 
It was explained that the decisions for each round were binding and that 
end-of-experiment rewards would be based on the sum of earnings from all 
rounds. Subjects were told that the unit of experimental money was the franc, 
and that the value of each franc was 0.5 pence. The average payoff, earned in 
about one hour, was approximately 13 English pounds in the communication 
treatment and 10 English pounds in the non-communication treatment. The 
non-questionnaire treatment lasted about half an hour and, in it, the average 
payoff was approximately 8 English pounds. 
After having received their own payment and before leaving the laboratory, 
the subjects who donate positive amounts to charity were asked to select one 
charitable institution from the provided list. 
'Complete copy of the instructions is reported in Appendix B. 
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7.4 Persuasion and other theories of cooperative be- 
haviour 
In this section I shall present what alternative theories of cooperative behaviour 
predict in the games used in my experiment. 
The way in which the basic game should be played under various theories 
has been discussed in Chapter 5, where I used utility function (5.8)-which 
generates earch subject's payoffs in the basic gameý-as an illustrative device. 
The predictions /restrictions derived in that context will now be recalled and 
exploited in order to construct the rival behavioural categories in the basic 
game. For each of these theories, its predictions /restrictions in the separation 
game will also be carefully examined. 
Although it would be desirable to have the same set of theories open to 
investigation here and in Chapter 6, it is not possible to take into account 
the strategies hypothesis as an explanatory category of this experiment's data. 
First of all, restriction (5.35) (on the amount of tokens that a strategic player 
must be observed to contribute in the first two periods of my basic game) 
depends on the probability, 6, that the player attaches to the likelihood that 
his playing partners are irrational, which is an unknown variable. Furthermore, 
given the non-binary dimension of the basic game's strategy set, it is not clear 
how strategic behaviour evolves in relation to the others' contributions in the 
time interval from period 3 to period T-1. As stressed in Chapter 5, in a game 
where the strategy set is not binary, the theory does not specify the decision rifle 
that a strategic player should follow when he intends to modify his contribution 
from one period to the next. Since in this study I discriminate among theories 
by exploiting the fact that they differ on whether and how an individual's own 
contributions are related to the others' behaviour, due to the impossibility of 
deriving the form of this relationship for a strategic subject in the basic game, 
this chapter will not include 'strategies' among the theories under investigation. 
7.4.1 Persuasive behaviour theory 
In the basic game, a persuasive strategy is concisely and completely defined by 
restriction (5-12) and by the two derivatives (5.16) and (5-17). 
For each level of contribution gp E 10,1,2,..., 9 1, restriction (5.12) allows 
the calculation of the maximum number of periods, p, for which a persuader 
can constantly contribute gp unreciprocated (i. e., without being followed by 
each of his partners). Substituting the parameters w, a, a and b, and the 
equilibrium amount 9* into (5-12), the relationship between gp and p turns 
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out to be as displayed in Table 7.1. This table shows the persuasive player's 
reciprocity-test-period, M, corresponding to each admissible contribution level, 
9P - 
Table 7.1: Value of the reciprocity-test- 
period p corresponding to each possible con- 
tribution level 9p in the basic game. 
PP 9 8 7 6 5 2 1 0 
p 0 0 1 
-2 
3 7 9 10 
Table 7.1 clearly indicates that the relationship between A and gp is inverse, 
which confirms the result obtained in Chapter 5 (Subsection (5.2.1)). Further- 
more, given that we can identify a persuader only when his M is at least 3,1 
Table 7.1 suggests that if we observe a subject to contribute an amount greater 
than 5 tokens, unreciprocated, for some consecutive periods, then the subject 
cannot be pursuing a persuasive strategy. This table shows, in fact, that only 
if gp < 5, then M>3. Thus, in the basic game, if a subject is observed to 
contribute, unreciprocated: a) more than 5 tokens, b) 5 tokens for more than 3 
periods, c) 4 tokens for more than 5 periods, and d) 3 tokens for more than 6 
periods, then we can infer that the subject is not a persuader. 
The two derivatives (5.16) and (5.17) represent two additional testable re- 
strictions on persuasive behaviour: by regressing the contributions of a subject 
on the total contributions of his partners in the previous period, if the slope 
of the regression line does not change (from zero to positive) in period A, this 
would mean that the subject is not following a persuasive behaviour. 
As far as the separation game is concerned, in it, the benefits of the public 
good must be shared with a charitable organisation. This means that the 
persuasive agent's main incentive not to be selfish disappears. Indeed, it is 
neither an altruistic concern nor a moraJ obligation towards the others that 
induce a persuasive player to contribute more than the equilibrium. Instead, 
this decision is taken with the expectation of future better gains for himself. 
Such an expectation can never be fulfilled in the sepaxation game, where the 
private benefits related with the public good are less than those connected with 
the equilibrium. In the separation game, no value of M>2 exists to justify 
positive contributions on the part of a persuasive player who is assumed not to 
care for the charity. Therefore, in the separation game, the persuasive behaviour 
is observational equivalent to the wholly 'selfish' Nash behaviour. 
9See Subsection (5.2.2) for clarification about this point. 
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7.4.2 Commitment theories 
In the basic game, commitment theories predict that an individuaJ will con- 
tribute throughout the game a constant amount equal to the social optimum 
(see Eq. (5.23)). As indicated in (5.24), this implies that, by regressing a 
Kantian player's contributions on the totaJ contributions of his partners, the 
regression line must exhibit a slope coefficient equal to zero. Thus, if a subject 
is observed not to contribute always 7 (so that a regression between his own 
and his partners' contributions generates a slope coefficient different from zero), 
then we can infer that the subject is not acting in accordance with commitment 
theories. 
Let us now consider the separation gwne. In it, in order to decide how much 
to contribute, a Kantian type solves the following problem: 
max (w-gi, t-a)"(yt+b)'-' 
gi't >0 
subject to: 
gk, t =: gi, t Vk =, 4 i Vt E 
[1,10], 
whose solution (as showed in Chapter 5) is g*, t 7. c 
Constrained Utility (y =3- git) 
63 
32 
git 
Figure 7.1: Kantian constrained utility in the separation game. 
The latter, in the separation game, is no longer a global maximum, since the 
discontinuity of the utility function in gi, t =0 implies a further local maximum 
at zero. Nevertheless, by comparing the two local maxima 
(i. e., by comparing 
1 
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the agent's utility in correspondence of each of them), we find that the absolute 
maximum still occurs at gi, t = 7. This is illustrated by points MI and M2 in 
Fig. 7.1, which graphs the Kantian constrained utility for all possible values of 
gi, t. It is easy to see that both M, and M2 represent extreme values, but i's 
utility is highest at M2. Thus, also in the separation game, a Kantian player is 
predicted to contribute always 7, regardless of the others' behaviour. 
7.4.3 Reciprocity theories 
In Chapter 5, we saw that the moral obligation upon which a reciprocator bases 
his choice leads him to contribute more than the equilibrium only if everyone 
else in his group does so as well. In Subsection (5.5.2), 1 demonstrated that, in 
a setting with the Stone-Geary utility function used in the basic game, a recip- 
rocal individual's contributions lie between the fully-rational Nash equilibrium 
of contributing 2 tokens and the symmetric social optimum of contributing 7 to- 
kens, depending on the other group members' behaviour in the previous period. 
Derivative (5.25) states, in fact, that the relationship between a reciprocator's 
contribution in t and the sum of the others' contribution in t-1 is positive, 
which means that a reciprocator increases (decreases) his contribution in round 
t if, in t-1, it was below (above) the average of the others. Relationship (5.25) 
represents a useful testable restriction on reciprocal behaviour: by regressing 
a subject's own contributions on those of his partners, if the slope coefficient 
does not come up to be positive, then we can infer that the player is not a 
reciprocator. 
In the separation game, a subject who acts in accordance with Sugden's 
reciprocity principle maximises utility function (7.1) subject to the constraint: 
gi, t =- min(g, *, gk, t- 1) , where g* is the optimal 
level of contribution under com- C 
mitment theories. If min(g*, 9k, t-1) = 9c, agent i is obliged to contribute at C 
least gc*, which implies g, *, t = 7. If min(gc*, 9k, t-1) :: -- 9k, t-1 = 0, agent i is 
obliged to contribute at least zero, i. e. the dominant-strategy Nash solution. 
On the other hand, it can never be g; t>7, because the individual would be 
contributing more than he is obliged to. Thus, in the separation game, the 
optimal contribution of a reciprocal person varies from the dominant-strategy 
equilibrium of contributing 0 to the social optimum of contributing 7. 
Furthermore, restriction (5.25) holds also in the separation game. Sugden 
proved, indeed, that the relationship given by (5.25) has a general validity: a 
reciprocator's contributions must be positively related to the contributions of 
his partners whatever the function used to model the subject's preferences. 10 
IOCf., Sugden (1984, p. 780). 
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7.4.4 Altruism theories 
In the basic game, the way in which altruistic behaviour evolves in relation to 
the others' contributions is given by Eq. (5.30), which displays the altruist's 
reaction function. By differentiating such a fanction by the sum of the others' 
contributions we obtain a negative derivative, as shown by (5.31). This means 
that, in the basic game, we can classify a subject as an altruist only if a regres- 
sion between his own and his partners' contributions presents a negative slope 
coefficient. 
Let us now consider the separation game. The discontinuity of payoffs 
present in such a game originates a discontinuity in the altruist's reaction func- 
tion whenever -y (the altruist's weight on the others' welfare) is such that 
0.4 < -y < 0.7. For values of y lying in the latter interval, if we calcu- 
late the altruistic optimal contribution g* as given by (5.30), we obtain that a 
V(gaiY) ýý* VAY) insofar as EkOagk does not exceed a critical value, 
For values of the sum of the others' contributions greater than ý(-y), the altru- 
ist results to be better off by contributing zero (the dominant-strategy 'selfish' 
Nash equilibrium) than by contributing g*. This means that for specific values a 
of -y and of EkOa 9k , the local maximum at g* 
is not longer a global maximum. a 
Altniist's optimal 
conthbutions 
9- 
8- 
7- 
6 ------------------- 
5 ------------------ ------------ 
4- --------------------------------- -- ------ 
3- 
2- 
1- 0<-y! 50.3 y=0.4 
: -Y = 0.5 
ý 0.6 
'Y = 0.7 
0.8 -y <1 
123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Sum of the others' 
contributions 
Figure 7.2: Altriidst's reaction function in the separation game. 
The behaviour of an altruist in the separation game depends, therefore, on 
his own -y. Fig. 7.2 graphs the altruist's reaction function for different values of 
, y. Specifically, we have the following. 
a) If 0< -( < 0.3, the altruist is predicted not to contribute anything, 
whatever his partners' behaviour throughout the game; thus, for these values 
of -y, the global maximum is at zero. 
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b) If 0.4 < -y :! ý 0.7, the altruist's reaction function exhibits a discontinuity. 
Consider the following general statement: "If y= -y*, the altruist will contribute 
ga* if k ý4-a A< 
ý(-y*); otherwise, he will contribute 0" - Then, if 'Y* 0.4 =:, 
ý(0.4) = 6. If -Y* = 0.5 =: ý ý(0-5) = 10. If -f* = 0.6 =>. ý(0-6) = 14. If = 0.7 
=* ý(0.7) =: 16. 
c) Finally, if 0.8 <7 :51, the altruist reaction function is that given 
by (5.30). In this case, the global maximum still occurs at ga*- 
7.5 Aggregate results 
My data are 2160 observed contributions to a public good (30 decisions for each 
of 72 subjects) collected from three separate sessions. Each session employed 
one of three treatments: communication treatment (henceforward CT), where 
the questionnaire was administered and subjects were able to transmit infor- 
mation about the motives of their contributions; non-communication treatment 
(henceforward NCT), in which the questionnaire was conducted, but the trans- 
mission of the subjects' motivations was not included; and non-questionnaire 
treatment (henceforward NQT), i. e., the treatment without any questions. Each 
session-treatment consisted of three supergames: the first and the third su- 
pergames were based on the basic game, while the second supergame was con- 
structed around the separation game. Let phase be another word for supergame. 
Thus, throughout the following discussion, phases 1,2 and 3 refer to the first 
basic supergame, the separation supergame and the second basic supergame, 
respectively. 
Summary results are reported in figures 7.3,7.4 and 7.5. Fig. 7.3 presents 
the individual average contributions separately for each phase and treatment. 
Fig. 7.4 displays the individual contributions associated with equilibrium, social 
optimum and their mean (4.5 tokens in phases I and 3, and 3.5 tokens in phase 
2), and charts average contributions in the three treatments for each period of 
the three phases. Fig. 7.5 compares average contributions in the three phases 
for each treatment, and reports the individual contributions associated with the 
mean between equilibrium and social optimum in phases 1 and 3. 
7.5.1 Treatment effects on aggregate behaviour 
This subsection investigates if, in aggregate, there are treatment effects. Sub- 
section 7.5.2 examines if average behaviour changes across phases. 
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Figure 7.3: Average individual contributions displayed sepaxately in the 3 
phases of each treatment. 
The effects of communication 
The communication treatment was included to explore whether the possibility 
for the subjects to communicate the reasons why they contributed that specific 
number of tokens increases the incidence of cooperative choice. If it is true that 
being confronted with an opinion from others is more effective in promoting 
contributive behaviour for subjects with a cooperative social motivation, than 
for those more individuahstically or competitively motivated, one should expect 
the rate of cooperation to be higher in the communication treatment than in 
the two treatments without communication. 
Table 7.2 shows the differences in average contributions between the CT 
and each of the two treatments without communication over aJl ten rounds of 
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Table 7.2: Differences in individual average contributions between the CT and 
the two treatments without communication. 
PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 
CT - NCT CT - NQT CT - NCT CT - NQT CT - NCT CT - NQT 
1 0.79 1.00 -0.29 -0.21 0.58 1.83 
2 0.08 0.83 -0.42 -0.83 1 1.58 
3 0.79 1.50 -0.13 0.38 0.63 0.71 
4 0.13 1.63 0.42 0.38 1.13 1.71 
5 -0-54 1.83 -0.38 -0.58 0.71 1.17 
6 -0.46 0.87 -0.46 -1.00 0.88 1.67 
7 1.00 1.96 0.25 -0.25 0.63 1.17 
8 0.67 0.92 0.00 -0.29 1.33 1.21 
9 0.08 0.88 -0.50 -0.04 1.04 2.17 
10 0.25 1.79 0.25 0.38 2.50 2.33 
First, let us compare the CT and the NCT. As can be seen from Fig. 7.4, 
in phases I and 3 average contributions under the CT are, most of the periods, 
above those under the NCT. Inspection of Table 7.2 reveals that this happens 
in 8 periods of phase 1 and over all phase 3. From examination of Fig. 7.5 
appeaxs that, while average contributions tend to fall with repetition under the 
NCT, they are almost steady around the mean between equilibrium and sociaJ 
optimum under the CT. Under the assumption of independent observations, if 
we pool the data over phases, and test-for each phase-the null hypothesis 
that the mean contributions of the two treatments are equaJ, we reject the null 
hypothesis for both phase I and phase 3 (at the 10% and at the 1% levels of 
significance, respectively). " 
"Let pc and JLNc be the respective means for the CT and the NCT. For each phase, I 
test the null hypothesis Ho : I-IC - IANC= 
0 against the alternative HI : I-IC - IINC> 0. The 
decision rule is to reject Ho in favour of HI if 
XC - XNC iC, NC(phase) > z,,,, +(82 V(ýCýlnc, ) + (sNc nNc) 
where XC and XNc axe the observed sample means for the CT and the NCT respectively; 
sc and sNc axe the respective sample standard deviations; nc = njvC = 240 is the number 
of observations; and iC, NC(phase) is the value obtained comparing the means of the CT and 
the NCT in a particular phase. 
In phase 1, the following values axe found: 
Yc = 4.49, XjvC = 4.20, sC = 2.55 and 
SNC 2.43; so that iC, NC(l) 1.28. In phase 3, 
Yc = 4.78, Xjvc = 3.74) 8c = 2.60 and 
SNC 2.63; therefore iC, NC(3) 4.37. 
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Thus, as far as the two phases constructed around the basic game are con- 
cerned, the kind of communication used in this experiment is found to affect 
people's behaviour in that it pushes them toward more cooperation. 
Interestingly, this result changes drastically when we consider phase 2. 
Fig. 7.4 shows that, in such a phase, average contributions in the CT are most 
of the time below those in the NCT. Table 7.2 confirms that, in 6 out of the 
10 periods, the proportions of tokens contributed to the public good is lower 
under the CT than under the NCT, and that, in one period, they are equal. 
The possibility of transmitting information does not seem to help cooperation 
when there are no 'private' benefits from it. Moreover, the test of no difference 
in individual mean contributions reveals that there is not a statistic significant 
difference between the CT and the NCT in phase 2.12 
Similar results are obtained when we compare the CT with the NQT. People 
contribute significantly more to the public good under the CT than under the 
NQT in phases I and 3, i. e. when they keep aJl the benefits associated with 
this choice. Instead, when the benefits from investing own tokens in the public 
good must be shared with a charitable institution (as happens in phase 2), in 7 
out of 10 periods, average contributions are less under the CT than under the 
NQT. In addition, the difference in mean contributions between treatments is 
found to be significant at the 1% level in phases I and 3, and insignificant in 
phase 2.13 
All these findings lead to the following first observation. 
Observation 7.1 At the aggregate level, communication strongly affects co- 
operation in the two 10-period phases where subjects retain all the monetary 
benefits generated from the production of the public good. Instead, when these 
benefits must be shared with charity, average contributions under the CT are 
not significantly different from those under the two treatments without commu- 
nication. 
The effects of the questionnaire 
The treatment without any question was introduced to investigate whether the 
act of eliciting beliefs about the others' motivations and actions influences a 
subject's own contributions. 
"In phase 2, Xc = 1.02 and sc = 2.36) 
XNC 
= 1.15, and SNC = 2.26. Hence, 
iC, NC(2) = -0.59. 
13 In particular, in phase 1, 
YNQ 
= 3.17 and 8NQ = 2.21; in phase 2, 
YNQ 
= 1.23 and 
SNQ = 2.42; in phase 3, 
YNQ 
= 3.23 and SNQ = 2.16. Therefore, iC, NQ(l) = 6.07, 
iC, NQ(2) =-0.95, and 
YC, NQ(3) = 7.12. 
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From exajnination of Fig. 7.4 it appears that average contributions under 
the NQT are most of the time below those under the other two treatments, 
especially as fax as phases I and 3 axe concerned. Fig. 7.5 clearly reveals that, 
while average contributions under the NQT lie always, in all three phases, below 
the corresponding means, this does not apply to the average contributions of 
the CT and NCT in phases 1 and 3. 
Table 7.3 reports the differences in average contributions between the NCT 
and the NQT over all ten rounds of each phase. The differences between the 
CT and the NQT are depicted in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.3: Differences in individual average 
contributions between the NCT and the NQT. 
PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 
NCT - NQT NCT - NQT NCT - NQT 
1 0.21 0.08 1.25 
2 0.75 -0.42 0.58 
3 0.71 0.50 0.08 
4 1.50 -0.04 0.58 
5 2.38 -0.21 0.46 
6 1.33 -0-54 0.79 
7 0.96 -0.50 0.54 
8 0.25 -0.29 -0.13 
9 0.79 0.46 1.13 
10 1.54 0.13 -0.17 
As stressed in the previous subsection, if phases 1 and 3 are taken into ac- 
count, average contributions are always higher under the CT than under the 
NQT, and the mean contributions of the two treatments are significantly dif- 
ferent. Instead, when phase 2 is considered, in 7 periods, average contributions 
are higher under the NQT than under the CT, and the difference in mean 
contributions is not significant. 
Inspection of Table 7.3 reveals that the differences in average contributions 
between the NQT and the NCT follow similar patterns: in phases 1 and 3, 
subjects contribute (on average) less when their beliefs and motivations are not 
elicited than when these are elicited; in phase 2, subjects contribute more when 
beliefs and motivations are not elicited than when they are elicited. Moreover, 
the difference in mean contributions between the NCT and the NQT is found 
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to be significant at 1% level in phases I and 3, and not significant in phase 2.14 
Thus, we can state the following. 
Observation 7.2 Asking subjects to motivate their own choices and to think 
about the motivations and the future decisions of their partners affects, at the 
aggregate level, their behaviour in the two phases constructed around the basic 
game in that it pushes them towards more cooperation. 
Interestingly, this finding contrasts with those shown by Croson (1998a, 1998b) 
and by the psychological literature-15 Indeed, in these earlier experiments, 
contributions are lower when expectations axe elicited. 
7.5.2 Interior versus boundary equilibria 
I turn, here, to a direct comparison of subjects' average behaviour in the three 
phases of each treatment. From inspection of Fig. 7.4 and Fig. 7.5 it seems that, 
at the aggregate level, subjects behave differently according to phase, especially 
under the NCT. 
In phase 1, and under the two treatments where the questionnaire was 
administered, average contributions are steady around the mean of equilibrium 
and social optimum (i. e., 4.5 tokens) at least in early decision rounds. 
In phase 2, in all treatments, averages are always below the corresponding 
mean (i. e., 3.5 tokens). 
In phase 3, averages lie systematically above the mean in the first 5 periods 
and systematically below it in the last 5 periods under the CT. This downward 
trend takes place earlier and it is much more sharp under the NCT. 
Table 7.4 reports the results of the test of no difference in individual mean 
contributions between phases, under each treatment. 16 As can be seen, average 
contributions are significantly different when we compare phase I and phase 3 
with phase 2, under aJl treatments; and when we compare phase 1 with phase 
3, under the NCT. 
These findings lead to the following two observations. 
Observation 7.3 In phase 2, where the dominant strategy is no provision and 
where the benefits from the public good must be shared with a charity, contribu- 
tions fall (on average) far short of the social optimum in every period. 
14 Specifically, the following values axe found: iNC, NQ(l) = 4.87, 
iNC, NQ(2) = -0.39, and 
iNC, NQ(3) = 2.34. 
15Cf., e. g., Shafir and Tversky (1992); and Shafir (1994). 
16In Table 7.4, ijj is the value of the statistics obtained if we compare phase i with phase j. 
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Table 7.4: z-statistics for the differ- 
ences between phases under each treat- 
ment. 
CT NCT NQT 
il, 2 15.5*** 14.2*** 9.16*** 
il, 3 -1.23 2.00* -0.29 
Z3,2 16.6*** 11.6*** 9.59*** 
*** p<0.001 *p<0.05 
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Observation 7.4 Under the treatment in which the questionnaire was admin- 
istered but no communication was included, people are (on average) less coop- 
erative in phase 3 than in phase 1. 
The strength of Obs. 7.3 and Obs. 7.4 can be refined if we take into con- 
sideration the percentages of Nash equilibrium strategies that are observed in 
each phase, by separating according to treatment. Table 7.5 displays these 
percentages. 
Table 7.5: Percentages of Nash equi- 
librium strategies observed in each 
phase of each treatment. 
NCT CT NQT 
Phase 1 17.5 5.00 24.2 
Phase 2 74.2 71.2 73.3 
Phase 3 21.7 8.75 29.6 
Coinsistent with the data on average contributions, we observe a high number 
of subjects following the strong free-riding strategy in phase 2. The proportions 
of 'egoists' is, on the contraxy, quite low in phases 1 and 3, although it increases 
from the first to the third phase. 
Because the settings with an interior-non-dominant-equilibrium are likely 
to be less transparent and compelling to subjects, the apparent more coopera- 
tive behaviour observed in them might be due to people's confusion over this 
too subtle solution. If deviations from the Nash equilibrium axe simply ran- 
domly distributed errors attributable to learning, then, in phases 1 and 3, we 
would observe contribution levels below as well as above the Nash predictions. 
On the other hand, if there remains an asymmetry toward over investment to 
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the public good, this would suggest that there is a more complex explanation 
for behaviour biased above the non-cooperative equilibrium, towards the social 
optimum. 
To give more insight into behaviour in the interior-Nash settings, let us 
consider the percentages of subjects who contribute less than the amount asso- 
ciated with the equilibrium-by following Sefton and Steinberg's study (1996) 
I shall refer to these people as too greedy for their own good-and the per- 
centages of subjects contributing more than the amount of equilibrium. People 
contributing above the equilibrium can be further classified in a) easy riders, 
those that contribute 3-6 tokens; b) welfare maximisers, those that give 7 to- 
kens, and c) martyrs, those that contribute 8 or 9 tokens. Table 7.6 shows these 
percentages separately for each treatment. 
Table 7.6: Percentages of non-equilibrium strategies. 
PHASE 1 
Too greedy for 
their own good 
Easy-riders Welfave 
maximisers 
Martyrs 
NCT 15.4 35.4 30.0 1.70 
CT 22.5 35.4 37.1 0.00 
__ 
NQT 22.9 40.8 9.20 
T 
2.90 
PHASE 3 
NCT 24.2 24.5 29.2 0.40 
CT 23.3 21.2 46.7 0.00 
NQT 20.3 37.6 12.1 0.40 
Examination of Table 7.6 leads to the following observation. 
Observation 7.5 Across all treatments, there is a pronounced bias above the 
equilibr%um in both phase 1 and phase 3. 
If we take into account the percentages of subjects whose contributions lie 
in a set of 'relatively' narrow bands around the equilibrium (i. e., we compare 
the proportions of easy-riders with those of subjects too greedy fcr their own 
good) Obs. 7.5 is more evident. In phase 1, there are systematically more easy- 
riders than too greedy people under all treatments. In phase 3, the relationship 
is reversed in the CT (where, however, a high percentage of subjects is found 
contributing 7 tokens), whilst it is kept under the NCT and the NQT. 
How might we explain all these figures and observations? 
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The behavioural differences that, at the aggregate level, subjects exhibit 
in phase 2 in compaxison with phases 1 and 3 suggest that the theories which 
predict no change in behaviour across phases do not play a main part in ex- 
plaining this experimental data. At odds with the predictions of these theories, 
people are found to be significantly less cooperative when they cannot keep all 
4private' benefits associated with the public good but must share them with a 
charitable organisation. 
On the other hand, the way in which contributions are dispersed around 
the Nash predictions in the two basic supergames tells us that deviations from 
the equilibrium are not simply transitional errors due to subjects' confusion 
over the subtleties of computing an interior solution. Consistent with earlier 
patterns of allocations to group account, I find in fact that, in the interior-Nash 
supergames, decisions are systematically biased above the equilibrium. 
These results suggest that there must be a more complex explanation for 
people's contributing behaviour. 
An analysis of behaviour across individuals-which will be carried out in 
the next subsection-should help to throw more light on the reasons why people 
voluntaxily contribute to public goods. 
7.6 Individual results 
I now turn to the analysis of behaviour across individuals and I discriminate 
among competing theories by exploiting the fact that they make different pre- 
dictions about the relationship between a subject's own contributions and the 
contributions of his paxtners. Thus, for each of the 72 paxticipants in the ex- 
periment, I estimate the following OLS regression: 
gi, t C+8E gk, t- 1 
(7.2) 
k5ýi 
where the only explanatory variable for subject i's contributions in t are the 
total contributions of i's fellow members in t-1. 
Since (7.2) is a dynamic equation, I cannot take into account the first round's 
data. Consequently, the sample size is 9 observations per phase. However, as far 
as the two phases constructed around the basic game are concerned (i. e., phases 
I and 3), it may be possible to increase the number of observations available 
per person, if the difference in the coefficients on others' contributions between 
these two phases was insignificant. Thus, before proceeding to the estimation 
(for each single phase) of the coefficients' values that best fit an individual's 
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data, I test for the equality of these coefficients in phase 1 and phase 3. 
7.6.1 The phase effect at individual level 
For each subject, I estimate a model which uses the observations of both phase 
1 and phase 3, and which includes a dummy variable D taking value 0 in the 
first phase and I in the third phase. That is, for each participant, I calculate 
the following regression equation: 
gi, t =c+ (C - c)D +81: gk, t + (S - s)D 
1: gk, t (7.3) 
k94-i k94-i 
where: 
0 for t= 10 (phase 1) 
1 for t= 21,..., 30 (phase 3). 
The coefficients (C - c) and (S - s) give the difference, respectively, in the 
intercepts and in the coefficients on others' contributions between phases. If, in 
a regression, the value of the coefficients turns out to be insignificant, this allows 
me to pool the data over the two phases and have, regarding that regression, 
18 observations. 
Notice that this test looks only at the way in which a subject's behaviour 
changes with respect to the others' contributions. Therefore, even if the sub- 
ject's level of contributions are different across phases, the two phases will be 
regarded as equal and data will be pooled provided that the relationship be- 
tween own contributions and others' contributions is the same. 
The results of this analysis axe reported in Table 7.7, that shows, treatment 
by treatment, the number of individuals for which the value of the coefficient 
was found significant. 
Table 7.7: Number of cases in which the phase effect is significant. 
NCT CT NQT 
2 4 
As can be seen, the phase effect is statistically significant for only one subject 
under the NCT, for two subjects under the CT, and for four subjects under the 
NQT. This means that, for all the other participants, it is possible to pool the 
data over the two phases. 
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7.6.2 The cutoff period 0 
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As pointed out in Subsection (7.4), commitment and reciprocity theories predict 
that the sign of the slope s in Eq. (7.2) should be the same across all three phases 
(despite the discontinuity of payoffs present in the separation game). According 
to commitment theories, the slope should be zero in each phase; according to 
reciprocity theories, it should be positive in each phase. 
In contrast with these two theories, the other two theories investigated in 
this study prescribe that subjects behave differently depending on the phase 
they are involved in, so that the sign of s in Eq. (7.2) varies according to phase. 
In the case of altruism, the slope of the regression line is predicted to be 
negative in the two phases constructed around the basic game. Instead, in the 
phase based on the separation game, the slope is negative-for all combina- 
tions of the others' contributions--only if -y (the weight that the altruist puts 
on the others' welfare) is greater than 0.7; if -y lies between 0.4 and 0.7, the 
slope is negative insofar as the others' contributions do not exceed a specific 
value (otherwise the altruist contributes zero); if -y assumes values less than 0.4, 
the global maximum of the altruist's reaction function is at zero, which means 
that-whatever the others' contributions-the altruist does not contribute any- 
thing throughout phase 2. 
As far as a persuasive player is concerned, he is expected to contribute 
always zero in phase 2; whilst, in phases I and 3, he is predicted to contribute a 
constant positive amount till period p and to reciprocate the others' behaviour 
thereafter. Thus, under the persuasive behaviour hypothesis, the relationship 
is zero in phase 2, while it turns from zero to positive in phase 1 and in phase 
3. This implies that, if my hypothesis applies, by splitting phase 1 and phase 
3 in two parts and by estimating separate models for each part, the sign of the 
relationship in the two models should be different. 
Thus, in order to test the predictions of these competing theories, in addition 
to regression (7.2), 1 estimate also the following model: 
gi, t = ! ýo + (Eo - ! go) Do + ýýo 
E gk, t- 1+ PO - ! ýO) 
E gk, t- 1 Do (7.4) 
k--Ai k54i 
where Do is a 'round' dummy variable taking value 0 for the first 0 rounds and 
I for the last (10 - 0) rounds; 0=2,..., 9 if phases 1 and 3 data can be pooled 
or 0=3,..., 8 if the regressions must be estimated for each phase separately; 17 
17 Since in order to draw a regression line at least two points axe necessaxy, the dummy Do 
must take value zero (or one) for at least two rounds. This implies that, when the regression is 
calculated for a single phase, 0 has to vary from 3 to 8 given that the first round's contribution 
decisions are not taken into account. On the other hand, when data can be pooled over phases 
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! go and ý!, O are, respectively, the intercept term and the slope coefficient for a 
regression caJculated in the first 0 periods of a phase; and 60 and 90 denote 
the intercept term and the slope coefficient for a regression calculated in the 
remaining (10 - 0) periods. 
Since 0 is a variable taking value either 2 to 9 or 3 to 8, model (7.4) yields 
8 or 6 different regression equations, each of which divides a phase into two 
intervals with 0 as cutoff point. 
7.6.3 Comparing decisions with others' behaviour 
In this subsection, for each of the 72 participants in the experiment, I estimate 
the coefficients of the 8 or 6 regressions generated by model (7.4), and (as the 
split of a phase in two paxts may not exist) I estimate also the coefficients 
of regression (7.2), either over all periods of each phase (if the phase effect is 
significant), or with data pooled over all periods of phases I and 3 (if the phase 
effect is insignificant). Among all these regressions, I select, for each subject, 
the one that minimises Akaike's information criterion. 
This kind of analysis allows me to verify, for each individual, if and when 
the slope coefficient changes its sign during a particular phase. I can hence 
identify which of the competing theories under examination (if any) is the best 
predictor of the subject's behaviour. 
According to the characteristics of the selected model, I allocate individuals 
into different groups. Specifically, a subject will be classified as: 
a reciprocator, if, in any phase, the regression that best fits his data is 
Eq. (7.2) and, in it, s>0; or, even if there is a split, ý! o and go are both 
positive; 
9a Kantian individual, if, in any phase, Eq. (7.2) is selected and, in it, 
8=0; 
an altruist, if, in any phase, Eq. (7.2) turns out to be the best regression 
and, in it, s<0; or, even if there is a split, §0 and go are both negative. 
On the other hand, an agent who is found to contribute aJways nothing to 
the public good in phase 2 might aJso be an altruist; precisely, he would 
be an altruist who puts a weight less than 0.4 on the others' welfare; 
aa persuasive player, if, in phases I and 3, the selected regression has a split 
1 and 3, if 0=2, D2 equals zero in the second round of both phases, and if 0=9, D9 equals 
one in the last round of both phases; hence, in these cases, there exist two points through 
which the regression line can pass. 
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in 0>3 and presents go :ý5,18 ýýo =0 and go > 0. On the other hand, a 
persuasive player must contribute nothing to the public good throughout 
phase 2. 
Notice that I allow both a reciprocator and an altruist to have a 'split' period 
within a same phase (i. e., in both cases, I allow for §0 and §0 to differ); t1ds 
means that a subject, while preserving the form of the relationship, becomes 
more/less reactive to the others' behaviour. This kind of change is permitted 
by both altruism and reciprocity theories, which require that the sign of the 
slope (not its absolute value) must remain the same throughout a supergame. 
Whenever a subject's selected regression does not exhibit any of the charac- 
teristics mentioned above, the subject will not be arranged in any behavioural 
category but will be considered unclassiflable. 
It is worth emphasising that, in two cases, the regression coefficients can- 
not be estimated: 1) when the individual exhibits constant own contributions, 
which amounts to having no variation in the dependent variable; and 2) when 
the sum of the others' contributions is constant, which means that it is im- 
possible to detect the effects of it on the dependent variable. As for the first 
issue, (in a parallel to the individual data analysis carried out in the previ- 
ous chapter) individuals who contribute a constant amount greater than the 
equilibrium throughout a phase will be considered always-contributors; on the 
other hand, those who contribute a constant amount equal to the equilibrium 
will be classified as players of the Nash type. 
The relationship under the NCT 
Phases 1 and 3 Under the NCT, the phase effect is not significant for 23 
out of a total of 24 participants (see Table 7.7). The regression coefficients and 
the best 0 (if any) of each of these 23 subjects axe shown in Table 7.8-19 
Inspection of Table 7.8 reveals the following. 
a) Four subjects (coherent with altruism theories) exhibit negative slope 
coefficients over all periods. 
b) Three more subjects (consistent with reciprocity theories) present posi- 
tive slope coefficients over all periods. 
18A similax restriction derives from (5.12) and from the corresponding vajues displayed in 
Table 7.1. These values suggest that if a player is observed to contribute an amount greater 
than 5 tokens (unreciprocated) for more than 2 periods, then he cannot be of the persuasive 
type. 
19In this table as well as in aJI the following ones, the decimal numbers with more than two 
zero digits axe rounded to zero. 
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Table 7.8: Characteristics of each subject's pooled regression under the 
NCT. 
Subject Type Best 0 ýýo ZO ýo 90 
5 Altruist 5 1.05 3.59 -0-10 -0.14 
15 Altruist 5 12.5** 1 2.66* -0.81 -0-03 
7 Altruist c=5.99 S= -0.10 
23 Altruist c=3.21*** s= -0.17** 
1 Reciprocal 4 1.02 1 -3.91 
ý 0.14 ý 1.11* 
2 Reciprocal c=1.30 s=0.30 
17 Reciprocal 5 -0.43 0.74 0.84* 0.30 
3 Persuasive 3 4.00* 0.61 0.00 0.44 
4 Unclassified 7 12.9** 1.28** -1.01* 0.47* 
6 Unclassified 2 13.0*** 1.03*** -0.80* 0.34** 
8 Unclassified 3 7.53 0.28 -0-10 0.39 
9 Unclassified 9 3.63*** 4.67 0.10 1 -0.33* 
10 Unclassified 6 7.00*** 0.14*** 0.00 0.64** 
12 Unclassified 7 7.00* 1 -9.33*** 0.00 0.19* 
13 Unclassified 5 7.00*** -1.13*** 0.00 0.52** 
14 Unclassified 8 1.66 7.50* 0.17 -1.00* 
16 Unclassified 5 7.00***1 0.65*** 0.00 0.43*** 
18 Unclassified 6 6.02** -1.96** 0.00 0.44* 
19 Unclassified 5 7.00*** 3.20*** 0.00 0.27*** 
20 Unclassified 4 7.00*** 0.72*** 0.00 0.39* 
22 Unclassified 4 3.37*** 2.00 -0.22* 1 0.00 
24 Unclassified 2 -32.0***, 0.77*** 3.00*** 
ý 0.00*** 
21 Always-Contrib. g2l, t =7 Vt 
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 *p<0.05 
c) Only one subject is found to behave in accordance with the persuasive 
behaviour hypothesis: he contributes 4 tokens until the third period and then 
he reciprocates the others' contributions. 
d) One individual contributes 7 tokens in all periods and, as a consequence, 
he is considered an always-contributor. 
e) Finally, a large number of participants are unclassifiable. Among these 
unclassifiable patterns of behaviour, we observe some homogeneity which is 
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worth emphasising. For instance, a few subjects axe found to contribute 7 
tokens (i. e., the socially optimal amount), unreciprocated, for some consecutive 
periods before their slope coefficient becomes positive. 20 
The only person who exhibits a significant phase dummy is of the Nash 
type in phase 1; while he counts as unclassifiable in phase 3 (in this phase, he 
starts contributing 2 tokens only after the fourth round). Table 7.9 reports the 
characteristics of his regression equation. 
Table 7.9: Characteristics of the regression for the subject whose 
phase effect is significant under the NCT. 
PHASE 1 
Subject Type 
11 Nash gll, t 2 vt 
PHASE 3 
Subject Type Best 0 90 ZO ýo ý10 
Unclassified 4 5.65*** 2.00*** -0.41** 
FO700** 
- 
*** 
< 0.001 
Phase 2 In the second phase of the NCT, for 3 subjects, the explanatory 
variable is constantly equal to zero, which implies that we cannot detect its 
effects on the dependent vaxiable. The characteristics of the selected regression 
of each of the remaining 21 participants are reported in Table 7.10. 
Examination of this table reveals the following. 
a) One subject is altruist. He fell in this category also in phases 1 and 3; 
thus, we can infer that his own -y is greater than 0.7. 
b) Consistent with reciprocity arguments, a positive relationship over all 
phase is observed in 4 cases. 
c) Three paxticipants do not present readily interpretable data and, coin-se- 
quently, are considered unclassifiable. 
d) Finally, an insufficient variation in the dependent variable is detected for 
13 subjects, who are found contributing always zero. Accordingly, they are all 
classified as Nash types. Among them, we find the only persuasive player of 
phases I and 3 as well as one of the four altruists of phases I and 3. The subject 
for which the latter is observed might be categorised as an altruist whose -y is 
less than 0.4, rather than as a type Nash player. 
20Examples of this kind of behaviour axe offered by subjects no. 10,12,13,16,19 and 20. 
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Table 7.10: Characteristics of each subject's selected regression in 
the second phase of the NCT. 
Sub . ect j Type Best 0 ýýo 
I ZO I ýo 90 
5 Altruist C=1.99 s= -0.22 
4 Reciprocal 4 -1.49 
1 
-4.00 
1 0.27 1 2.00 
6 Reciprocal c= -0.43 s=0.64*** 
8 Reciprocal c=2.18 s=0.29 
14 Reciprocal c=0.37 s=0.52* 
1 Unclassified 7 0.00 4.50 0.00 -0.50 
7 Unclassified 6 7.00 0.38 0.00 0.11 
13 Unclassified 8 5.00*** 2.00** -0.10 0.50 
3 Nash 93, t = 0 Vt 
9 Nash gg, t = 0 vt 
10 Nash 910't = 0 vt 
11 Nash g1l't = 0 Vt 
12 Nash 912, t = 0 vt 
16 Nash 915't = 0 vt 
18 Nash 918, t = 0 vt 
19 Nash glg, t =0 in t = 2, ..., 10 
20 Nash 920, t = 0 Vt 
21 Nash 921, t =0 in t = 2,..., 10 
22 Nash 922, t = 0 Vt 
23 Nash 923, t = 0 Vt 
24 Nash 924, t = 0 Vt 
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 *p<0.05 
The relationship under the CT 
Phases 1 and 3 Under the CT, we can esth-nate 22 pooled regressions. In 
one of them, the explanatory variable equals 14 in all periods so that we cannot 
discern its effects on the dependent variable. The remaining 21 subjects exhibit 
regression coefficients as reported in Table 7.11. 
Inspection of this table shows the following. 
a) In only one case the slope is always negative, as predicted by altruism 
theories. 
b) In one more case the slope is always positive, as predicted by reciprocity 
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Table 7.11: Characteristics of each subject's pooled regression under the CT. 
Subject Type Best 0 !; a ZO §0 ýO 
7 Altruist 3 -5-11 2.23 -0-89 - 0-05 
- 
18 Reciprocal 2 -13.7** -6-52 1.33*** 0.94 
4 Persuasive 3 5.00 5.39 0.00 0.40 
10 Persuasive 3 5.00 -3.67* 0.00 1.22* 
1 Unclassified 4 7.00* 0.36* 0.00 0.44 
2 Unclassified 3 8.68*** 1.00*** -0.73*** 0.00*** 
3 Unclassified 4 -8.34 4.38* 1.34* -0.29* 
5 Unclassified 7 4.36*** 5.73 0.00 - 0.82* 
8 Unclassified 2 6.00*** 4.81 -0.17 0.10 
9 Unclassified 3 -17.0 3.13* 1.50* - 0.26* 
11 Unclassified 4 7.88*** 0.75*** -0.63*** 0.10*** 
12 Unclassified 6_ 7.00*** -2.76** 0.00 1.09** 
13 Unclassified 7 7.00*** -0.23*** , - 
0.00 0.42** 
16 Unclassified 9 -0.38 2.33 
ý 0.51*** ,- 0.17* 
14 Always-Contributor 914, t =5 
914, t =7 
Vt 
Vt 
= 1, ..., 10; 
= 21,..., 30 
15 Always-Contributor gi. 5, t =7 Vt= l, ..., 10,21,... , 30 
17 Always-Contributor 917, t =5 
917, t =7 
Vt 
Vt 
= 1, ..., 10; 
= 21,..., 30 
19 Always-Contributor gig, t =7 Vt= l, ..., IO, 21,... , 30 
22 Always-Contributor 922, t =5 
922, t =7 
Vt 
Vt 
= 1, ..., 10; 
= 22,..., 30 
23 Always-Contributor 923, t =7 Vt= l, ..., 10,21,..., 30 
24 Always-Contributor 924, t =7 Vt= l, ..., 10,21,..., 30 
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 *p<0.05 
theories. 
c) Two subjects can be considered persuasive players. Before their slope 
coefficient becomes positive, both invest 5 tokens, unreciprocated, for three 
periods. 
d) An insufficient variation in the dependent variable is found in seven cases, 
suggesting that these subjects should be classified as always-contributors. In 
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particular, out of these seven subjects, four invest 7 throughout both phases; 
three invest 5 throughout phase I and 7 throughout phase 3. 
e) Finally, ten persons remain unclassified. A careful look at some of these 
unclassifiable behavioural patterns reveals that also under the CT (as under the 
NCT) there are a few subjects who contribute 7 tokens, unreciprocated, for some 
consecutive periods before starting reciprocating the others' contributions. 21 
As for the two subjects who show a siginificant phase dummy, the features 
of their regressions are described in Table 7.12. 
Table 7.12: Chaxacteristics of each subject's regression when the 
phase effect is significant under the CT. 
Subject Type I Best 01 go zo ýO g-o-] 
PHASE 1 
6 Unclassified 6 0.00 7.52* 0.00 -0.37 
21 Unclassified 3 1.00 1.29 0.00 -0.10 
PHASE 3 
6 Unclassified 3 7.00** 2.29* 1 0.00- 
FO. 03 
21 Reciprocal c= -2.12 s=0.37* 
** p<0.01 *p<0.05 
Phase 2 By turning to the analysis of the relationship in the second phase of 
the CT, the regression of two participants present the regressor equals zero over 
all phase. Table 7.13 reports details of the regression of each of the remaining 
22 paxticipants. 
The following results are obtained. 
a) One person behaves as an altruist. 
b) Three subjects present an always positive slope coefficient, in accordance 
with reciprocity theories. 
c) Three participants are unclassiflable. 
d) Finally, 15 subjects are found to be of the Nash type since they contribute 
always zero. The two persuasive persons as well as the altruist of phases 1 and 
3 fall in this category. The latter might, therefore, be classified as an altruist 
with -Y < 0-4. 
2 'The subjects who exhibit this behavioural pattern axe subjects no. 1,12, and 13. 
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Table 7.13: Chaxacteristics of each subject's selected regession in the 
second phase of the CT. 
Subject 7)7pe Best 0 go 
F E0 ýo go 
18 Altruist c=2.61* = -0.21 
8 
_Reciprocal 
C=1.00 s = 0.71* 
19 Reciprocal c= -5.18 s = 1.31 
16 Reciprocal 6 -0.38 2.83 0.34 0.81 
6 Unclassified 3 -17.5*** 0.00 3.50 0.00*** 
15 Unclassified 4 7.00* 5.40 1 0.00 1 0.23 
20 Unclassified 4 7.00* 0.72*--- l 0.00 0.02 
I Nash gl, t = 0 vt 
2 Nash 92, t = 0 Vt 
3 Nash 93, t = 0 Vt 
4 Nash 94, t = 0 Vt 
5 Nash 95, t = 0 Vt 
7 Nash 97, t = 0 Vt 
9 Nash gg, t = 0 Vt 
10 Nash 910't = 0 vt 
11 Nash gil't = 0 vt 
12 Nash 912, t =0 in t= 2,..., 10 
13 Nash 913, t = 0 vt 
21 Nash 921, t = 0 vt 
22 Nash 922, t = 0 Vt 
23 Nash 923, t = 0 Vt 
24 Nash 924, t = 0 Vt 
*** < 0.001 *p<0.05 
The relationship under the NQT 
Phases 1 and 3 Under the NQT, it is possible to pool the data over phases 
1 and 3 for 20 subjects, whose regression coefficients and best 0 (if any) are 
shown in Table 7.14. 
Inspection of this table reveals the following. 
a) Four participants present negative coefficients over all periods, in accor- 
dance with altruism theories. 
7.6 Individual results 180 
Table 7.14: Characteristics of each subject's pooled regression under 
the NQT. 
Subject Type Best 0 90 ZO ýo SO 
4 Altruist 8 5.27*** 2.29 -0.29** -0.41 
10 Altruist 7 1 9.14*** l 9.86 -0.60** -1-36 
24 Altruist 2 14.0* T 2.25* ). 10 
12 Altruist c=3.51* s= -0.08 
15 Reciprocal 2 -9.33 2.15 1.33 0.02 
11 Reciprocal 5 2.48*** 3.69* 0.17** 0.11 
7 ReciprocaJ 61 4.85*** l 1.23* 1 0.04 1 0.36 
3 
_Reciprocal 
9 2.10* 1 0.00 0.14 0.20 
I Reciprocal c= -2.46 s=0.46 
17 Persuasive 3 5.00* 1 3.76 ý 0.00 ý 0.46 
21 Nash 921, t =2 Vt 
8 Unclassified 3 10.0** 2.15* -1.25* 0.02* 
23 Unclassified 3 15.5 -0.08 -0.82 0.45 
19 Unclassified 8 6.96** -7.67* -0.47 2.33* 
20 Unclassified 5 3.19* 7.05 0.15 -0.43* 
5 Unclassified 7 -0-15 4.93 0.31 -0.46 
14 Unclassified 9 2.35*** 5.33 0.03 -0.67 
9 Unclassified 4 7.00* 1.33 0.00 0.26 
2 Unclassified 1 
51 7.00***l -6.90*** 1 
0.00 2.00** 
13 Unclassified 
1 71 3.67***ý 2.00 1 -0.23 0.00 
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 *p<0.05 
b) Five subjects exhibit positive coefficients over all periods, in accordance 
with reciprocity theories. 
c) One person is persuasive: he contributes 5 tokens, unreciprocated, for 3 
periods and then he reciprocates the others' behaviour. 
d) One subject is found contributing always the amount of tokens associated 
with the equilibrium. He can be therefore considered of the Nash type. 
e) Finally, the regression of nine participants present features such that 
these participants cannot be arranged in any category. Two out of these nine 
unclassifiable persons are found to contribute the socially optimal amount, un- 
reciprocated, until their cutoff period 0 and to reciprocate the others' contri- 
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As for the 4 participants whose phase dirmyny is found to be significant, the 
regression coefficients and the best 0 of each of them are reported in Table 7.15. 
Table 7.15: Characteristics of each subject's regression when the phase 
effect is significant under the NQT. 
ý Subject I Type I Best 01 ýýO ZO 
1 
§0 -S7O 
PHASE 1 
6 Unclassified 7 10.5** -44.0** -1.15** 5.50** 
16 Unclassified 5 7.00* 2.00 -1.00 0.00 
18 Unclassified 4 7.00 0.62 1 0.00 1 0.38 
22 Altruist I c=2.30*** 8= -0.10* 
PHASE 3 
6 Reciprocal 7 3.80 -5.14 -0.07 -0.43* 
16 Unclassified 5 2.05** 2.00 0.29*** 0.00 
18 Unclassified 1 31 7.00 1 2.00*** 1 
0.00 0.0 1 
22 Unclassified 1 51 7.00* ý -2.00 
ý 0.00 0 
P<0.001 P<0.01 p<0.05 
Phase 2 In the second phase of the NQT, the regression of two participants 
exhibit a zero regressor throughout the phase. The coefficients and the best 0 
of the remaining 22 subjects are depicted in Table 7.16. 
The following can be observed. 
a) For six participants the slope of the regression line is always positive, as 
predicted by theories of reciprocity. 
b) Six more participants are unclassifiable. 
c) The remaining ten subjects contribute always zero. They axe, therefore, 
categorised as Nash types. Among these always-defectors we find the persuader 
as well as one of the altruists of phases I and 3. 
Discussion 
A few observations stand out from this study. 
First of all, it shows not only that there is a considerable variety of be- 
haviour across individuals, but also that there axe a substantial number of 
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Table 7.16: Characteristics of each subject's selected regression in 
the second phase of the NQT. 
Subject Type Best 0 qo ZO ýo ýo 
10 Reciprocal 3 - 12.0* 0.11* 4.00** 0.26** 
23 Reciprocal 4 -17.5 2.00* 4.50* 0.50 
15 Reciprocal 8 6.20**1 -3.00* 0.13 1 4.00* 
7 Reciprocal c=0.98 
_ 
s=0.44* 
11 Reciprocal c=0.17 s=0.23 
19 Reciprocal c= -3-47 s=0.89 
I Unclassified 4 4.17** -0.21* - 2.50* 0.70** 
6 Unclassified 5 5.00* 1.25 -0.55 0.53** 
22 Unclassified 8 1.16 1 -0.60 -0.07 0.60 
8 Unclassified 7 2.27 8.85 1.21 - 1.60* 
5 Unclassified 5 -0.89 0.00 1.07** 0.00** 
13 Unclassified 8 -0.34 0.00 0.74*** 0.00 
9 Nash gg, t 0 in t 2,10 
20 Nash 920, t 0 in t 2,10 
2 Nash 92, t = 0 Vt 
3 Nash 93, t = 0 Vt 
4 Nash 94, t = 0 Vt 
14 Nash 914, t = 0 Vt 
16 Nash 916't = 0 Vt 
17 Nash 917, t = 0 Vt 
18 Nash 918, t = 0 Vt 
Nash 921, t = 0 Vt 
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 *p<0.05 
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subjects who modify their behaviour and their attitude towards the others dur- 
ing a supergame. This is especially true for phases I and 3, where most of the 
regressions that best fit an individual's data exhibit a cutoff period. 
In these two phases, under the NCT, only I out of the 21 subjects whose data 
can be pooled shows an earlier zero-later positive relationship as predicted by 
the persuasive behaviour hypothesis; 3 subjects exhibit a positive relationship as 
predicted by reciprocity theories; and 4 subjects present a negative relationship 
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as predicted by altruism theories. No one shows a zero coefficient over all periods 
as predicted by commitment theories. When the phase effect is significant, we 
find one more reciprocator in phase 1, and one more altruist in phase 3. 
Under the CT, a conspicuous number of subjects is represented by aJways- 
contributors; such a result is consistent with the data on average contributions. 
As for the ability of the competing theories to explain the CT's data, none of 
them appear to fare well in this treatment. Indeed, when data can be pooled, 2 
subjects out of 21 behave in accordance with the persuasive behaviour hypoth- 
esis, 1 in accordance with reciprocity theories, and another one in accordance 
with altruism theories. Again, no one acts according to commitment theories. 
When regressions are estimated separately for each phase, we find one more 
reciprocator in phase 3. 
As far as the NQT is concerned, an interesting feature of the data is that, 
under this treatment, in phases I and 3, we do not find any aJways-contributor 
but, rather, we observe one player of the Nash type. This contrasts with the 
results obtained under the other two treatments and confirms that, in my exper- 
iment, individuals are less inclined to contribute when they are simply required 
to state a contribution decision and are not 'forced' to think about their own 
and the others' behaviour. As pointed out on p. 166, this finding differs from 
those reported by Croson (1998b) and in the psychological literature; in these 
earlier experiments, in fact, the act of eliciting beliefs significantly decreases 
contribution levels and cooperation. 
By turning to the phase based on the sepaxation game, in it, under all treat- 
ments, no one behaves as a Kantian individual, and very few subjects behave 
as reciprocators or altruists. Instead, a remarkable proportion of paxticipants 
is represented by always-defectors. Some of these aJways-defectors are found 
to be altruists in the two phases constructed around the basic game. This sug- 
gests that, in the classifications of the subjects which refer to phase 2, these 
participants might be categorised as altruists withy < 0.4 rather than as Nash 
types. 
In addition, in phase 2, we observe more subjects of the Nash type in the 
two treatments with the questionnaire than in the treatment without questions. 
Under the NCT and the CT, 13 and 15 persons (respectively) contribute the 
equilibrium amount throughout the phase while, under the NQT, only 10 play- 
ers behave as Nash types. My second phase's data appear, hence, to be in 
line with Croson's result. It is necessary, however, to take into account that, 
in contrast with the previously cited experimental studies, in phase 2 of my 
experiment subjects do not get all the benefits connected with the public good 
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but they must shaxe them with a charitable organisation. Such a difference 
between the second phase of my experiment and the earlier experimental works 
makes a direct comparison between them difficult. 
A last aspect of the data which deserves to be underlined concerns the 
significance of the estimated coefficients: a substantial number of them, indeed, 
is found to be statistically insigmificant. This may be due to the few number 
of observations available per person as well as to the amount of noise in the 
data. However, even if many coefficients lack statistical significance, from an 
economic point of view (which matters here) they are significant. 
7.6.4 Comparing an individual's expectations with the others' 
contributions 
A further study that the data from this experiment allows us to do concerns 
the relationship between each subject's expectations and the actual patterns of 
contributions of his fellow members. 
In order to verify if subjects form expectations on the basis of what they 
observe, for each of the 48 participants in the two treatments in which beliefs 
were elicited, I calculate the following OLS regression: 
Ei, t gk, t+1 aO + al 1: 9k, ti (7.5) 
kOi k ý, -' i 
where the only explanatory variable for subject i's expectations in t are the 
observed total contributions of his partners. 
If, in Eq. (7.5), ao =0 and a, = 1, this would mean that subject i expects 
from the others that they will contribute in t+1 the same amount that they 
contributed in t; i. e., that the foundations of i's expectations are the actual 
contributions of his fellow members. I shall refer to the subjects for whom the 
latter holds as perfect beliefs updating (henceforwaxd PBU) individuals. 22 
In a paraJlel to the analysis caxried out in the previous subsection, before 
proceeding with the estimation of the regression coefficients for each individual 
and for each phase, I test for the equality of these coefficients in the two phases 
based on the same (basic) game. Specifically, for each subject, I estimate a 
model which uses the observations of both phases and which includes a dummy 
variable taking value 0 in the first phase and 1 in the third phase. If, in a 
regression, the difference in the coefficients is found to be insignificant, then I 
22This terminology may appear somehow ambiguous. It intends only to indicate a person 
for whom there is a one to one correspondence between his beliefs in t and what he observes 
in t. 
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can pool the data over the two phases and have, regaxding that regression, 18 
(rather than 9) observations. 
Results of this study reveal that, under the NCT, the difference between 
phases is significant for 4 people while, under the GIP, it is significant for 8 
subjects. 
Let us start the analysis by considering the NCT data. Under this treat- 
ment, 5 out of the 20 subjects whose data can be pooled (i. e., 25%) exhibit a 
regression line with ao =0 and a, = 1. As for the four subjects for whom 
the regression must be estimated separately for each phase, we find that three 
of them are PBU individuals in phase 3. By turning to the analysis of the 
relationship in the second phase of the NCT, the OLS regression gives a perfect 
fit in 4 cases (20%). 
Under the CT, 6 out of the 16 pooled regressions (37.5%) present a constant 
equal to zero and a slope equal to one. Among the six subjects who show a 
statistically significant difference in their regression coefficients between phases, 
we observe one PBU individual in phase I and three PBU individuals in phase 
3. FinaJly, as far as phase 2 is concerned, under the CT, the regression gives a 
perfect fit in 7 cases (29.2%). 
Similar findings suggest that a few people in my experiment form and update 
their expectations on the basis of what they observe. This confirms previous 
experimental findings that the outcome of the game may affect the beliefs and 
the decisions in the next play of the game. 23 
7.7 Conclusions 
The main purpose of this chapter was to test the relevance of the persuasive 
behaviour hypothesis in an environment more complicated than that used in 
the previous chapter. I did so by using a game with interior solutions (which, 
according to various authors, introduce scope for potentially confounding ef- 
fects) and by exploiting the fact that, in this setting, different theories make 
different predictions about the relationship between a subject's contributions 
and the contributions of his partners. 
Two main results come out from this study. The first is that (in contrast 
with the results obtained in the previous chapter) the persuasion hypothesis 
fails to explain much of this experiment's data: two subjects are categorised as 
persuaders under the CT and only one persuasive player is detected in each of 
the other two treatments. 
23 See, for example, Offerman (1996) and references quoted there. 
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The second noteworthy result of this experiment is that most of its data 
remain unexplained, which implies that also the other theories under investiga- 
tion do not fare very well in this experiment. None of these earlier approaches 
to cooperation is able to account for the change in the same subject's behaviour 
that we observe within a same supergame. 
In both the phases constructed around the basic game and under each of 
the three treatments considered here, we find a few subjects who contribute, 
unreciprocated, the socially optimal amount until their cutoff period, 0, and re- 
ciprocate the others' contributions thereafter. The regression that best tracks 
these subjects' behaviour turns, therefore, from zero to positive in period 0. 
While, in principle, the persuasive behaviour hypothesis can justify this kind 
of split, the restrictions imposed on persuasive behaviour do not allow the clas- 
sification of a subject as a persuader if he is found to contribute the sociaJ 
optimum for more than one period. In other words, the 'hardwired' compo- 
nent of the persuasive strategy does not allow attempts to persuade to explain 
most observed behavioural patterns. Thus, it appears necessary to loosen these 
'hardwired' elements of the program defining the basic persuasive strategy- 
by giving the agent increasing scope for discretion/optimisation-iin order to 
improve the effectiveness of the persuasion hypothesis in explaining previously 
unexplained behaviour. But this is a different story which can only give sug- 
gestions for future improvements of the theory. For the moment, by relying 
on the definition adopted here and exposed in Chapter 5, we must reject the 
possibility of persuasion to be a valid explanation for the cooperative behaviour 
which people are found to exhibit in this (non-linear) experiment. 
Chapter 8 
Summary and suggestions for 
future research 
8.1 Introduction 
This concluding chapter attempts to provide an appraisal-based on the ev- 
idence from the experiments described in Chapters 6 and 7-of the results 
achieved so fax by my behavioural hypothesis, an assessment of its strengths 
and weaknesses, and a vision of what might be done in the future. 
Despite the relative robustness of the phenomenon of voluntary contribu- 
tions in public goods environments, there is no unified theory which can explain 
aJI (or even most of) the observed regularities. So I begin my assessment by 
taking into account which kinds of previously unexplained empirical evidence 
the persuasion theory allows us to accommodate, underlying its main theoreti- 
caJ strengths (its simplicity and its resting on strong common-sense principles) 
and its main weaknesses (its limitations on the agent's discretion/rationality 
and its incapability of accounting for some of the former results). Then, I shall 
concentrate on the empirical validity of my theory by summarising how well it 
performed in the series of experiments which I have run to empirically examine 
it. Finally, I shall look to the future, indicating what developments should be 
done to reach more decisive conclusions. 
8.2 Theoretical considerations 
Let me recall the main motivations of this work: proposing a new theory of 
cooperative behaviour, and presenting a series of experiments which explore its 
empirical validity and, hence, which demonstrate if and to what extent it can 
be regarded as a positive theory of behaviour, where the latter refers to a theory 
8.2 Theoretical considerations 188 
which is constructed as much as possible on empirically supported elements. ' 
The theory is relatively simple. It rests on two principles that seem to have 
strong common-sense. An agent understands the benefits that he himself can 
obtain if the public good is provided and, as a consequence, he contributes 
a constant amount for p consecutive periods in order to persuade his 'selfish' 
partners to perform the same action. Then, if he is successful in these attempts, 
he continues with his constant contribution as long as he observes that each of 
the others does the same; otherwise, he modifies his contribution in the direction 
of the others' average contribution in the previous period, which implies that 
he decreases his contribution if it was above the average of the others. Hence, 
the persuasion theory is compatible with both the observed successes and the 
observed failures of voluntary cooperation. 
It also allows for the accommodation of previously unexplained empirical 
evidence. In particular, two key observations from former dilemma games ex- 
periments are 'captured' by my theory. First, the frequency with which an 
individual chooses to cooperate after several cooperative outcomes have oc- 
curred; such a frequency implies that the individual does not take advantage of 
the others' willingness to cooperate by switching to the immediately rewarding 
(defecting) strategy. This seems to support a theory of reciprocity (according to 
which an individual's regard for the utility of the others depends on how 'kind' 
the others are towards him). But, if reciprocity is the principle underlying 
behaviour, it is not easy to explain a second key observation; namely, that peo- 
ple tend to repeat cooperative choices after they have just cooperated without 
reciprocation; experimental evidence shows, indeed, that there exist subjects 
who cooperate even if their group members do not do the same. Although 
pure altruism might account for this result, in contrast with aftruism models, 
previous experimental findings report that cooperative subjects change their 
attitude towards the others if they refuse to modify their selfish behaviour. 2 
An hypothesis as that proposed here-under which, a subject cooperates un- 
conditionally for M periods by expecting that, in t= 1L, the others will follow 
his behaviour, and then he reciprocates the others' observed decisions (so that 
he will stop cooperation if his expectations are not fulfilled)-appears to fit the 
reported observations quite well. 
The fundamental assumption upon which I built my hypothesis is that, at 
the outset of the game, a persuasive player must believe that, if he contributes 
a constant amount throughout the first p periods, all his partners will modify 
'Cf., Wong (1987); and Offerman (1996). 
2 For discussion and experimental evidence related to this tendencY, see Brewer and Kramer 
(1986); Dawes and Thaler (1988); Simon (1993); and Offerman (1996). 
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their initial 'selfish' choice and will follow his contributing decision from period 
p until the end of the game. On the basis of such expectations -he decides 
the optimal amount to contribute up to period M. This is the only kind of 
discretion/rationality allowed to him: during the game, in fact, a persuasive 
player is a simple automaton forced to follow a predefined set of instructions. 
I do not want to withhold the fact that a similar way of modelling coop- 
eration has some inbuilt problems which may raise criticism. First of all, it 
restricts too much the rationality of an agent, who, once solved his first pe- 
riod's maximisation problem and decided (on the basis of a well-defined set 
of a priori expectations) how much to contribute throughout the first A pe- 
riods, must stick with the program of instructions given to him and cannot 
anymore optimise. This implies that, even if his a priori expectations change 
when the game is actually played, this change has no bearing on his 'automatic' 
behaviour: the set of instructions defining a persuasive strategy do not allow 
for a modification of the behaviour based on changed expectations. These kinds 
of restrictions bring the persuasive behaviour hypothesis in the line of eaxlier 
approaches to cooperation: a reciprocator, an altruist, a tit-for-tat player type 
can all be regarded as 'hardwired' individuals without any discretion during the 
game. 
A further criticism which might be moved against my hypothesis is that 
it is incapable of accounting for some former experimental findings. Indeed, 
since persuasive motives can be pursued only in repeated public good games 
where players interact always in the same groups, the persuasion theory cannot 
explain why people cooperate in single-shot games or in repeated games where 
groups are randomly formed anew in each round. My response to a similar 
axgument relates to the intentions I had in proposing a new model of cooperative 
behaviour. As pointed out eaxlier, I did not want to build one grand theory 
capable of explaining all significant phenomena of the games we are interested 
in. Such a theory seemed to me to be quite awkward and unmanageable. 
Rather, I wanted to propose a simple theory that could justify some previous 
unexplained empirical evidence. 
8.3 Achievements to date 
In principle, the hypothesis of persuasive behaviour deserves to be taken seri- 
ously as one among several ways to explain individuals' underlying motivations 
for choosing actions that do not maximise their monetary payoffs (especially in 
early stages of repeated social dilemma games). 
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In practice, since it generates testable predictions which differ from those of 
earlier theories, its ability to explain previously inexplicable behaviour can be 
empirically verified. 
With the experiments described in Chapters 6 and 7,1 wished exactly to 
assess the successes of my theory in comparison with alternative models of 
cooperative behaviour. This has been done in two ways. On the one hand, by 
exploiting the fact that the various theories make different predictions about the 
relationship between a player's contributions and the contributions of his group 
members; on the other hand, by adopting appropriate experimental designs. 
In particular, two aspects of my experiments were designed for serving this 
purpose. The first concerns the introduction (in both my experiments) of a 
questionnaire through which I asked subjects to motivate their own decision, 
to speculate about the motivation of the others and to predict the others' next 
decision. The second refers to the inclusion (only in Chapter Ts experiment) of 
a treatment in which subjects had to shaxe the benefits deriving from the public 
good with a charitable organisation. Such a treatment allows for the verification 
of whether (or not) people support public goods when they do not derive private 
benefits from their production. The persuasive behaviour hypothesis--at odds 
with other theories-predicts that they should not. 
8.3.1 On the strengths and weaknesses of my design 
The inclusion of a questionnaire combining behaviour with beliefs elicitation 
and with a systematic investigation into subjects' motivations for their own de- 
cisions represents a very useful and straightforward means of obtaining insights 
into subjects' decision rules and better understanding the relationship between 
people's actions in public goods settings. Thus, in principle, its use can be 
considered a strength of my design. Nevertheless, the way in which I have im- 
plemented the questionnaire seems (in the light of the experience which I have 
gained in these kinds of experiments) not to be the best in order to identify a 
persuasive player-type. 
Two obvious problems of my experiment are that it lacks any evidence on 
persuasive intention as well as on players' a priori expectations. Both these 
aspects are crucial for successfully detecting a persuader. On p. 3 of this work, 
I defined persuasion as the intention to influence the others in order to make 
them behave in a way that they otherwise would not. Furthermore, a persuasive 
player is predicted to hold a specific and well-defined set of a priori expectations 
about his partners' behaviour. This implies that if, before the start of the game, 
a subject is not observed to hold the kinds of expectations required by my 
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hypothesis, he cannot be classified as a persuasive type. Thus, the elicitation 
of each subject's a priori expectations would add a further testable restriction 
on persuasive behaviour and would contribute to an effective and unmistakable 
identification of this player type. 
To reach the latter objective and correct the two weaknesses of my design 
above-mentioned, it seems opportune to amend the questionnaire in two of its 
features. 
First of all, in order to know if a subject's contributing decision is intended 
to induce the others (who are free-riding) to do what is best for the group, 
it suffices to modify the list of alternatives among which the subjects have to 
choose in order to motivate their own decisions so as to include an answer 
explicitly corresponding to persuasion (e. g., "I want to persuade the others"). 
Second, in order to have information about the a priori beliefs of a player, it 
seems enough to elicit expectations before decisions. Although this modification 
would complicate the structure of each decision round, 3 it would permit the 
identification of the expectations that a subject holds prior to the staxt of the 
game so as to test if the prescriptions of the persuasive behaviour hypothesis 
about this issue are respected. 
The latter modification would also bring my experiment closer to those run 
by Croson (1998a, 1998b), thus making a direct comparison between them eas- 
ier. Since in my experiment, in contrast with Croson's ones, people are found 
to be more cooperative when the questionnaire is included, it might be argued 
that my opposite result is due to the fact that I applied the questionnaire after 
(rather than before) each decision. By carrying out an experiment that elim- 
inates this source of difference, I can verify which between mine and Croson's 
findings are replicated. If the latter is observed, then we can infer that the 
moment in which beliefs are elicited affects behaviour in the sense that people 
react differently depending on whether their expectations are elicited before or 
after their decisions. Notice that this would simply be a 'framing' effect. 
8.3.2 Major results: a summary 
The main finding that comes out from my empirical analysis is that, in contrast 
with the predictions of economic theory, people voluntarily contribute to public 
goods. This is observed in both the experiments described in this work, which 
therefore are in line with many laboratory studies done by others. Data from 
3 As pointed on p. 119, since the motivational questions can be answered only after the 
decisions, the elicitation of the expectations before them would divide each single decision 
round into three (rather than two) parts. This is considered a complication of the design both 
for the subjects and for the experimenter. 
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Chapter Ts experiment reveaJ, however, that the willingness to contribute is sig- 
nificantly less when subjects do not get all the pecuniaxy benefits generated by 
the public good. Results from the latter experiment show, indeed, significantly 
differences in aggregate and individual behaviour between the supergames in 
which the subjects receive all the benefits associated with the production of the 
public good and the supergame in which they do not: individuals are found to 
free-ride significantly more in the latter than in the former. This suggests that 
the emphasis placed by the literature on people's 'unconditional' (i. e., with- 
out reserve) voluntary contributions may be misplaced: people appear willing 
to invest their own tokens in the production of public goods from which they 
(themselves) derive benefits, but not in the production of others. 
A second noteworthy result (common again to both my experiments) is that 
a substantiaJ number of subjects axe found to modify their behaviour and their 
attitude towards the others within a supergame. This confirms the results of 
previous experiments and suggests that all theories which do not allow for this 
kind of modification cannot adequately explain much of my experimentaJ data. 
Let us consider in detail how well the rival theories investigated in this work 
fared in my experiments. 
A first hypothesis of cooperative behaviour which I exa; rnined is altruism. 
According to altruism theories, a player's utility increases not only in his own 
payoffs but also in the other players' payoffs. In Chapter 6s experiment, this 
implies unconditional cooperation whenever -y (the altruist's weight on the oth- 
ers' welfare) is greater than a criticaJ value (which depends on the mrs between 
private and public goods). As for Chapter Ts experiment, in the two 10-fold 
repetitions of the basic game included in it, the assumptions of altruism theo- 
ries imply unconditional cooperation and a negative reaction function for any 
value of -y; while, in the 10-fold repetition of the sepaxation game, these impli- 
cations are obtained only for vaJues of -y greater than 0.7. Data from both the 
experiments reveal that a theory based on altruistic motives for giving is not 
adequate for explaining the cooperative behaviour exhibited by most of my sub- 
jects: participants in my experiments are found to decrease their contribution 
level if the other group members refuse to modify their 'selfish' attitude. 
For the same reason motivations lying on Kantian principles are rather 
unsuccessful in explaining much of my data. If subjects were following a Kantian 
reasoning they should contribute the socially optimaJ amount throughout any 
supergame, regardless of the others' behaviour. But this is barely observed in 
both my experiments. 
An alternative approach investigated in each of my experiments supposes 
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that people act on the basis of a reciprocity principle. According to such a prin- 
ciple, anyone who benefits from the public good has moral obligations towards 
those who contribute. Applied to my public goods situations, this implies that 
a subject must cooperate if he observes cooperation from all the others, and 
that he must increase his contribution if the others increase their contributions. 
Only 1% of the participants in Chapter 6's experiment are found to behave 
in accordance with the criteria used in that context to identify a reciprocator. 
Although reciprocity theories do much better in Chapter Ts experiment, they 
are unable to explain the kind of behavioural change that many subjects exhibit 
within a same supergame. 
An alternative explanation as to why people cooperate is Andreoini's (1988) 
strategies hypothesis, which is a theory of rational behaviour in the sense of 
Kreps et al. (1982). According to it, when the information about the other 
types is incomplete, if a fully-rational and selfish player believes that there is 
a small chance that the others are irrational (i. e., non-payoff maximising), it 
may be rational for him to contribute in order to build reputation. This would 
imply a relatively high contribution level in the early periods, which decreases 
as the end draws near, given that, in the last round, the free-riding strategy is 
always optimal. 
Although it would have been desirable to have the same set of theories 
open to investigation in each of the two empirical chapters, the impossibility of 
deriving the form of a strategic player's reaction function in the games axound 
which Chapter Ts experiment was constructed led me to not include 'strategies' 
among the theories investigated in the latter chapter. As far as the data from 
Chapter 6's experiment axe concerned, strategic behaviour is rather successful 
in justifying them: 21 percent of the paxticipants in this experiment are found 
to behave according to the criteria used in that context to identify a strategic 
player; such a percentage decreases to 14% if (in analysing the data relative to 
the second subsession)4 we see phases 4,5 and 6 as continuations of phases 1, 
2 and 3 respectively. Specifically, it is the observation of some subjects who 
cooperate throughout a supergame (in the sense that they are found to not 
defect in the final period) which weakens this approach's ability to explain my 
data. 
Finally, let us consider how well the hypothesis that I propose in this work 
to explain why people voluntarily provide public goods performed in each of my 
two experiments. The results obtained in this respect are contrasting: while 
the data from my first 'simple' experiment show that a quite reasonable per- 
4R, eCall that the experiment described in Chapter 6 consisted of two perfectly identical 
subsessions. 
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centage of the observed cooperative behaviour-which cannot be explained by 
any of the other alternative theories-is explicable with the persuasion hypoth- 
esis, ' the latter fails to explain much of the data from the more complicated 
(non-linear) settings upon which Chapter Ts experiment was built. 6 Never- 
theless, the observation, in this experiment, of a few subjects who contribute, 
unreciprocated, the sociaJly optima. 1 amount for some consecutive periods and 
reciprocate the others' behaviour thereafter suggests that it is because of the 
restrictions imposed on the rationality of a persuasive player that attempts to 
persuade are unable to explain a higher percentage of the observed behavioural 
patterns. 7 Thus, it appears necessary to loosen the 'hardwired' elements of the 
program defining the basic persuasive strategy-by giving the agent increasing 
scope for discretion/optimisation-in order to improve the effectiveness of the 
persuasion hypothesis in explaining previously unexplained behaviour. 
8.4 Other theories and other empirical studies 
Other approaches in the literature might be relevant for describing my ex- 
perimental results. One of these is the equity (or inequality aversion) theory 
proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Ac- 
cording to equity theories, a subject's regard for the others' payoffs depends on 
how the latter compare to his own. These models are based on the assumption 
that people dislike inequality in payoffs, and that they dislike inequality more 
if it is to their disadvantage than if it is to their advantage. This implies a 
contributing behaviour which depends on fixed (exogenous) preferences over 
payoff distributions, regardless of whether the others have done anything at all. 
Nevertheless, players have to form beliefs about the others' choices in order to 
choose their contribution level and, as long as inequality-averse players believe 
that other players are contributing, they are willing to contribute too. If (as 
found in my experiments) subjects update their beliefs in the light of what they 
observed in the previous round, a few patterns of behaviour detected in my ex- 
periments are compatible with equity (inequality aversion) theories: if matched 
with other contributors, contributive subjects keep on contributing throughout 
the game; if matched with defectors, they lower their own contribution. These 
5 Specifically, if we consider the two identical subsessions of this experiment as independent, 
we found that, out of a total of 144 individuaJs (24 subjects x6 phases), 14 percent act in 
accordance with my hypothesis of persuasive behaviour. This percentage increases to 20% if 
we consider the second subsession as a continuation of the first one. 
'Only 3 out of the 72 participants in this experiment axe, in fact, categorised as persuaders. 
7p 
, eCall that, in Chapter 7s experiment, a subject cannot be classified as a persuader if he 
is found to contribute the social optimum for more than one period. 
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theories cannot, however, explain the fact that some contributive subjects are 
found to repeat their choice for some consecutive periods before matching the 
others' lower contributions. Even if their fixed preferences could be such that 
they solve the trade-off between pecuniary and relative payoffs in favour of the 
latter (so as to justify the repeated, unreciprocated, eaxly contributions), it is 
not clear why these preferences should change over time. 8 
On the other hand, there is some evidence from recent experiments which 
corroborates my findings that subjects unconditionally cooperate in early pe- 
riods of repeated public goods games, and then they reciprocate the observed 
contributions of their partners. This is reported, for instance, by Keser (1999) 
and by Keser and van Winden (2000), who suggest an interpretation of sub- 
jects' behaviour in terms of (what they caJI) conditional cooperation, which is 
based on the two aspects of future-oriented and simple reactive behaviour. As 
future-oriented behaviour they define "aspects of subjects' behaviour that are 
induced by their perception of future interaction"; as reactive behaviour they 
intend individuals' behaviour that changes in the direction of the other group 
members' average contribution in the previous period. 
If we interpret my experimental results as suggesting the necessity to com- 
bine the insights of various approaches into a richer model in order to adequately 
explain the voluntaxy contributions phenomenon, we find further support in the 
existing literature, such as in Bolton (1998) and Charness and Haruvy (1999). 
8.5 Research agenda 
In looking towards the future, there seem to me to be two major issues that I will 
need to confront to assess the validity of my persuasive behaviour theory. The 
first is a purely theoretical issue and concerns the (already emphasised) necessity 
to loosen the 'hardwired' elements of the program defining the basic persuasive 
strategy, giving the agent more discretion with respect to the length of his 
reciprocity-test-period. This might be done by allowing the persuasive player 
to Bayesian update his expectations during the game, rather than requiring 
him to stick with the optimal contribution calculated at the outset of the game 
on the basis of his a priori expectations. 
The second issue relates to my methods which, as pointed out in Subsec- 
tion (8.3.1), should be amended with respect to the implementation of the 
questionnaire. 
8A fundamental assumption of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) is that the trade-off must 
remain stable for the duration of the experiment. 
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In the immediate future, I intend to replicate the 'simple' experiment de- 
scribed in Chapter 6 whose main problem, besides the two just mentioned, is 
the small number of observations. Indeed, the experiment consisted of only two 
sessions with 12 subjects each. Since public goods decisions axe of high variance 
and earlier research has shown that people differ very much in their inclination 
to cooperate, my strong interest in individual characteristics requires much 
more data than those collected in the study presented in this work. More data 
would increase the robustness of the classifications and, hence, the confidence 
in my findings. 
In replicating such an experiment, apart from modifying the definition of the 
(basic) persuasive strategy and the way in which I conducted the questionnaire, 
I intend to add two control treatments. The first is "borrowed" from my second 
experiment, and refers to the running of an experimental session without the 
questionnaire in order to check if and in which way the questions/predictions 
asked between rounds affect the rate of cooperation. 
The other control treatment which I would like to run refers to the possibility 
of transforming a theoretical weakness of my model (i. e., its impossibility of 
accounting for some former results) into an empirical strength. This would 
be done by taking into account (along with Partners) Strangers situations. 
Specifically, a same pool of subjects would be required to participate in two 
different sessions: in one (the Partners session), they would interact in the 
same groups during the entire game (like the experiments presented here); in 
the other (the Strangers session), the groups' composition would change in each 
period in a way such that participants cannot expect to meet the same fellow 
members again in a later period. In order to control for order effects, I would 
carry out two treatments which differ from each other depending on having the 
Partners session before or after the Strangers session. A similar experimental 
design would allow me to verify if cooperative agents classified as persuasive 
in the Partners situation change their behaviour (and, therefore, defect) in the 
Strangers situation. I can, in such a way, reach more decisive conclusions about 
the practical validity of the persuasive behaviour hypothesis. 
8.6 Conclusions 
The hypothesis that, in social dilemmas, a subject cooperates because of his 
understanding of the benefits that he derives from such a choice when it is 
made by other group members, and of the consequent benefits from him to 
induce the others to cooperate, finds some support in one of the experiments 
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reported in this work, but it fails to explain much of the data from a second 
(more complicated) experiment. In this concluding chapter, I have proposed 
a number of improvements which can be made both to the theory and to the 
methods used for testing it so as to reach a better assessment of its ability to 
explain the observed voluntary contributions phenomenon. 
Appendix A 
First experiment's instructions 
This appendix contains the instructions given to the participants in the experi- 
ment described in Chapter 6. Section A. 1 provides the instructions for the first 
subsession. Section A. 2 presents those for the second subsession. 
A. 1 Instructions for the first subsession 
This experiment is a study of economic decision making. The instructions are 
simple. If you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you may earn a 
reasonable amount of money. 
The unit of EXPERIMENTAL MONEY will be the TOKEN; i. e., during the 
experiment you will be earning tokens. These will be converted into pounds 
and paid in cash to you at the end of the experiment according to the exchange 
rate I Token = XO. 02. 
The University of York has provided the funds for this study. 
Please take your time to read these instructions at your own pace. If you 
have any questions while reading them, please raise your hand and someone 
will come to help you. 
THE EXPERIMENT 
The experiment consists of 2 PARTS. There will be a ten-minute break in 
the middle. You will receive the instructions for the first part in a moment. 
Information on the second part will be given to you after the break. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE FIRST PART 
The first part of the experiment is divided into 3 PHASES of 10 ROUNDS each. 
This means that you will play for a total of 30 rounds. 
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Groups At the beginning of each phase, you will be assigned to a group of 3 
people. 
The composition of your group will remain FIXED throughout each phase. 
That is, you will play with the same other two subjects in all 10 rounds that 
each phase contains. 
The composition of your group will be changing every phase. After each 
phase you will be REASSIGNED TO A NEW GROUP of 3 participants. The 3 
group members will never have been members of the same group in the past. 
You have NO chance of being in a group with any other paxticipant more than 
once. 
At no point in the experiment will you know the identities of the other 2 
members of your group, nor will your identity be made known to them. 
You are not allowed to talk or communicate with other participants. 
The One-Round Choice In each round of part 1, you and the other two 
members of your group Will EACH have two possible choices. 
YOU MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN X and Y without knowing what the others 
in your group are deciding. The tokens you get will depend on the choice that 
you and the other members of your group make. 
1. Choice of X 
If you choose X, you (and ONLY YOU) will earn 50 tokens. The other members 
of your group will receive NOTHING as a consequence of your choice. 
2. Choice of Y 
If you choose Y, you, as well as EACH MEMBER OF YOUR GROUP, will earn v 
tokens. Similarly, You (and everyone in your group) will receive v tokens for 
each of your group-members who choose Y. That is, it does not matter who 
chooses Y: every member of the group gets v tokens from it-whether he chose 
Y or not. 
We will reveal to you what v is during the experiment. 
The Questionnaire In every round, besides making a choice between X and 
Y, you will be also asked: 
1) to indicate the main reason for your choice in that period; 
2) to guess what motivated the previous choice of both your fellow-participants; 
3) to predict the next choice of both your fellow-participants. 
A questionnaire will appear on your computer screen after all three group 
members have made their choices asking you to pick out one (and ONLY ONE) 
of several alternatives for every question. 
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Additional Tokens The questionnaire will allow you to get tokens in addi- 
tion to those you accumulate from your choices. In fact, your predictions of your 
fellow-participants' next choice as well as your beliefs about the motivations 
behind their last choices will be confronted with their answers. 
Each round you may earn 30 ADDITIONAL TOKENS if you predicted correctly 
the next choice of BOTH your partners. A FURTHER 30 TOKENS will be given 
to you if you guessed the motivation behind the last choices of BOTH your 
fellow-participants. 
We stress that we do NOT consider your answer correct if you guessed the 
next decision and the motivation of ONLY ONE member of your group. 
Time Limits You can take your time to give your responses in the first round 
of each phase. But in all other 9 rounds that each phase contains you will have 
TIME LIMITS on each of your responses. This time is fixed to 20 SECONDS PER 
ANSWER, so that you have to take each decision in 20 seconds. 
A countdown timer displaying the number of seconds remaining in the cur- 
rent decision will be visible on your screen and 5 seconds before the end of the 
time you will hear a sound informing you that you have to take a decision very 
quickly. If you answer after the time limit, your response will be taken to be 
that of the previous round. 
Recalling Previous Choices Before starting a new round you may want 
to recall your partners' previous decisions. By pressing P-at the end of each 
round-you will be able to see the past history of the gwne. 
Your Cash Earnings The tokens you obtain on all 3 phases of the first part 
will be ADDED to calculate your experimental earnings from that part. 
This experimental earnings will be then turned into cash earnings. In par- 
ticular, your cash earnings from the first part will be the total number of tokens 
you earned in it divided by 5. For example, if you get 4000 tokens, your cash 
earnings will be 800 p. If you get 3000 tokens, then your cash earnings will be 
600 p. 
INFORMATION ON THE SCREEN 
Payoff-Table In the figure which follows is depicted the PAYOFF-TABLE PER 
ROUND. 
Depending on your choice, and everyone else's in your group, six different 
situations may occur in each round. In particular, if you choose X, you may 
A. 1 Instructions for the first subsession 
(a) r if all three group members choose X 
(b) r+ v if one person in the group chooses Y 
X/ (c) r +2v if both the other two fellow participants choose Y 
Y (d) 3v if all three group members choose Y 
(e) 2v if one person in the group chooses X 
(f) v if both the other two fellow participants choose X 
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obtain one of the situations indicated by (a), (b) and (c). If you, instead, choose 
Y, one of the situations indicated by (d), (e) and (f) may occur. 
The exact value of v will be revealed to you during the experiment. 
The Decision-Window for Making a Choice To report your choice you 
will have to use a 'decision window' which in the FIRST ROUND of each phase 
will be like the one shown below. 
YOUR CHOICE OPPORTUNITIES: 
x 
/ 
N 
Y 
Please make your choice (enter X orY). 
In this window, your two choice opportunities are shown and by typing X 
or Y you can indicate for which opportunity you want to enter your decision. 
After you enter a choice, the three possible situations related to that choice 
will appear on your screen. If you are NOT happy with your choice, you have 
the possibility to change it by pressing N. 
The Decision-Window for Confirming your Choice The decision win- 
dow that will appear on your computer screen in ALL OTHER ROUNDS of each 
phase will be the following: 
In the previous round your choice was II and you earned II to- 
Ikens. 
Do you want to CONFIRM that choice also for this round? 
Enter Yes or No 
In this window, both the action you chose and the tokens you earned in 
the previous round are shown. So that, if you are still happy with that choice 
you can simply confirm it and continue with the experiment by pressing Y. 
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Otherwise, if you are not more happy with your previous choice, you can modify 
it by typing N. 
Result-Table 
RESULTs TABLE FOR ROUND NUMBER: q 
YOUR choice: 
Choice of the SECOND 
MEMBER of your group: 
Choice of the THIRD 
MEMBER of your group: 
Situation occurred: g 
(g = a, b, c if you chose X) 
(g = d, e, f if you chose Y) 
Your Payoff 
TOTAL NUMBER OF TOKENS YOU GOT 
FROM YOUR CHOICES: 
When everybody in your group 
has made his choice, a RESULTS 
TABLE (shown on the left) will 
appear on your screen. 
In this table, your choice, the 
choices of your fellow partici- 
pants, and the situation occur- 
red in that round (with your 
related payoff) axe registered. 
The total number of tokens 
you earned from your choices 
in all past rounds is shown at 
the bottom of the table. 
The Questionnaire After having seen the results table, you will have to 
answer three questions. 
The FIRST QUESTION asks you to indicate the main reason for your choice 
in that round. In order to answer it, you must choose one (and ONLY ONE) of 
the 5 alternatives listed in Table A. I. 
INDICATE THE 'MAIN' REASON FOR YOUR CHOICE: 
I chose II because: 
A) of the past behaviour of my fellow-participants; 
B) whatever my fellow-participants would have chosen, this 
choice assured me higher payments than those I could obtain 
by choosing the other action; 
C) if all 3 group members took this choice, we would obt 
the highest payments; 
D) this choice gave my fellow-participants the lowest pay- 
ments; 
E) of other reasons. Please, specify which these reasons axe. 
Table A-1: First question of the questionnaire 
Once you have taken your decision, you must type the associate letter on 
your keyboard. 
The SECOND QUESTION asks you to guess what motivated the previous de- 
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cisions of your fellow-participants. You must answer this question twice (once 
for the second member of your group and once for the third member) and each 
time you must pick out one (and ONLY ONE) of the 5 alternatives listed in 
Table A. 2. 
Why, in your opinion, did the SECOND (THIRD) MEMBER of 
your group choose as he (or she) did? 
A) because of my and third member's past behaviour; 
B) because whatever me and the third member would have 
chosen, this choice assured him (her) higher payments than 
those (s)he could obtain by choosing the other action; 
C) because he realised that, if all three group members took 
this choice, we would obtain the highest payments; 
D) because that choice gave other participants the lowest 
payments; 
E) because of other reasons. 
Table A. 2: Second question of the questionnaire 
The THIRD and LAST QUESTION asks you to predict the next choice of each 
of your fellow-participants. 
Once you have made your predictions, you must type the choice you think 
your fellow-participailts will take (i. e., X or Y) on your keyboard. 
A. 2 Instructions for the second subsession 
The second part of the experiment will be an EXACT REPETITION of the first 
part. 
This means the following. 
1) You will play 3 different PHASES of 10 ROUNDS each in a group of 3 people. 
2) The 2 participants you will be matched with are THE SAME as in the first 
part; i. e., you will play each ten-round phase of the second part with the same 
people with whom you played in the respective phase of the first paxt. 
3) In each round you will be asked to choose between X and Y, and to answer 
the questionnaire. 
4) The 3 values of v will be exactly like they were in the first part. 
5) Your cash earnings will be calculated as in the previous part. 
Appendix B 
Second experiment's 
instructions 
This appendix contains the instructions given to the participants in the exper- 
iment described in Chapter 7. Specifically, it presents the instructions for the 
communication treatment. 
Omitting either the text in italics on page 206 or all the references to the 
questionnaire, one obtains the set of instructions which were provided in the 
non-communication treatment and in the non-questionnaire treatment, respec- 
tively. 
Instructions for the communication treatment 
This experiment is a study of economic decision making. The instructions are 
simple. If you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you may earn a 
reasonable amount of money. 
The unit Of EXPERIMENTAL MONEY will be the FRANC; i. e., during the 
experiment you will be earning francs. These will be converted into pounds 
and paid in cash to you at the end of the experiment according to the exchange 
rate I Franc = XO. 50. 
In a way that will be explained later, through your decisions you may also 
help a charity organization. Next to your computer, there is a list of charities. 
After you have completed the experiment, you will be asked to choose one of 
them-if you decided to help any. 
The European Commission has provided the funds for this study. 
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THE EXPERIMENT 
The experiment is divided into 3 PHASES Of 10 ROUNDS each. You will be 
therefore playing for a totaJ of 30 rounds. 
Groups At the beginning of each phase, you will be assigned to a group of 3 
people. 
The composition of your group will remain FIXED throughout each phase. 
That is, you will play with the same other two subjects in all 10 rounds that 
each phase contains. After each phase you will be RANDOMLY REASSIGNED TO 
A NEW GROUP of 3 participants. 
The 3 group members will never have been members of the same group in 
the past. You have NO chance of being in a group with any other participant 
more than once. 
At no point in the experiment will you know the identities of the other 2 
people in your group, nor will your identity be made known to them. 
You are not allowed to talk with the other participants. 
The One-Round Investment Decision In each round of the experiment, 
you and the other 2 members of your group will EACH have a budget of 9 tokens. 
You must decide--without knowing what the others in your group are 
deciding-how many of these tokens you wish to invest in a public account. 
Each decision you take yields a given amount of francs to You and to EACH 
MEMBER OF YOUR GROUP. The number of francs you may earn depends there- 
fore on the investment decisions of ALL group members; it is reported in a 
PAYOFF mATRix. This matrix will appear on your screen at the beginning of 
each round. It will be the same throughout all ten periods of each phase. 
The Payoff Matrix in the First and Third Phases The matrix that you 
will face in the first and third phases is depicted in Table B. I. The ROWS Of 
the matrix represent the number of tokens you decide to invest; the COLUMNS 
are the total number of tokens invested by both your partners, and its ENTIUES 
show the amount of francs you may earn according to your and your partners' 
investment decisions. 
The Payoff Matrix in the Second Phase In the second phase, the nu- 
merical details of the payoff matrix will differ. The new matrix is described in 
Table B. 2. The consequences of your decisions will be different as well: through 
them, you may provide money for a charitable institution. 
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Charitable Contributions Any token you decide to invest in phase 2 will 
generate earnings for a charity organization. 
UNLESS YOU INVEST ZERO, you will keep only half of the entries in the 
matrix; the remaining haff will be given to the charitable institution that you 
will pick out from the provided list. 
ONLY IF YOU INVEST ZERO, you will receive the entire amount of francs 
written in the first row of the matrix. 
Your earnings will depend-of course-on the decisions of the other two 
group members. Suppose, for example, that the total investment of your part- 
ners is 5 tokens; then, if you invest 3 tokens, your own earnings would be 461 = 23 2 
francs, and the same amount of francs will be given to the charity; if, instead, 
you choose to invest 0, then your earnings would be 62 francs and the charity 
will receive nothing as a consequence of your decision. 
The Questionnaire In every round, besides making an investment decision, 
you will be also asked: 
1) to indicate the main reason for your decision in that period; 
2) to guess what motivated the previous decision of both your fellow-participants; 
3) to predict the next decision of both your fellow-participants. 
A questionnaire will appear on your computer screen after all three group 
members have made their investment decisions asking you to pick out one (and 
ONLY ONE) of several alternatives for every question. 
The reason you have selected for your investment decision will be said to 
your partners and you will be informed about your partners' actual motivations 
for their decision. 
The FIRST QUESTION asks you to indicate the main reason for your own 
investment decision in that round. In order to answer it, you must choose one 
(and ONLY ONE) of the answers listed below: 
1) 1 wanted to make MY OWN earnings as large as possible given that I was 
expecting the same behaviour from the others; 
2) if ALL 3 group members decided to invest that amount of tokens, WE would 
obtain the highest payments; 
3) 1 thought that the others would have invested a LARGE amount of tokens; 
4) 1 thought that the others would have invested a SMALL amount of tokens; 
5) 1 wanted to help my partners; 
6) that investment decision gave my partners the lowest payments; 
7) the others' past behaviour induced me to make that decision; 
8) time was over; 
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9) IF PHASE 2: 1 wanted to help the charity. 
If none of the provided alternatives expresses the right motivation for your 
decision, then-by typing 0-you will have the chance to write down your 
specific reasons. 
The SECOND QUESTION asks you to guess what motivated the previous in- 
vestment decision of your fellow-paxticipants. You must answer this question 
twice (once for each member of your group) and each time you must pick out 
one of the following alternatives: 
0) he provided his own reasons; 
1) he wanted to make HIS OWN eaxnings as large as possible given that he was 
expecting the same behaviour from the others; 
2) he realised that-if ALL 3 group members decided to invest that amount of 
tokens-WE would obtain the highest payments; 
3) he thought that the others would have invested a LARGE amount of tokens; 
4) he thought that the others would have invested a SMALL amount of tokens; 
5) he wanted to help the others; 
6) his investment decision gave the partners the lowest payments; 
7) the others' past behaviour induced him to take that decision; 
8) time was over; 
9) IF PHASE 2: he wanted to help the chaxity. 
Once you have chosen one of the listed alternatives, you must enter the number 
associated with it. 
The THIRD and LAST QUESTION asks you to predict how many of their 9 
tokens will be invested by EACH of your paxtners in the following round. 
Once you have made your predictions, you must type the expected amounts 
(i. e., two numbers from 0 to 9) on your keyboaxd. 
Additional Francs The questionnaire will allow you to get francs in addi- 
tion to those you accumulate from your investment decisions. In fact, your 
beliefs about the motivations behind your partners' last decision, as well as 
your predictions of their next decision, will be compared to their answers. 
Each round you may earn 50 ADDITIONAL FRANCS if you guessed correctly 
the motivation behind the last decision of BOTH your fellow-participants. 
A FURTHER 50 FRANCS will be given to you if you predicted correctly the 
next decision of BOTH your partners. 
We stress that we do NOT consider your answer correct if you guessed the 
motivation and the next decision of ONLY ONE member of your group. 
208 
Time Limits You can take your time to give your responses in the first round 
of each phase. But in all other 9 rounds that each phase contains you will have 
TIME LIMITS on each of your responses. 
This time is fixed to 20 SECONDS PER ANSWER, so that you will have: 
1.20 seconds to decide how many tokens you wish to invest; 
2.20 seconds to provide the main reason for that investment decision; 
3.20 seconds to guess the motivation of BOTH your partners; 
4.20 seconds to predict BOTH their next investments. 
A countdown timer displaying the number of seconds remaining in the cur- 
rent decision will be visible on your screen and 2 SECONDS before the end of 
the time you will hear a sound informing you that you have to take a decision 
very quickly. If you answer after the time limit, your response will be taken to 
be that of the previous round. So that, it does not make sense that you try to 
modify your decision after the permitted time. 
Recalling Previous Choices Before starting a new round you may want 
to recall your partners' previous decisions. By pressing P-at the end of each 
round-you will be able to see the past history of the game. 
Moreover, next to your computer, you can find a record sheet where you 
can write down-if you wish-the round by round decisions of your partners. 
Your Cash Earnings The francs you obtain on all phases will be ADDED to 
calculate your total experimental eaxnings. 
These experimental earnings will be then turned into cash earnings. In 
particular, your cash earnings will be the total amount of francs you earned 
divided by 2. For example, if you get 4000 francs, your cash earnings will be 
2000 p. If you get 3000 francs, then your cash earnings will be 1500 
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Appendix C 
First experiment's data 
This appendix reports all individual data collected from the experiment de- 
scribed in Chapter 6. Section CA describes the data from the first subsession. 
Section C. 2 describes those from the second (identical) subsession. In both 
cases, data appear separated according to phase. 
For all 10 periods of the 6 phases in which the experiment was divided, each 
of the tables that follow reports: 
i) the choice between X and Y made by the subject in the decision stage, in 
the first column; 
ii) the motivation provided by him for that choice, in the second column; ' 
iii) his guesses about the motivations underlying the second and the third 
partners' choices, in the third and forth columns respectively; 2 
iv) his predictions about the next choices of the second and the third paxtners, 
in the fifth and sixth columns respectively. 
Throughout all exposition, the three aligned tables refer to the three players 
in the same group. 
'Table A. 1 in Appendix A depicts the 5 alternatives (labelled from A to E) among which 
subjects had to choose in order to answer this question. 
Actually, Table A-1 shows the 5 possible answers available to the participants from the 
second to the tenth round of each phase of subsession 1, and in all ten rounds of each phase 
of subsession 2. 
In the first round of each phase of subsession 1, alternative A was not in the list and the 4 
remaining alternatives were labelled A, B, C, and D, respectively. 
2 Table A. 2 in Appendix A lists the 5 alternatives among which subjects had to choose in 
order to answer this question. Also in this case, alternative A was not included in the first 
round of each phase of subsession 1. 
CA First subsession's data 
C-1 First subsession's data 
Phase I 
Subiect 1 
Y B A B X X 
Y C B C X Y 
Y C B A Y Y 
Y C B A X Y 
X B B C X Y 
X B B C X Y 
X A A C X Y 
X A A C X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A 
Subiect 4 
X A B B X X 
X B C C Y Y 
X B C A X Y 
X B A A X X 
X A A C X X 
X A B C X Y 
X B A C X Y 
X B A C X X 
X A A A X X 
X B A A 
Subiect 2 
X A B B Y Y 
X A C C Y X 
X A B C X Y 
X A A A X Y 
X A A E X Y 
X A A E X Y 
X A A D X Y 
X A A D X X 
Y A A D X X 
X C C D 
Sub-ject 7 
X A A B X X 
X A A C X X 
X B A C X X 
X A A C X X 
X D A E X X 
X B B C X X 
X B B A X X 
X B B A X X 
X B B A X X 
X B B A 
Subiect 5 
Y B A B Y Y 
Y C B C X X 
X A B C X X 
X A B C X X 
X A B A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A E A X X 
X B B B 
Subiect 8 
X B B C X X 
X A B C X X 
X A B C X X 
X B B C X X 
X A B C Y X 
X A E C X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A 
212 
Subiect 9 
y B B D Y Y 
y C A D X X 
Y A A B Y Y 
Y E* A B X X 
Y C A B Y Y 
Y C E E Y Y 
Y C E E Y Y 
Y C A B X X 
X A A A X X 
X A E A 
* Hope others will follow. 
Sub-iect 10 
Y D* A B X Y 
Y C B C X X 
Y C B A Y Y 
Y C B A X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A E B X X 
X A B B 
If we all chose this the 
group as a totaJ would 
benefit 
Subiect 12 
Y B A A X X 
Y C B E X X 
Y E* A A Y X 
Y C A A X Y 
Y C A A Y Y 
Y C A A X X 
X A B B X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A 
Expected at least an- 
other to follow. 
CA First subsession's data 
Subiect 3 
X A A A X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X A A A X X 
Y E* A A X Y 
X A A A X Y 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A 
Subiect 6 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A 
Make my partners to 
choose differently in the 
next rounds 
Subiect 13 
X A A A Y X 
X E* E E X X 
X A B E X Y 
X A A B X X 
Y B B B Y X 
Y A A A X X 
X B A A X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B 
Subiect 16 
X A A A X X 
X B B C X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B C B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B 
I felt that it was the 
best profit based on my 
predictions of their ac- 
tions. 
Subiect 14 
Y B B B Y Y 
y c c c y y 
Y A A C Y Y 
Y C A C Y Y 
Y C A C Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y C A C Y Y 
Y C B A 
Subiect 17 
Y B B B Y Y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c x Y 
X A A C 
213 
Subiect 11 
X D D D X X 
A A A X X 
A A A X X 
A A A X X 
A E A X X 
E* A A X X 
A A A X X 
A A A X X 
A A A X X 
A A A 
Used it as a probe to see 
if others would choose 
Y. 
Subiect 21 
X A A A X Y 
X B A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A C A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A 
Subiect 22 
Y B B B Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A B 
CA First subsession's data 
Subiect 15 
X A D A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A E E X X 
X A C E X X 
Y E* C E Y X 
Y E* E E Y X 
Y E* E E Y Y 
Y E* E E X X 
X A E E 
Subiect 18 
X A A A X x 
X A A A Y Y 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
Y C A A Y Y 
Y C A A X X 
X A E A X X 
X A E A X X 
X A E A X X 
X A E A 
If we all chose this we' 
d be better off 
Subiect 19 
X A A A Y Y 
X B E E X X 
X B C B X X 
X B C B X X 
X B B B X Y 
Y A B B X Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y X 
Y A A B Y Y 
Y A A B 
Subiect 20 
x A A A y y 
Y C B C X Y 
y c A C y y 
y c A C x x 
X A B B X X 
X A A B Y X 
Y B A A Y Y 
Y B C A Y X 
y A C A y y 
Y C C B 
Phase 2 
Subiect I 
Y B A A X X 
Y C B B Y X 
Y C B B Y Y 
Y C A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A 
Subiect 11 
X A D D X X 
X B C B X X 
X B C B X X 
X B C A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A 
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Subject 23 
X A A A X X' 
X B B B X Xi 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X x 
X B B C X X 
X B C C X Y 
X B C B X X 
X B C B Y X 
X B C B X X 
X B B B 
Subject 24 
x A A A Y X 
X B A A Y X 
X B A A X Y 
X A A A X Y 
x A A A x Y 
x A A A Y X 
x A A A Y X 
X B A A Y X 
X B A A X Y 
X B A A 
Subiect 5 
X A C A X X 
X A C A X X 
X B C A X X 
X B C A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A 
CA First subsession's data 
Subject 2 Subject 9 
Y B A B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A C B X Y 
X A C C X X 
X B C B Y X 
X B B B X Y 
X B B C X Y 
X B B C X Y 
X B B B X X 
X B B B 
Y B D B Y Y 
X A A D X X 
X A C D Y Y 
Y C C B X X 
X A C B X X 
X A A B Y X 
Y C A B Y X 
y c A A x x 
x A A A x x 
X A A A 
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Subject 12 
X A D D X X 
X A B Aý X X 
Y C B A Y Y 
Y C C A Y X 
Y C A A X X 
" A A A X X 
" A A A X X 
X B C A X X 
" B A A X X 
" B A A 
Subiect 3 Subiect 7 Subiect 10 
Y B A B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A C B X Y 
X A C C X X 
X B C B Y X 
X B B B X Y 
X B B C X Y 
X B B C X Y 
X B B B X X 
X B B B 
Y B A B X X 
Y D D B X X 
Y B E B X Y 
y c c c x Y 
Y B C C X Y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
Y B C C Y Y 
Y B B B 
Y B A B Y Y 
Y C B C X X 
X A A C Y X 
Y A A C Y Y 
Y C C A Y Y 
Y C C A Y Y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c x x 
X B C C 
Subiect 4 Subiect 6 Subject 8 
X A A B X X 
X B B C X X 
X A B C X X 
X A A A X Y 
Y C A A X Y 
Y C B C X Y 
Y C B C X X 
X D B C X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B 
X A A B X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A 
Y D* A A Y X 
Y C B B Y Y 
Y C A B X X 
X A A B X X 
X D E A Y X 
Y A E A Y Y 
Y A E B Y Y 
Y C D E X X 
X h- D D B X X 1x 
D D B 
I sent signals that I will 
play Y and in the long 
run we will all earn 99. 
CA First subsession's data 
Subiect 13 
X B D A Y X 
X A C B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B 
Subiect 17 
Y B B A Y Y 
Y C B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A A B X X 
X A A B X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A 
Subiect 14 
Y B A A X X 
Y C B B X Y 
Y C C B Y Y 
Y C C B Y Y 
Y C C B Y Y 
Y C C B Y Y 
Y C A B Y Y 
Y C B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B 
Subiect 15 
X D* B B X Y 
X E* A C Y Y 
X E* A C Y Y 
X E* C C Y Y 
X B E C X Y 
X B E C Y Y 
Y A C C Y Y 
Y A C C Y Y 
Y A C C Y Y 
Y A C C 
*I wanted to maximise 
Subiect 21 
X A D A Y Y 
X B C B X Y 
Y A A B X X 
Y A C B Y Y 
Y C C B Y Y 
Y C E B Y Y 
Y C C B Y Y 
Y A C B Y X 
Y A A B X X 
X A A B 
Subiect 19 
Y B B C X Y 
Y C B C Y Y 
Y C B C X Y 
Y C B C X Y 
Y C B C Y Y 
Y C B C Y Y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c 
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Subiect 23 
X A A C Y Y 
X B A C x y 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B 
Subiect 24 
X A B A X Y 
X A B A X X 
X B A C Y X 
X A C C Y Y 
X A C C Y Y 
X A A C Y X 
X A A A Y Y 
X A C A X Y 
X A B B X Y 
X A B B 
Subiect 22 
Y B A B X Y 
Y C B C Y Y 
Y C B C X Y 
Y C B C X Y 
Y C B C Y Y 
Y C B C Y Y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
Y C A A Y Y 
A A 
my payout. 
CA First subsession's data 
Subject 16 Subject 18 Subiect 20 
X A B A X X 
X B C B X X 
X B C C Y Y 
X B C C Y Y 
X B A A X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B 
Phase 3 
Y B A A Y Y 
Y C E B Y Y 
Y C E A Y Y 
Y C E A X Y 
X B E A X X 
X B E A X X 
X B A A X X 
X B A A X X 
X B A A X X 
X B A A 
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X D A B Y X 
X B B C X Y 
Y A B C X Y 
Y A B C X Y 
Y A B A X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B 
Subiect I Subiect 2 Subiect 3 
Y B A B X Y 
Y C B C Y Y 
Y C B A X X 
X A B A X X 
X A B A X X 
X A B A X X 
X A B A X X 
X A B A X X 
X A B A X X 
X A B A 
X A B B X X 
X A C B Y Y 
X A C A X X 
X B B B X Y 
X B B B X Y 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B 
Y B B A Y Y 
Y C C B Y X 
X A C B X X 
X A A B X X 
X A A B X X 
X A A B X X 
X A A B X X 
X A A B X X 
X A A B X X 
X A B 
Subiect 4 Subject 5 Subject 12 
Y B B B Y Y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c 
Y B B B Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A X X 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A B A 
Y B B B Y Y 
Y E* C C Y Y 
Y E* C C Y Y 
Y E* C C Y Y 
Y E* C C Y Y 
Y A C C Y Y 
Y A C C Y Y 
Y A C C Y Y 
Y A C C Y Y 
Y A A C 
* Ensure Y trend contin- 
ues. 
C-1 First subsession's data 
Subject 6 
X A B B X X 
X B C C X X 
X B A C X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A C X X 
X A C C X X 
X A C A X X 
X A A A 
Subject 9 
D D Y Y 
A E X X 
A C X x 
A A X X 
A A X X 
A A X X 
A C X Y 
A C X Y 
A C X X 
A A 
Subject 8 
Y B A B Y Y 
Y C B C X X 
Y C B E Y Y 
Y C B C Y Y 
Y C B B X X 
Y C B B Y Y 
Y E* B C Y Y 
Y C B C X X 
X D B C X Y 
X B B C 
Subject 10 
Y B B A Y X 
Y C C B Y Y 
Y C A B Y Y 
Y A A B X X 
X B A A X X 
X B B B X X 
Y C C B Y X 
Y C C B Y X 
Y C A B X X 
X B C B 
So that we can all go to 
Y and eaxn 120. 
Subiect 13 
Y B A A Y X 
Y C B B X X 
Y C B C X Y 
Y C B C Y Y 
Y A B A X X 
X A B A X Y 
X A B C X Y 
Y C B C X Y 
Y C B C Y Y 
Y C B C 
Subiect 14 
X B C B X X 
X A C B X X 
X A C C Y Y 
x A c c y y 
X A C A Y X 
X A A A X X 
X A A C Y Y 
X A C C Y X 
X A C C Y Y 
X A C C 
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Subject 7 
Y B A B X X 
Y C B C Y Y 
Y C B D X X 
X D B B X Y 
X D B B X X 
X D B A X X 
Y C E A X X 
Y C B C Y Y 
Y C B C X X 
X E* B A 
Because the other two 
in this group do not un- 
derstand cooperation, 
number two is just 
stupid. 
Subject 11 
X A B B Y Y 
X A B A Y Y 
X A A A X Y 
X B A A Y Y 
X A A A Y X 
X A A A X X 
X A C C Y Y 
X A A A Y Y 
X A A A X X 
X A C A 
Subiect 15 
X D B B Y Y 
X B C A X X 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A E Y X 
X E* A E X X 
X E* A E X X 
Y A E E X Y 
Y A C B Y X 
Y A C B Y X 
Y A C B 
Týied to maximise my 
payoff. 
CA First subsession's data 219 
Subject 16 Subiect 17 
Y B B A Y Y 
Y C C B Y X 
Y C C B Y X 
Y C C B Y X 
Y C C B Y X 
Y C C B Y X 
Y C C B Y Y 
Y C C B Y Y 
Y C C B X X 
X B B B 
Y B B C Y X 
Y C C B Y X 
Y C C B Y X 
Y C C B Y X 
Y C C B Y X 
Y C C B Y Y 
Y C C B Y Y 
Y C C B Y Y 
Y C C B X X 
X A A A 
01-I- , -: )UDJeCt Z4 
X A B B X-Y- 
X B C C y y 
X B C C Y y 
X B E C Y Y 
X B E E Y Y 
X B A A Y Y 
X A A A Y Y 
X A E E Y Y 
X A A A Y Y 
X A B B 
- 
Subject 18 Subject 21 Subject 19 
Y B B B Y Y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c 
Y B B B Y Y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c 
Y B B B Y Y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c 
Subiect 20 Subiect 22 Subiect 23 
Y B B B X Y 
Y A C C Y Y 
Y A C C Y Y 
Y A C C Y Y 
Y A C C Y Y 
Y A C C Y Y 
Y A C C X Y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c Y X 
X E B C 
Y B B B Y Y 
Y C A C Y Y 
Y A A C Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y C A A Y Y 
Y C A C X X 
X B B C 
Y B B B Y Y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c x Y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c x Y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c x Y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c x Y 
Y C B B 
C. 2 Second subsession's data 
C. 2 Second subsession's data 
Phase 4 
Subject I Subject 4 Subiect 9 
y c c c y y 
Y C A C X Y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c x x 
X A B A 
y c c c y y 
Y C C A X Y 
y c c c x Y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c x x 
X B B B 
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y c ý5 c- --y -Y 
Y A C C Y X 
Y A C C Y Y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c x x 
X B B B 
Subiect 2 Subject 5 Subject 10 
X B C C Y Y 
x c c c x Y 
X B B C X X 
X B B C X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B 
Y A B C Y Y 
Y A B C X Y 
X A B C X X 
X A B C X X 
X A B A X X 
X A B A X X 
X A B A X X 
X A B A X X 
X A B A X X 
x B A 
Y C B C X X 
Y C B C X X 
Y C B B X Y 
Y C A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X A A A 
Subiect 7 Sub-iect 8 Subject 12 
X D A C X X 
X B A C X X 
X B A C X Y 
X B C A X X 
X B A A X X 
X D A C X X 
X B A A X X 
X B A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A 
X D D C X Y 
X D D C X X 
X D D C X Y 
Y C D A X X 
X D D C X X 
X B D C X X 
X B D B X X 
X D B B X X 
X D B B X X 
X D B_ B 
Y E* E E X X 
Y E* E E Y X 
Y A E E X X 
X A E C Y X 
Y A E A X X 
Y C A A X X 
X A A A. X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A 
* All Y greater than all 
C. 2 Second subsession's data 
Subiect 3 
X A B B X X 
Y E* E B Y Y 
Y C C B Y Y 
Y C B B X X 
Y C B B Y Y 
Y C B B X X 
X A A B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A A B 
Subiect 6 
X A A A X X 
X A C A X X 
X A C A X X 
X A C A X X 
X A C A X X 
X A C A X X 
X A A C X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B 
To change the be- 
haviour of the others. 
Subiect 13 
Y C A C X Y 
Y C A C X Y 
Y C A C X Y 
Y C A B X X 
X A A B X X 
X A A B X X 
X A A B X X 
X A A B X X 
X A A B X X 
X A A B 
Subject 16 
X B C C X X 
X B C C Y Y 
X B C C Y Y 
X B C B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B 
Subiect 14 
y c c c y y 
X B C C Y Y 
X B C C X Y 
X A C A X Y 
X A C A Y X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B 
Subiect 17 
y c c c y 
Y C B A Y Y 
Y C B A Y Y 
Y C E A X Y 
Y C A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A 
221 
Subiect 11 
X B B B X X 
X A C A X X 
X A C A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A E A X X 
X A E A Y X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A 
Subject 21 
Y C C B Y Y 
Y C C B Y X 
Y C C B Y X 
X A C B X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
A A 
Subiect 22 
Y A C C Y Y 
Y A B C Y Y 
Y A B A Y Y 
Y A A A X Y 
X A A A Y Y 
X A B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B 
C. 2 Second subsession's data 
Subiect 15 
X E* E E X X 
X E* A E X X 
X E* A E X X 
X A A E X X 
X A A E X X 
X A A E X X 
X A A E X X 
X A A E X X 
X A A E X X 
X A A E 
Su4iect 18 
X B B B X x 
X A B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B 
*I expected everyone 
else to chose X. 
Su4iect 19 
Y C B B X Y 
Y C B B X X 
Y C B B X X 
X A B B X X 
Y C B B Y X 
Y C B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B 
Subiect 20 
X D C B Y Y 
X E C B Y X 
X A C B Y X 
Y E B B X X 
X E C B X X 
X A C B X X 
X E B B X X 
X E B B X X 
X E B B X X 
X B B 
Phase 5 
Subiect I 
Y C B B X X 
Y A B B Y X 
Y C B B X X 
X A A B X X 
Y C A B Y X 
Y C A B X X 
Y C A B X X 
X A A B X X 
X A A B X X 
X A A B 
Subiect 11 
X B C E Y Y 
X A C A X X 
X A C A Y X 
Y A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A 
222 
Subiect 23 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B 
Subiect 24 
X B A B X X 
X B A B Y X 
X B A B Y X 
X B A A X X 
X B A A X Y 
X B A B Y X 
X B D B Y X 
X B D B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B 
Subiect 5 
X A C A X X 
X A C A X X 
X A E A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A C A Y Y 
X A C A X X 
X A C A X X 
x A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A 
C. 2 Second subsession's data 
Subject 2 Subiect 9 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
Y C A A Y Y 
Y C A A X X 
Y C C B 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c x x 
X B C C 
Subiect 12 
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y E* E E y -Y 
Y E* E E y y 
y E* E E y y 
Y E* E E Y Y 
Y E* E E Y Y 
Y E* E E Y Y 
Y E* E E Y Y 
Y E* E E Y Y 
Y E* E E Y Y 
Y E* E E 
* All Y greater than all 
X. 
Subject 3 Subj ect 7 Subject 10 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
Y C B C Y Y 
Y C B C X Y 
X A A A X X 
X A A A 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
X B C C Y Y 
X B C C X X 
X B A C X X 
x A A A 
Y B B B Y Y 
Y B B B Y Y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
Y C C B Y Y 
Y C C B Y X 
Y A A B X X 
X B B B 
Subject 4 Subject 6 Subject 8 
Y C B C X X 
Y C B C X Y 
Y C B C Y Y 
Y C B D X X 
X D B D X X 
X B B B X X 
X D B C X X 
X D B C X X 
X D B C X X 
X D B C 
X A C C X X 
X A C C X X 
X A C C X X 
X A C A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A C X X 
X A B C X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B C 
Y C C D Y X 
Y C C D Y X 
Y C A D X X 
X B C B X X 
X D B A X X 
X A A A X X 
Y C A A X X 
Y C A A Y X 
A A A Y Y 
y C A A 
C. 2 Second subsession's data 
Subject 13 Subject 17 
y c c c Y X 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
Y C A A Y X 
y c c c y y 
y c c c Y X 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
Y C C B 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
Y C A A X X 
y c c c y y 
Y C C A Y X 
Y C C E Y Y 
Y C C E X X 
X A C E 
Subject 23 
224 
y C c c Y X 
y c c c y y 
y C C c y y 
y C C c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c x Y 
X C A 
Subject 14 Subject 21 Subject 24 
X B B B Y X 
X B A B X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X Y 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A 
X D B B Y Y 
X D C B X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A Y Y 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A E E X X 
X A E E X X 
X A E E 
X B B D X X 
X B C D X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B D X X 
X D B D X X 
X D B B X X 
X D B B X X 
X B B B 
Subiect 15 Subject 19 Subject 22 
Y A E A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A X X 
X A A B 
Y C A C Y Y 
Y C A C Y Y 
Y C A C Y Y 
Y C A C Y Y 
Y C A C Y Y 
Y C A C Y Y 
Y C A C Y Y 
Y C A C Y Y 
C A C Y X 
y C A B 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c x x 
X B B C 
C. 2 Second subsession's data 
Subject 16 Subiect 18 
X B C B X X 
X B C B Y X 
X B C B Y X 
X B C B Y X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B 
Y C B B Y X 
Y C B B X Y 
Y C B B Y X 
Y C B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B 
Phase 6 
Subject 20 
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X E, I B C ýx 
' 
y- 
! Xýý EI B C ý X X 
IXI EI B C X X 
! Xý El iB C X Yý 
X D B A X x 
X D B A X X 
X D B B X X 
X D B B X X 
X D B B X X 
X D B B 
Subject I Subject 2 Subject 3 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
Y C A C X X 
Y A A A X X 
X A A A 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A X X 
X B B B 
y c c c x Y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
Y A A E Y X 
Y C A E X X 
X A A E 
SuNect 4 Subj ect 5 Subject 12 
Y c c Y Y 
y c c y y 
y c c y y 
y c c y y 
y c c y y 
y c c y y 
y c c y y 
y c c y y 
Y C E X X 
X B B 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
'Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A B X X 
X A A A 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c x x 
X A A A 
C. 2 Second subsession's data 
Subiect 6 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B X X 
X A A A X X 
X B B B X X 
X B A B X X 
X A B A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X D A A 
Subiect 9 
X A A A X X 
A A X X 
A A X X 
A A X X 
A A X X 
A A X X 
A A X X 
A A X X 
A A X X 
A A 
Subiect 8 
Y C D D Y Y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
Y C C B Y Y 
Y C B B Y Y 
Y C B B X X 
X A B C 
Suhiect 13 
c c x Y 
c c y y 
c c y y 
c c y y 
c c y y 
c c y y 
c c y y 
c c y y 
C B X X 
B B 
Subiect 10 
X B B A X X 
Y A A A Y X 
Y C A A Y Y 
Y C A C Y Y 
Y C A C Y Y 
Y C A C Y Y 
Y C A C Y Y 
Y C A C Y Y 
Y C A C Y Y 
Y C B B 
Subiect 14 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
Y A C C Y X 
Y A C B Y X 
X B A B 
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Subject 7 
X A A A ý: X x 
X A A A1 X X: 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X A A A X X 
X D A A X X 
X D A A 
Subiect 11 
Y C C B Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
X B A A 
Subiect 15 
Y E* E E Y Y 
Y E* E E Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A E Y X 
X A A E X X 
X A E E 
I expected everyone 
else to choose Y. 
C. 2 Second subsession's data 
Subject 16 
Y C B C Y Y 
Y C B C X Y 
Y C B C X X 
y c c c y y 
c c y y 
c c y y 
c c y y 
c c y y 
c c y y 
C B 
Subject 17 
X B C C Y y 
X A C C Y Y 
X A C A X Y 
Y C C A Y X 
Y C C A Y X 
Y C C A Y X 
Y C C A Y X 
Y C C A Y X 
Y C C A Y X 
Y C C A 
Subject 18 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c y y 
y c c c x x 
X A C C 
Su4ject 20 
y c c c y y 
Y E C B Y Y 
Y C C B Y Y 
Y C C B Y Y 
Y C C B Y X 
X D B A X Y 
Y E B A X Y 
Y A C A X X 
X D B A X X 
X E B B 
Subject 21 
Y E E E Y Y 
Y A E E Y Y 
Y A E E Y Y 
Y A E E Y Y 
Y A E E Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A A Y Y 
Y A A C X X 
X A A A 
Subject 22 
y c c c y y 
Y C C B Y Y 
Y C C B Y Y 
Y C C B Y Y 
Y C C B X Y 
X A B C X X 
X A C C Y X 
X A C B X X 
X A B B X X 
X A B B 
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SuNect 24 
Y A A B Y Y 
Y A A B Y Y 
Y C A B Y Y 
y C A A Y Y 
y C A A y y 
y C A A Y Y 
y C A A y y 
y C A A y y 
Y C A A Y Y 
X B C C 
Subject 19 
Y A A C Y Y 
Y A A C Y Y 
Y A A C Y Y 
Y A A C Y Y 
Y A A C Y Y 
Y A A C Y Y 
Y A A C Y Y 
Y A A C Y Y 
Y A A C X X 
X A B B 
Subject 23 
Y A A A Y Y 
X B C C X X 
X B C C X Y 
X B C C X Y 
X B C C Y Y 
Y A A A Y X 
Y C A A X X 
X B A C X X 
X B B B X X 
X B B B 
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